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1 Regions in the European Union 
 
 
 
What is the role of regions within the EU’s complex multi-level system? What options does a 
region have to promote its interests upwards in the European institutions? Does the EU pose a 
threat or an opportunity for legislative regions? Has the central government lost its gate-keeper 
role in EU politics? Do regions by-pass their central government in order to pursue their own 
objectives? These questions have been addressed by theorists and practitioners alike for some 
time now. Some argue that regions do have the possibility to defend their regional interests on 
their own whereas other strongly reject that claim. As this puzzle is still unsolved, this study raises 
the question of which is the preferred lobbying strategy of legislative regions in Germany and the 
United Kingdom in order to generate new empirical data about the actual role of legislative 
regions in the EU. It will be argued that the legal and constitutional situation of the EU and the 
Member State constitutes the key factor which impacts on the respective lobbying strategy. 
The European Union has been and continues to be an interesting but also controversial 
subject for study which raises many exciting questions that are of practical and theoretical 
relevance. Undeniably, the EU has an immense impact on our daily lives in almost all 
circumstances; people can travel freely since frontiers have been removed, tourists can pay with 
the same currency since the Euro has been introduced, students can easily spend a semester 
abroad since the EU has started the Bologna process, cities in different Member States have 
increasingly established partnerships since the EU has set up financial programs and so forth. All 
of these examples provide evidence that the EU has made life more convenient for most citizens. 
Yet, where there is light, there is also shadow. One should not overlook that the EU also 
renders policy-making more complicated, that many citizens simply do not understand the various 
mechanisms happening behind closed doors, that voters feel alienated from their representatives 
in the European Parliament, that people do not trust EU institutions due to package-deals and 
horse-trading among political leaders in the Council, or that citizens gain the impression that the 
Commission is a ‘bureaucratic octopus’ trying to harmonize every sphere of their lives. 
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European integration has not only have a huge impact on the daily lives of EU citizens but 
also on the political system of the Member States. Before the latter decided to delegate more 
national legal competences upwards to the European level in the late 1980s, the respective 
national context constituted the fundamental domain in which legislation was initiated as well as 
adopted. This has changed significantly as the following figures demonstrate: during the German 
Bundestag’s 15th electoral period (2002-2005), 385 laws were passed, of which 139 (36%) had 
emanated from European decisions (Moore and Eppler 2008: 497). To be more precise, in 
environmental policy 81% of national law stemmed from the EU. With regard to agricultural 
policy, 75% of domestic policy originated from the EU arena. In further areas such as economic 
policy (40%), transport (40%), family policy and health (37%), figures were lower, but still 
considerable (Töller 2006: 7). In the UK, the Minister of State in the Cabinet Office stated in 2004 
that “about half of all measures that imposed non-negligible costs on business, charities and the 
voluntary sector originated from the European Union” (UK Cabinet 2004). Moreover, in the case 
of Scotland, the Scottish Government as well as academics stress that over three-quarters of the 
work of the Government and the Parliament is, to some extent, influenced by decisions taken in 
Brussels (Scottish Executive 2010; MacPhail 2008: 19).  
As it will be demonstrated later, the political evolution of the European Union also affected 
legislative regions to a large extent. Before the next chapter turns to the common concerns of 
citizens, politicians and experts about the EU’s increased competences, it is necessary to clarify 
the term ‘region’ in general and ‘legislative region’ in particular. Depending on the respective 
subject, a region can be understood in a variety of ways. The academic literature differentiates 
between: 
1. economic regions 
2. historical/ethnic regions 
3. administrative/planning regions 
4. political regions (Keating and Loughlin 1997: 2-5).  
According to these scholars, the first term relates to economic criteria only such as 
industrialized/de-industrialized, and urban/rural, or it refers to sectors like car-building or 
defense-industry. Historical/ethnic regions, on the contrary, solely include territories which 
exhibit strong cultural and linguistic characteristics that differ from the rest of the nation state. 
The third category, administrative/planning regions, is considered somewhat artificial because 
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that territory was only created in order to acquire EU regional funds. Political regions, however, 
possess an elected parliament which is capable of passing laws that have a direct impact on the 
public goods and services provided to citizens in the specific territory. Nowadays, these kinds of 
regions are also called legislative or constitutional regions. In this regard, Jeffery states that the 
term ‘legislative’ was added in order to distinguish those regions that have a special interest in 
European integration from other kinds of regional and local authority across the EU (Jeffery 2005: 
180). Legislative regions enjoy more political power than administrative regions, and therefore 
they probably see European integration in a different light. On the one hand, European integration 
could be considered negatively because it takes regional competences from the legislative regions 
away, but on the other hand, these regions have more instruments at their disposal to influence 
European policy-making, so that they have the possibility to participate in establishing something 
unique. 
 
1.1 Common concerns about the EU’s competences 
Since the enforcement of the Single European Act in the late 1980s, several legislative regions 
have not been very enthusiastic about European integration, because they have lost some of their 
political competences to the European level (Eppler 2009: 195-197; Schmuck 2009: 489). In 
particular many German Länder did not welcome this development at all and attempted to 
prevent future competence transfers by using a variety of strategies (Sturm 2006: 42; Bauer and 
Börzel 2010: 257). But not only the Länder started to grumble about these inconvenient 
consequences; politicians and citizens in the EU alike raised concerns about democratic 
legitimacy. They felt that they had no say in European policy-making because many projects are 
worked out in the backrooms of the national government and EU institutions without their 
inclusion (Urban 2011: 78). Against this backdrop, the Commission introduced initiatives and 
published White Papers with the objective to explain its intention and projects better to the wider 
public: 
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“The White Paper proposes opening up the policy-making process to get more people and 
organisations involved in shaping and delivering EU policy. It promotes greater openness, 
accountability and responsibility for all those involved. This should help people to see how 
Member States, by acting together within the Union, are able to tackle their concerns more 
effectively” (European Commission 2001: 3) 
 
Yet, a short while ago a survey of the European Commission (2008b) provided evidence that, 
apparently, this goal has not been reached. About 59% of 27.000 interviewees stated that their 
local and regional authorities are not sufficiently included into the European decision-making 
process. Additionally, Open Europe, an influential think tank located in Brussels, London and 
Berlin, has recently published an article which reveals that German voters have little faith in the 
European Parliament and the European Commission, which are only trusted by 33% and 30% 
respectively. In contrast, the German government, the Bundestag and Landtag are trusted by 44%, 
45% and 48% respectively. 1  On top of that, there is strong support for devolving political 
competences from the EU to the Member State in Germany. About 50% of the interviewees claim 
that the German government should back the efforts by some European politicians to decentralize 
powers from the EU to the national, regional or local level (Open Europe 2013). Figure 1 provides 
an overview of some areas and cases in which German citizens’ call for less EU involvement. 
Bearing the regional focus of this research project in mind, it is interesting to note that 61% of the 
voters state that decision over regional development subsidies should only be made by national 
politicians rather than at the EU-level. 
 
                                                          
1 The latest Standard Eurobarometer in 2014 (82.3) has generated similar results: only 34% have trust in 
the EU as a whole whereas 48% and 49% of the German interviewees have trust in the national government 
and national parliament, respectively.   
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Figure 1: Support for decentralization of power by German voters 
 
Source 1: Open Europe 2013 
 
This is not a pure German phenomenon, though. Citizens and leading political figures in other EU 
Member States sympathize with that attitude also. In Great Britain, Prime Minister David Cameron 
has recently started the debate about Britain’s membership in the EU. In his speech on 23 January 
2013, he claimed that the EU is supposed to undergo seven major changes including the possibility 
that power can “flow back to the member states” because “[C]ountries are different. They make 
different choices. We cannot harmonise everything. For example, it is neither right nor necessary 
to claim that the integrity of the single market, or full membership of the European Union requires 
the working hours of British hospital doctors to be set in Brussels [...]” (Cameron 2013).  
On top of that, not only ‘normal’ citizens or politicians but also very prominent experts attack 
the EU. The former Federal President of Germany Roman Herzog, criticized the sachwidrige 
Zentralisierung (‘improper centralization’) of the EU since civil servants in the Commission, Council 
members and the European Court of Justice have continued to enhance the EU’s competences in 
various policy fields although European legislation was considered unnecessary in many cases. 
Perhaps even more interestingly, he stated that the institutional structures of the EU constitute a 
de facto abolition of checks and balances and, because of this situation Herzog raises the question 
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of whether the Federal Republic of Germany can be called a parliamentary democracy at all 
(Herzog and Gerken 2007). In similar vein, Günther Verheugen, who served as European 
Commissioner for Enlargement from 1999 to 2004 and then as Commissioner for Enterprise and 
Industry from 2004 to 2010, stated that “Cameron has said what many people think in Europe. 
The EU is not perceived by the vast majority of citizens as a helpful benevolent partner, but as an 
insatiable competence-octopus…“ (Ross 2013: 3; own translation). 
Bearing these facts and ‘heavy weights’ opinions in mind, it does not come as a surprise that 
many journalists (Gammelin 2013: 18; Pérez 2013: 14; Assheuer 2013: 42), political scholars 
(Paskalev 2009: 4; Nassehi 2013: 2; Heidbreder 2013: 2; Grabbe 2013: 2) and even MEPs such as 
Gianni Pittella (Accardo 2012) or Daniel Hannan (2012) have repeatedly reported or claimed that 
the EU suffers a democratic deficit. Although this expression has been used very often, a single 
definition does not exist. One reason for this relates to the fact that there is not just one notion 
of democracy either: “the notions of democracy differ largely on what they stand for positively 
and are variously presented as core ideas, preconditions, elements, indicators, factors or 
outcomes of it. Some notions are value-related, such as ‘freedom’, ‘tolerance’, and ‘legitimacy’, 
while others are process-related, such as ‘elections’, ‘majority rule’ and ‘responsiveness’” (van 
Schendelen 2010: 321). Despite these various notions, it is still possible to identify some general 
aspects about the democratic deficit that not only exist in academic papers but also in newspaper 
articles.  
First, the executive has been strengthened whereas national parliaments have experienced 
a loss in control (Follesdal and Hix 2006: 534) and as a consequence some describe the system of 
the EU as executive federalism (Dann 2003; Habermas 2014: 90). Because of this development 
some commentators have even warned against the “post-democratic way” (Crouch 2008) which 
stands for private bi- or trilateral agreements made by a few national leaders of economic 
powerful Member States behind closed doors. Habermas states that for a democratic Europe, a 
concentration of power in an intergovernmental committee of the Heads of State or Government, 
who force their will upon national parliaments, is the wrong way (Habermas 2011a). Second, the 
European Parliament is too weak compared to the Council and needs more rights (Habermas 
2013; Barroso 2012: 9). Although each EU Treaty – particularly the Treaty of Lisbon – has 
continuously enhanced the EP’s rights, it still does not possess the same political competences in 
every policy field. Moreover, some experts have stressed that especially since the EU’s sovereign 
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debt crisis the institutional balance has shifted to the European Central Bank, an institution which 
is not elected or controlled by the people. In particular (but not only) citizens in the Southern part 
of Europe cannot avoid the impression that it is not their elected politicians but technocrats who 
determine the welfare and future of their country (Sauga, Schult and Seith 2013: 66-69; Zydra 
2013: 21). Third, the EU is simply ‘too distant’ from voters (European Commission 2001: 1; 
Follesdal and Hix 2006: 536) which means that many citizens are of the opinion that the European 
Commission and the European Parliament are not aware of the problems in peoples’ everyday 
lives. Even the Commission itself has acknowledged this issue and admits that “The Union is often 
seen as remote and at the same time too intrusive” (European Commission 2001: 1) so that it 
becomes clear that some form of action is necessary. Organizations such as the Assembly of 
European Regions particularly refer to the last mentioned aspect of the democratic deficit when 
they argue that people would place more trust in the EU institutions if regions were more involved 
in the EU’s decision-making processes (Assembly of European Regions 2006). 
Bearing the citizens’ and experts’ opinions about the EU’s competence as well as the overall 
impact of European legislation in mind, scholars have raised the question of how far legislative 
regions are able to participate in the EU’s decision-making processes since they constitute an 
integral part of the EU Member State’s political system. Not only that they have to implement EU 
legislation but, as it will be shown below, they are of utmost importance for citizens for a variety 
of reasons. With regard to the regions’ participation possibilities, scholarship has already set out 
the diverse official and unofficial channels through which regions are capable of voicing their 
concerns and representing their interests. However, the vast majority of studies have focused on 
EU Cohesion and Structural policy solely which means that it is not known which lobbying strategy 
appears to be most promising in other policy fields. Do regions primarily cooperate with other 
non-governmental actors to put pressure on the decision-makers in EU Competition policy? Do 
regions merely work through their central government in order to influence legislation in EU 
Environmental policy? Do regions regularly act on their own behind their government’s back in 
EU Education policy? Since researchers have not come up with empirical evidence in this regard, 
this study examines the preferred lobbying strategy of German and UK legislative regions in EU 
Competition, Environment and Education policies. This puzzle sets the theoretical frame for 
political scholars to theorize and argue about the functioning of the European Union. 
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1.2 Different perspectives on the functioning of the European 
Union 
Most prominently, the functioning of the EU is distinguished between state-centered and actor-
centered perspectives. The first view is taken by liberal intergovernmentalists whereas the latter 
is adopted by multi-level governance proponents. Depending on the theoretical lens, the potential 
influence of legislative regions differ significantly. To be more specific, the EU might constitute a 
“threat” or an “opportunity” (Jeffery and Rowe 2012: 749) which means that either regions do 
not have a say in EU politics or that they are capable of promoting their interests within the EU 
institutions autonomously.  
Most importantly, liberal intergovernmentalists stress that states are rational actors whose 
national preferences are primarily determined by weighing the economic costs and benefits - 
actors who “calculate the utility of alternative courses of action and choose the one that 
maximizes (or satisfies) their utility under the circumstances” (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 
2009: 68). With regard to EU day-to-day politics, Moravscik disaggregates international 
negotiation into a causal sequence of three phases: national preference formation, interstate 
bargaining and institutional creation (Moravcsik 1993: 482).2  
The liberal theory of national preference formation emphasizes that many different interest 
groups compete at the national level for getting their interests accommodated and that the 
respective Member State’s political system and the balance of power between the competing 
organizations determine which actors are capable of making their voice heard. In contrast to 
realist approaches, the state is not perceived as a ‘block-box’ with fixed preferences, but “foreign 
policy goals of national governments are viewed as varying in response to shifting pressure from 
domestic social groups, whose preferences are aggregated through political institutions” 
(Moravscik 1993: 481). According to Marcur Olson’s logic of collective action (1965), liberal 
intergovernmentalists believe that particularly small organizations with very specific interests are 
more likely to mobilize their members and bring pressure to the national government compared 
to large organization with diffuse interests (Steinhilber 2012: 148).  
                                                          
2  With his third identified phase ‘institutional creation’, Moravscik also explained why national 
governments delegated power to supranational institutions. Since this research project concentrates on 
daily EU politics and on the functioning of the EU, this aspect will be left out.  
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As soon as the stage of interstate bargaining begins, it is assumed that preferences are stable 
and that power has been explicitly or implicitly delegated to the national government (Moravcsik 
1995: 625). Consequently, the central government is treated as a unitary actor and inner-state 
organizations are not able to change the government’s position anymore (Moravscik 1998: 22). 
For that reason, liberal intergovernmentalists state that the national government acts as a gate-
keeper between the domestic and the international level. Especially, the assumptions for this 
stage make clear that “governments are the most fundamental actors” (Moravcsik 1995: 613) in 
the EU decision-making process and that the influence of autonomous actions by legislative 
regions vis-à-vis European decision-makers is considered negligible or marginal at best. 
Yet, Multi-Level Governance proponents adopt a different understanding as regards the 
functioning of EU: “we are seeing the emergence of multilevel governance, a system of continuous 
negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers - supranational, national, 
regional, and local - as the result of a broad process of institutional creating and decision 
reallocation that has pulled some previously centralized functions of the state up to the 
supranational level and some down to the local/regional level” (Marks 1993: 392). This statement 
illustrates that MLG neglects the state-centered perspective of liberal intergovernmentalists and 
adopts an actor-centered view instead which aims to take the complex processes of European 
decision-making into account.  
Although those scholars do not dispute the national government’s importance in EU politics, 
they stress that the Member State no longer monopolizes European-level policy making, because 
“policy-making in the EU is characterized by mutual dependence, complementary functions and 
overlapping competencies” (Marks et al. 1996: 372). To put it differently, political competences 
are shared between various levels of government so that they cannot be exercised by the Member 
State alone. Transport or environmental policy, for example, are dealt with by the local, regional, 
national as well as a European level. Since competencies in most other policy fields are not 
distributed perfectly either among these various levels, one can detect a lack of institutional 
hierarchy. 
In contrast to liberal intergovernmentalism, the European Commission is not regarded as an 
agent of the Member States but it constitutes an independent actor who possesses the monopoly 
to initiate European legislation: “Regulatory initiative at the European level is demand driven 
rather than the product of autonomous supranational action, but the demands come not only 
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from governmental leaders. A significant number of initiatives originate in the European 
Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee, regional governments, and various private and 
public-interest groups” (Marks et al. 1996: 357). Furthermore, regional actors are in the position 
to create direct relations with European institutions, especially the European Commission with 
the consequence that they might even act behind the back of the national government (Hooghe 
and Marks 1996). Evidently, some regions are very active at the European level, invest many 
resources and engage in EU decision-making so that scholars argue that regional governments do 
have the possibility to get their regional interests accommodated and do by-pass their central 
government (Tatham 2008: 493). Finally, the latest EU treaties have significantly increased the 
legal power of the European Parliament and several scholars consider it a real co-legislator vis-à-
vis the Council in most policy fields (see chapter 2). As a consequence, the Member State has lost 
its veto-player position in EU politics for the vast majority of areas.  
 To sum up, liberal intergovernmentalism illustrates that regional governments’ can only 
affect EU decision-making by working through the Member State. The EU strengthens the national 
government in comparison to its legislative regions, because it possesses a gatekeeper role in 
international negotiations in general and in EU politics in particular. Although liberal 
intergovernmentalists accept that there is a multitude of actors at the European level which may 
even act independently, those theorists underline that “member states are ‘masters of the treaty’ 
and continue to enjoy pre-eminent decision-making powers” (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 
2009: 68). Applying the initial ‘threat/opportunity’ distinction from a liberal 
intergovernmentalist’s perspective, one can only conclude that the EU poses a threat since the 
national government is the ‘pre-eminent decision-maker’ and autonomous lobbying activities by 
regional governments are not effective. MLG, however, concludes that “state executive 
dominance is eroded in the decision-making process [...]” (Marks et al. 1996: 361) and grants 
subnational authorities room for independent, efficient lobbying activities to influence policy-
making at the European level. Consequently, the EU would constitute an opportunity for regions.  
This chapter has demonstrated that this project is of theoretical significance for political 
scholars. If we want to better understand the functioning of the European Union, more research 
has to be carried out. Additionally, this work is also valuable for practitioners and the general 
audience because it will provide new insights of the daily work of German and UK regions’ 
representation offices in Brussels, thereby revealing the real role of legislative regions in the EU 
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decision-making processes in EU Competition, Environment and Education policy. As it has been 
shown above, many people express severe concerns about the functioning of the EU and have the 
impression that their region is not sufficiently included in the EU machinery. The following chapter 
is going to highlight the increasing importance of regions so that one better understands the 
rationale why research in this area has still not come to an end. 
 
1.3 The increasing importance of regions within the European 
Union 
Irrespective of the theoretical lens, this chapter provides political, cultural and economic 
arguments that will depict the crucial role of regions in the EU today. Politically, regions have 
experienced an upgrade by the European Commission through structural and cohesion policy; 
they constitute a level of government which remains close to citizens, and they are entities with 
high political responsibility which have to implement EU legislation. Culturally, they are the 
bastion of regional identity providing guidance and orientation in an increasing globalized world. 
Economically, only this level is able to offer products or services that meet the local and regional 
demand of consumers (Thiele 2006: 35). The remainder will elaborate on these arguments and 
show that especially because of globalization and European integration, topical research is not 
supposed to focus on the Member State solely but on the regional level as well. 
 
1.3.1 Political significance 
First and foremost, the majority of regions have been strengthened by the Commission’s 
structural and cohesion policy because it allowed regional governments to establish direct 
contacts with European actors, thereby by-passing the national level. Scholars note that the 
Commission was not only willing to include regions in this policy field but that it was also ambitious 
to strengthen the regional level by creating a system of multi-level governance (Hooghe and 
Marks 2001: 90; Greenwood 2011: 182). In this regard, the Commission initiated and financed 
various regional cooperation programs that aimed to reduce administrative, legal and physical 
barriers, to create mutual trust and understanding for local-regional issues and to establish EU-
wide regional networks for spreading best practice in administrative and economic 
modernization. It should be emphasized, however, that this argument refers specifically to 
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administrative regions. In comparison to legislative regions, which used to have more policy 
competences and political participation rights before the Treaty of Maastricht came into force, 
administrative regions had little to lose if political competences were delegated to the European 
level. In fact, some Member States such as Greece and Ireland did not even have a regional level 
before the EU decided to set up structural and cohesion policy programs in the mid-1980s. But in 
order to be eligible and apply for regional funding, these Member States started to create a 
regional level of government in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Hooghe and Marks 2001: 196; 
Quinn 2010: 244-245). The bottom line is that administrative regions experienced an upgrade 
through the evolution of the European Union whereas many legislative regions perceived this 
development negatively (Börzel 2002: 53).   
A second political argument, which exemplifies the increased role of regions, relates closely 
to the EU’s previously mentioned remoteness: the proximity to citizens. Because regions are much 
closer to people than the national or European level, these entities are portrayed as the bridge 
that communicates Europe to and reconnects it with its citizens (Bourne 2006: 2). Regions are not 
only familiar with the citizens’ regional needs but they also maintain a direct relationship with 
them so that an inclusion of regions in the EU decision-making process would help to formulate a 
more appropriate agenda for meeting regional specific issues. Although the European Commission 
is aware of the fact that it needs to better explain its policies and objectives to the European 
audience and provide more readable and legally clear texts (European Commission 2006), it lacks 
the financial resources and appropriate channels to do so. Also in this context, regions can be seen 
as a key to overcome this issue. 
On top of that, regions are also authorities with a high degree of political responsibility 
because they are expected to implement EU legislation. Especially those regions with law-making 
power are considered to play a crucial role in this regard: not only are they a democratic elected 
institution enjoying a high level of legitimacy, but they also possess far reaching expertise in many 
policy fields which affect the EU citizens’ daily lives to a large extent. Therefore, not including 
regions in EU decision-making processes could cause feasibility problems which places the EU in 
poor light.  
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1.3.2 Regional identity  
Scholars stress that Europe experienced a wave of regionalization since the 1980s because in 
times of globalization and European integration, the nation state has lost its political power and 
people feel a strong attachment to their region (Wirsching 2012: 299-308). As a result regional 
identities became more important: “European integration, by partly dismantling the nation states, 
encourages individuals to cease believing that they live in nation states, and accepting that they 
are Bretons, Lombards, or Bavarians” (Kirsch 1995: 67). As a consequence, both phenomena gave 
regionalist and separatist parties across Europe a boost; typical examples include Convergència i 
Unió (Convergence and Union) in Catalonia and the Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea (Basque Nationalist 
Party) in the Basque Country in Spain, the Scottish National Party in the UK as well as Partito Sardo 
d’Azione (Sardinian Party of Action) in Sardinia. These parties attempted to use the EU as a means 
for promoting their regional profile and some even hoped to find an ally in the European 
Commission for their separatist ambitions (Hepburn 2010).  
Spain provides several inner-state examples that demonstrate the increasing significance of 
regional identity. After Franco’s death in 1975, Spain drew up a new constitution with 
decentralized elements which granted political competences to the Communidades Autónomas 
(autonomous communities) and for most of the Spanish regions these newly granted powers were 
fundamentally important for establishing institutional stability and democracy. The Basque 
Country, however, was not satisfied with this status. Uncompromisingly, Basque public opinion 
stated that their identity is Basque not Spanish and referred to their antique history and language 
which is not linked to the Roman culture. Although the central government was willing to confer 
special autonomy concessions to the Basque Country, radical left parties strove for independence 
and claimed that the Basques were ‘persecuted more than before’ so that “ETA’s actions were 
considered not only justified but necessary”(Conversi 1997: 149). 
Additionally, one could also detect a strong sensation for secession in Catalonia which, 
however, is not only based on cultural-historic and political reasons but also on economic 
disadvantages. Between 1939 and 1975, General Francisco Franco prohibited Catalan and other 
regional cultural traditions in order to “annihilate or assimilate” (Zelik 2014: 22; own translation) 
Basque and Catalan cultural communities. Due to these and other historic suppressions, many 
Catalans started to fight for an autonomous region with far-reaching political-economic rights and 
some even for an independent state. However, neither the conservative Partido Popular nor the 
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socialist party Partido Socialista Obrero Español were willing to support them and when the 
Spanish national government cut Catalonia’s budget in light of the financial crisis in 2008, the 
regionalist left-party Convergència i Unió began to mobilize Catalan citizens for independence 
(Zelik 2014). 
 Since regionalist and separatist parties usually do not enjoy the support of the national 
government, the may “use” (Hepburn 2010) Europe to project their demands upwards to the 
European level. If, for example, an ethnic or linguistic minority feels disadvantaged or even 
oppressed, it may use the EU to attract international media attention; thereby putting pressure 
on the national government. In case a regionalist party forms a government with its national party, 
the latter may be compelled to accommodate some of the regional demands. The bottom line is 
that due to the increasing importance of regionalist and separatist parties, the national party is 
challenged more often so that the chances of meeting regional interests are likely to be higher. 
  
1.3.3 Satisfying local and regional demands 
Although some experts in the 1980s such as Theodore Levitt (1983) believed that consumers 
would mainly purchase globally-standardized products in the future - thereby making local and 
regional particularities superfluous - the opposite has become true. Indeed, sociologists have 
recently clarified that globalization does not necessarily override locality (Robertson 1995: 26) and 
that one can detect a regionalization of economic relations (Thiele 2006: 37).  
Nowadays, consumers get quickly fed up with standardized products of international 
companies and demand special quality which suits their local and regional desires (Crocoll et al. 
2013: 26). Scientists have invented the term ‘Glocalization’ to describe that phenomenon. 
Robertson defines glocalization as “the tailoring and advertising of goods and services on a global 
or near-global basis to increasingly differentiated local and particular markets” (Robertson 1995: 
28). Consequently, as glocalized products or services valorize locality, large as well as small- and 
medium-sized companies are able to maximize their profit. To put in simple words: companies 
have to ‘think global, but act local’.  
This slogan goes hand in hand with the ‘new regionalism’ literature which not only 
emphasizes the increasing importance of local production systems but also the “social 
construction of the region as a key element in success or failure” (Keating 2003: 52). In this regard, 
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regions in the EU constitute crucial spaces or entities with particular demands. Some regions 
possess a very strong identity and culture so that every business man needs to be aware of local 
and regional differences. People outside of Germany, for example, usually think of ‘Lederhosen’, 
the ‘October-Fest’ or ‘BMWs’ when they are asked about German culture or products, not 
knowing that all these associations are only rooted in one Southern German region.  
A further argument strengthening the economic importance of regions is a recent 
phenomenon called ‘cluster’-building. By definition clusters are “geographic concentrations of 
interconnected companies and institutions in a particular field” (Porter 1998: 78). The strengths 
of cluster-building lay in the resulting spill-over effects such as facilitating the recruitment of new 
employees in the respective region, improving the coordination with the corresponding suppliers, 
intensifying cooperation among similar companies and so forth. Therefore, the spatial proximity 
of diverse companies can be regarded as a useful strategy to come up with new ideas and 
innovative products as Scott and Storper emphasize: “Specialized regional economies are the 
locus of intense knowledge spillovers, thereby helping to raise the rate of innovation, and to 
promote long-term growth” (Scott and Storper 2003: 583). 
This last argument is particularly relevant for legislative regions because – in contrast to 
administrative regions such as French ones – they enjoy political competences which can be used 
for the promotion of regional economic development. In this regard, the basic objective would be 
to create optimal legal and infrastructural conditions for such clusters (Thiele 2006: 39). To sum it 
up, it is fair to conclude that over the last decades the regional level has constantly gained 
importance for business interests. 
 
1.4 Regional engagement in the European Union 
After having elaborated on the importance of regions at present, this chapter is going to focus 
specifically on the diverse EU activities of regions from the 1980s until the coming into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.3 It will be shown that regional engagement has increased significantly 
during this period and that the regions’ EU activities went hand in hand with the unrealistic wish 
to establish a regional or ‘third level’. After leaving this hope behind at the end of the 1990s, 
                                                          
3 The reason for not going back to the 1970s or 1960s is due to the fact that regions were not concerned 
about EU policies at that time. 
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regions started to adopt a rather pragmatic and professional approach on European integration 
with the objective to make their voice heard in EU-decision making. 
 
1.4.1 The 1980s - the roots of regional engagement  
The first time the regional level experienced an upgrading was in the 1980s when the European 
Commission initiated its regional policy programs in order to enhance social cohesion and reduce 
the economic disparities among Europe’s regions. Later on, this aim was legally codified in the 
Single European Act which stated that “The European Regional Development Fund is intended to 
help redress the principal regional imbalances in the Community through participating in the 
development and structural adjustment of regions whose development is lagging behind and in 
the conversion of declining industrial regions” (Article 130c). As a result, regions were allowed to 
play an active role in a specific supranational policy area for the first time of the European Union. 
The 1980s were of particular importance for the regional level and 1984 can be considered 
the founding year of the sub-state representations in Brussels: Birmingham City Council opened 
the first office. It did not take long for other sub-national authorities to follow suit so that from 
that date onwards political scholars have detected a quick burgeoning of regional representation. 
Approximately ten years later, the number of offices reached more than 140 (Jeffery 1997b: 183) 
and today it is estimated that there are more than 200 sub-state offices (Huysseune and Jans 2008: 
1). Experts highlight that it is impossible to name their exact number because, contrary to Member 
State permanent representations, embassies or consulates, sub-national offices do not enjoy 
official status which means that they need not to register (Tatham 2010: 81).4 
The principal reason for the establishment of regional representations in the second half of 
the 1980s was the Single European Act which resulted in an increasing transfer of political rights 
from the national to the European level (Jeffery 1997b: 189). Already at that time several 
subnational authorities in a number of Member States enjoyed far reaching political competences 
in several policy fields but this development curtailed their power. By opening representation 
offices in Brussels, German and Austrian regions, for example, hoped to gain direct access to the 
EU institutions in order to receive information about upcoming EU legislation as soon as possible 
                                                          
4  This observation specifically refers to administrative regions because almost all legislative regions 
maintain an individual webpage about the activities of their representation office or provide at least contact 
details on the regional government’s webpage. 
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(Hooghe and Marks 2001: 87). The basic objective for them was to prevent any future transfers 
of power whereas administrative regions such as the British ones were not concerned about this 
aspect but focused on acquiring EU funds instead. The UK devolution process in the 1990s, 
however, led to newly elected regional authorities and granted far-reaching political rights to 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland which, in turn, resulted in a change of activity for the 
respective regional representation offices. New structures had been created in order to be better 
able to meet the new regional government’s objectives.   
Other regions considered the German Länder experiment a test case for their own regional 
engagement and subsequent regional representations were capable of building upon the 
precedents set by the German ‘pioneer’ group (Rowe 2011: 48). From the late 1980s until the 
second half of the 1990s German representation offices fought a long battle against the federal 
government for the right to establish direct contacts to the EU institutions. They argued that EU 
policy-making could no longer be treated as foreign policy – a policy area under which the 
competences were reserved to the federal government – because most laws stemming from the 
EU seriously impacted on the regional level (Bulmer et al. 2000: 34). The federal government, on 
the other hand, argued that such a Nebenaußenpolitik (‘auxiliary foreign policy’) would jeopardize 
the federal government’s scope of negotiation in the Council since Germany would not speak with 
one but 17 voices. Yet, this perception was over exaggerated. After some time and some quarries 
the German government accepted the Länder EU engagement and both actors started to work 
with instead of against each other.  
 
1.4.2 The 1990s - sub-national mobilization and wishful thinking 
With the enforcement of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, a significant transfer of political power 
from the national to the European level took place. This development, in turn, heavily affected 
regional competences. In Germany, for example, the Länder lost competences in higher 
education, occupational training, environmental protection, transport, regional policies as well as 
regional promotion of economic development, agriculture, organization of the market in wine, 
and public finance (Laufer and Münch 1998: 289-290). In order to sign the Maastricht Treaty the 
German national government depended on the consent of the Länder, though. That was the very 
first time that regions could express their claims and national as well as European leaders needed 
to take their demands into consideration. As a result, the subsidiarity principle was incorporated 
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into the Treaty, the Committee of the Regions was established, and regional access to the Council 
of Ministers was granted. According to former Art. 5 (TEC) the subsidiarity principle specifies that 
“In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the 
scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community”.   
The possibility of regions to build strong coalitions and to shape the European integration 
process initiated the debate about a ‘third level’, a ‘Europe of the regions’ and ‘sub-national 
mobilization’. The basic vision of the third level was that there has to be a state level beneath the 
level of the nation-state in every Member State (Jeffery 1997a: 69), so that the regional level 
officially forms part of the EU’s decision-making processes next to the first (EU) and second 
(nation-state) levels. Furthermore, strong regional players such as the German and Belgian regions 
associated with the slogan ‘Europe of the regions’ a federal Europe in which, ultimately, regions 
might become even more important actors than the national government itself.  
In hindsight, these expectations can only be regarded as excessively exaggerated or wishful 
thinking. Because of the sub-national diversity in the EU a homogenously constructed ‘Europe of 
the regions’ could not become reality since sub-national structures “remain strongly influenced 
by national traditions and reflect the differences of bureaucratic cultures and political conflict of 
the past” (Bullmann 1996: 4). For that reason, scholars have rephrased the slogan and, at present, 
one speaks of “Europe with... some of... the regions” (Greenwood 2011: 176; emphasis in the 
original). The word ‘some’ in this slogan already indicates that not all regions possess the 
capability or the will to engage in the complex European decision-making processes. Particularly 
legislative regions stand out in this context because they have to transpose and implement 
European laws in the end. In order to increase regional cooperation in economic and cultural 
matters and to forge political ad-hoc coalitions more quickly, these regions founded the 
Conference of European Regions with Legislative Power (REGLEG) in 2000. REGLEG members are 
obliged to actively participate in policy formation in accordance with the principles of subsidiarity. 
Another crucial objective is to raise the visibility, awareness and understanding within the EU-
institutions of the specific features of regions with legislative power. The vast majority of 
administrative regions, in contrast, simply do not engage in that sort of activity because they are 
poorly endowed with personnel and financial resources. Besides, they lack the legislative 
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competences so that regional engagement at the European level is primarily focused on fund 
acquisition and information gathering. In comparison with their legislative counterparts, the 
frequency of legislative lobbying activities is very low (Interview 1, Interview 2, Interview 3). 
The role of legislative regions in the various negotiation rounds on the Treaty of Maastricht 
and the foundation of regional representation offices in Brussels from the mid-1980s onwards 
have also triggered the debate about ‘subnational mobilization’. This concept contradicts the 
state-central model which highlights the gate-keeping role of the Member State as well as their 
monopoly of representation. Liesbet Hooghe was among the first scholars who described this new 
phenomenon: “Subnational mobilization is perceived as an instrument to challenge state power, 
and to support supranational authority. Subnational units compete with member states for 
control over territorial interest aggregation” (Hooghe 1995:4). This is not to say, however, that 
subnational mobilization erodes the central role of the Member State in EU decision-making but 
complements it (Hooghe 1995: 5). The debate about subnational mobilization led to a variety of 
studies examining the diverse formal and informal channels of interest representation which will 
be described in detail in chapter 2. 
As the EU had gained more political competences in the 1990s new actors appeared on the 
surface and the debate on multi-level governance began. This debate focuses on whether a 
“reconfiguration of governance” (Jeffery 1997c: 212) in the EU could be detected since regions 
could engage on European politics autonomously because they had established an own direct 
route to the institutional architecture of the EU via their regional representations. From that 
moment on, several scholars have continued to point out that the EU also provides a ‘window of 
opportunity’ for some regions because, theoretically, they could simply by-pass their central 
government through their EU networks (Ansell et al. 1997: 350). Especially in EU Regional policy, 
there are several cases which demonstrate that regions made use of this strategy because their 
central government reduced national regional spending (Hix and Hoyland 2013: 176).  
Depending on the respective type of regions – administrative or legislative – regional 
mobilization can take various forms such as securing information on EU developments, explaining 
the region’s viewpoint on policy issues to EU decision-makers, or even attempting to influence EU 
policies (Jeffery and Rowe: 2012). With regard to the latter one has to differentiate between 
‘downloading’ and ‘uploading’-activities. The first term describes the process in which the 
representation office collects as much relevant information and data as possible and forwards it 
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to its home base where the regional government decides upon the positioning. The second term 
refers to provide European Commissioners, MEPs and all civil servants of the various committees 
with regional specific information. To put it in other words: uploading includes interest 
representation or lobbying. Especially this activity is of high importance for legislative regions if 
they attempt to make their voice heard and get their interests accommodated at the European 
level. It does not come as a surprise that interest representation entails high costs so that not 
every legislative region is financially in the position to lobby for its interests. Although it is difficult 
to exactly quantify the representation’s added-value, it is fair to assume that they are of utmost 
importance for regions to make their voice heard - otherwise it is hard to explain why Bavarian 
officials purchased and renovated a property the beginning of the 21st century the whose costs 
amounted up to approximately 30 million euros.  
 
1.4.3 The 21th century - more power for regions?  
Since most legislative regions had come to terms with the fact that their initial hopes and 
expectations of the early 1990s about their future role in EU decision-making were far too 
ambitious and unrealistic, a more differentiated and pragmatic approach towards the European 
Union was considered necessary in the beginning of the 21th century. Due to massive allegations 
of corruption and the subsequent resignation of the Santer Commission, the Commission as a 
whole was ‘stigmatized’ and lost credibility in the eyes of many citizens so that it needed to regain 
trust. Therefore, regions argued and still argue that by ensuring a stronger inclusion of the regional 
level in the EU decision-making processes, the Commission would not only increase its legitimacy 
but could also counter the often cited EU’s remoteness from citizens - a “win-win-situation” for 
both actors (Interview 10; Interview 15). 
As a response, the Commission published a White Paper on Governance in which it 
acknowledged that “Many people are losing confidence in a poorly understood and complex 
system to deliver the politics that they want. The Union is often seen as remote and at the same 
time too intrusive” (European Commission 2001: 1) and continues to write that “there needs to 
be a stronger interaction with regional and local governments and civil society” (European 
Commission 2001: 2). From that moment on, the Commission even increased its efforts to include 
small interest organizations in its decision-making process by offering financial support to non-
profit organizations such as Eurolink Age, European Federation of National Organisations Working 
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with Homeless, European Disability Forum, European Anti-Poverty Network and many more 
(Buholzer 1998: 240).  
Since the Lisbon Treaty came into force in December 2009, the formal position of regions 
have been somewhat strengthened. To begin with, the principle of subsidiarity was expanded and 
now it explicitly refers to the regional and local level: “Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas 
which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at 
central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the 
proposed action, be better achieved at Union level” (Art. 5 (3) TEU; emphasis added). In similar 
vein, the Protocol on subsidiarity has been re-formulated so that the Commission is formally 
obliged to take into account “the regional and local dimension of the action envisaged” (Protocol 
No. 2, Art. 2). Next, the Committee of the Regions is legally able to appeal the European Court of 
Justice if it believes that the subsidiarity principle has been breached. Finally, Lisbon has 
established an early-warning system for national parliaments concerning the compliance with 
subsidiarity. If a certain threshold has been reached, national parliaments are able to object to a 
Commission’s legislative proposal so that, in turn, the Commission needs to review it. Afterwards, 
it has to decide if it maintains, amends or withdraws the respective proposal.  
Yet, in how far these changes really increase the position of regions in practice remains a 
controversial issue. On the one hand, political scholars assess that this framework “sets a 
potentially significant new marker in the relations between the EU’s key agenda setter and the 
local and regional level” (Jeffery and Rowe 2012: 756). This assumption, however, is rather vague 
because it does not refer to any clear measurable criteria that allows to trace improvements in 
reality. Legal experts, on the other hand, stress that the region’s capacity to challenge EU actions 
is rather weak because they are still treated by the EU Courts as ‘non-privileged applicants’ which 
requires applicants to be either addressed, or directly and individually concerned by the 
respective EU initiative (Thies 2011: 25-27). Since these conditions constitute an “almost 
insurmountable obstacle to conferring the capacity to impugn EU acts on individual, as well as on 
the Länder, which are on the same level from this point of view” (Panara 2011: 149), one can 
conclude that regional governments still face huge difficulties in defending their political 
competences by referring to the subsidiarity principle.  
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That the Committee of the Regions has been granted a new right can certainly be considered 
an increase in the importance of that body. However, this change might have a symbolic rather 
than political relevance because litigants are almost never successful in challenging EU actions on 
the basis of a potential breach of the subsidiarity principle. The reason for this is due to the fact 
that it is very easy for the European Commission to explain why action at the Union level is 
necessary. In general, EU legislation attempts to reduce or even eliminate different legal 
regulations in the Member States in order to guarantee uniform standards as regards consumer 
protection, product safety, environmental conditions and so forth. Since a single Member State is 
literally not in the position to achieve these transnational objectives, the necessity for EU action 
is hard to deny (Nuffel 2011: 66). Besides, the Commission always pays close attention to include 
passages in its legislative proposals that underline the necessity of taking action at the European 
level so that it appears rather unlikely that the Union Courts will uphold potential claims.  
As regards the last mentioned innovation - the establishment of an early-warning system for 
national parliaments concerning the compliance with subsidiarity - is also debated controversially. 
Some scholars believe that this instrument could indeed strengthen the regional level (Kiiver 2011; 
Cooper 2012) whereas others call into question its effectiveness due to the lack of parliamentary 
human resources and the very short scrutiny time of only eight week (Paskalev 2009; Knutelská 
2011). What we can be sure of, though, is the relatively limited use of the EWS. Several studies 
have demonstrated that, evidently, national parliaments are rather reluctant to make use of it 
(Raunio 2010; de Wilde 2012; Hefftler 2013). 
 
1.5 State of the art and research relevance 
In the early and mid-1990s, studies on EU activities of regional governments started to grow 
considerably.5 At that time, Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks - who are among the most known 
political scientists in this subject - published several articles about the increasing importance of 
sub-national actors and the diminishing role of nation states in EU decision-making (Hooghe and 
Marks 1996). They argued that the EU provided the regions with various external channels to 
upload their interests autonomously, thereby by-passing their central government and 
                                                          
5 It should be noted, however, that the German academic literature had already dealt with that topic much 
earlier (Birke 1973; Oberthür 1978; Hrbek and Thaysen 1986).    
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influencing EU decision-making. Since then much time has passed and academia has come up with 
many competing and sometimes contradicting results. Due to this lack of consistency it is difficult 
to make any general remarks about recent findings because scholars stress that the actual role of 
regions in EU decision-making depends upon a lot of factors.  
To begin with, the policy field itself is of major significance (Swenden 2009: 122). In this 
regard, the majority of studies have been limited to regional and cohesion policy (Jeffery and 
Rowe 2012: 752) which provided evidence that regional governments did challenge their central 
governments in terms of establishing direct networks with the European Commission. Yet, since 
this policy area is founded on the principle of partnership, the increasing communication and 
negotiations with civil servants of the Commission do not come as a big surprise. Besides, one 
cannot easily transfer conclusions in cohesion policy to other policy areas because most EU policy 
fields do not exert (re)-distributive but regulatory effects. As a consequence, experts highlight that 
since “[...] regional political exchange with the supranational level is largely confined to EU 
structural policies [...] we need more analyses that investigate the differential impact of regional 
political choices on a larger portfolio of relevant policies” (Bauer and Börzel 2010: 260). 
Apart from specific policy analyses, scholarship has also attempted to produce rather general 
results concerning the regions Europafähigkeit (fit for Europe) for Treaty amendments (Große 
Hüttmann 2005; Bauer 2006; Eppler 2008) and EU day-to-day politics (Jeffery 1997d; Lambertz 
and Große Hüttmann 2009; Sturm and Dieringer 2010). With regard to the former, scholars have 
noted that constitutionally strong regions such as the German, Austrian and Belgian ones have 
recently changed their ‘let us in’ to a ‘leave us alone’ attitude (Jeffery 2003: 107; Jeffery 2004b: 3) 
which means that they do not demand further participation rights in negotiations about Treaty 
amendments but aim to protect their regional competences at the national level instead. In EU 
daily politics, however, some scholars consider legislative regions as active players who might 
even by-pass the Member State government which means that they are able to defend their 
individual interests autonomously. Ansell et al. argued that regions could “potentially mobilise 
Commission support against their own national government” (Ansell et al. 1997: 350). In similar 
vein, Tatham found that the opportunity structures provided by the European level “do represent 
important channels of access that regions can use in an attempt to influence the EU policy 
process”(Tatham 2008: 493) and concludes that “[R]egions thus have the opportunity to become 
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relevant players in the Brussels policy-game even against the wishes of their sometimes 
inextensible gate-keeping central governments” (Tatham 2008: 511).  
Other authors, however, are rather skeptical about these assumptions and believe that 
working with the central government yields much greater results (Pollack 1995: 362-363; Bache 
1997; Jeffery 1997c: 205; Nagel 2009: 86; Swenden 2009: 122). For bringing structure to this 
debate, Rowe advocates not to treat regions all around Europe as similar actors but to 
differentiate between legislative or constitutional regions on the one hand, and administrative or 
non-constitutional regions on the other (Rowe 2011). She states that, in contrast to legislative 
regions, administrative regions do not represent an elected regional government but a very 
heterogeneous subscriber base of profit and non-profit organizations with the result that they 
“are often implementing only a weakly articulated strategic policy agenda on Europe” (Rowe 
2011: 96). Consequently, if scholars are about to making general conclusions about subnational 
authorities’ lobbying strategies, they should make very clear reference to legislative regions since 
in most circumstances they are the active participating players that seek to make their voice 
heard.  
However, legislative regions do not represent a homogenous group of actors either, which 
renders any analysis even more complicated. Generally, EU regions in federal states such as 
Germany, Austria and Belgium enjoy more political competences and inner-state mechanisms to 
defend their interests and coordinate their actions than regionalized states such as the UK, Italy 
or Spain. Bearing these differences in mind, it is not surprising that recent studies which laid their 
focus on one Member State solely have provided competing results. The German Länder are 
usually seen as the most active players in the multi-level system of the EU which make immense 
efforts to promote their interests directly upwards the EU institutions (Knodt et al. 2009). The 
Spanish Communidades Autónomas, in contrast, rely on the Member State’s government in most 
circumstances (Nagel 2009: 86) whereas Scotland works sometimes with and sometimes without 
the central government (Swenden 2009).  
These different results and sometimes contradicting findings are the primarily reason why 
the debate among multi-level governance proponents on the one side and liberal 
intergovernmentalists on the other has still not come to an end. Whereas the latter argue that 
the Member State government is the most crucial actor in EU decision-making which holds a gate-
keeper position, the former challenge this claim and assume that regions could by-pass their 
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central government and pursue their own individual objectives. Since some authors demonstrated 
that some regions are capable of representing their interests autonomously at the European level 
without involving their national government, the question arises of how often and in which policy 
fields regions actually make use of this method. Until the present day, no scholar has provided 
hard evidence about regular state by-passing. Undeniably, several regions do that once in a while. 
But is it possible to make general conclusions if this action is the exception rather than the rule? 
This work argues that multi-level governance proponents can only seriously challenge liberal 
intergovernmentalists if at least two conditions are met. First, state by-passing has to be observed 
also in areas other than EU Structural and Cohesion policy. For that reason, this research project 
conducts a comparative study between German and British legislative regions in three distinctive 
EU policy fields: Competition, Education and Environmental policies. Second, state by-passing 
needs to occur on a regular basis which means that the majority of regions within a Member State 
defend their interests without the support of the central government if the European Commission 
takes action. It will be argued that no region alone is able to influence EU decision-making 
substantially so that the basic criterion for defending regional interests is coalition-building with 
other actors in order to increase the region’s political weight. If we find evidence that regions 
prefer to forge a coalition with their regional counterparts rather than with the central 
government in one of these policy fields, the theoretical debate gets fresh impetus. 
Another issue in this subject is that experts disagree about the most important variable that 
affects regions’ EU lobbying activities. Scholarship has identified a number of factors which 
somehow impact on the capability of regions to influence EU decision-making to their favor (see 
chapter 3). As a consequence, research went down different paths without providing irrefutable 
results that could have convinced liberal intergovernmentalist theorists. For example, some 
authors focused exclusively on the region’s size (Nielsen and Salk 1998), whereas others 
concentrated on the region’s financial situation (Bouwen 2002: 10) or its cultural distinctiveness 
(Hepburn 2010). If we are aware of the most crucial variable in this context, future research can 
bundle its efforts and come up with new evidence. 
Bearing in mind that scholars could not detect this key variable, this study makes use of 
insights from a different discipline: organizational sociology. By applying the situational approach, 
one of the most popular approaches in organizational sociology, this work is going to show that 
the legal and constitutional situation of the EU and the Member State is by far the most essential 
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variable for hypothesizing whether a region works with or without the national government. 
However, since the situational approach lacks explanatory power concerning actor behavior, it 
will be combined with rational choice theory. 
To sum it up, this work makes at least three contributions to the on-going debate of 
subnational activity at the European level that has emerged over the last decades: 
1. To scrutinize the preferred lobbying strategy of legislative regions with different legal 
provisions in EU Competition, Environmental and Education policy generates new data about 
potential state by-passing. Depending on the final results, this project provides further arguments 
for liberal intergovernmentalist or Multi-level governance proponents. 
2. Tackling this field of study from a different discipline (organizational sociology) adds a new 
theoretical perspective to the subnational mobilization literature which might provide fresh 
impetus. The situational approach offers a clear analytical structure which helps to elaborate on 
the relationship between the various identified factors in MLG and lobby group literature, thereby 
revealing the most important variable that influences regions’ lobbying activities. As a result, 
future researchers can bundle their efforts and find new evidence more easily. 
3. A comparative study of German and UK regions allows to draft a more accurate picture 
about the role of legislative regions in the EU. Moreover, illustrating whether these regions 
interact with or without their central government on the one hand and with the European 
institutions on the other in three different policy areas helps to better grasp the complexity of EU 
decision-making. Depending on the final result, this research may provide arguments for or 
against the alleged EU’s democratic deficit (EU’s remoteness to citizens). 
 
1.6 Case selection and methodology 
The principle reason for this comparison constitutes the different legal-political situation of both 
Member States which results in distinctive inner- and outer-state information as well as 
participation rights in EU decision-making. Due to the German constitution the German Länder do 
not only possess comparatively strong legal political competences but they also dispose of many 
formal mechanisms and instruments to coordinate their views and to get their interests 
accommodated at the national as well as the European level. Since the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, the EU has been provided with a precise catalogue of competences which is divided 
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into exclusive, shared and supporting competences. This differentiation resembles very much the 
situation of the German Länder and other regions and allows to develop clear-cut hypotheses 
about the cause-effect-relationship between the legal and constitutional situation of the EU and 
the Member State (independent variable) on the one hand and regions’ lobbying strategies 
(dependent variable) on the other. It will be argued that the national government is the most 
important coalition-partner in EU Environmental policy because it constitutes a potential veto-
player through the Council of Ministers. In EU Education and Competition policy, in contrast, other 
actors such as inner- and outer state regions are considered more important to defend regional 
interests because either the regional or the European level enjoys exclusive competences so that 
the national government does not hold a veto-player position. Due to the constitutional situation 
of the German Länder, state by-passing is expected in both EU Education and Competition policy. 
Ideally, a comparison between constitutional and non-constitutional regions might appear 
very fruitful; however, almost no administrative region engages in legislative lobbying. Scholarship 
has already shown that the vast majority of those regions concentrate on gathering information 
and fund acquisition. In fact, administrative regions from England, Hungary and Czech Republic 
have reduced their staff or have even closed their representations (Interview 1) so that this study 
needs to select a Member State whose regions are not equipped with strong legal-political 
competences in EU affairs: the UK. The still ongoing devolution process has resulted in a 
asymmetry between Northern Irish, Scottish and Welsh competences and although these regions 
enjoy comparable political competences vis-à-vis their German counterparts, their legal situation 
is a different one. EU politics is treated as reserved matter to the central government which means 
that these regions only possess shared political competences in this matter. Admittedly, this 
renders a UK/Germany comparison somewhat difficult in EU Education policy since the German 
Länder do not lose their exclusive competences in this regard.6 However, this policy field is still 
very interesting because it scrutinizes the only situation in which some regions are legally as strong 
as the Member State government or perhaps even stronger. In case that by-passing occurs only 
in this policy area but not in EU Competition and Environmental, one may hypothesize that 
exclusive legal competences are the key criterion for state by-passing. As a consequence, state 
by-passing of UK legislative regions is expected in EU Competition policy. 
                                                          
6 By the way, this situation applies to every EU Member State. At present, only the German Länder possess 
constitutionally guaranteed political rights in EU Education policy.  
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The reason for choosing EU Competition, Environmental and Education policy is because the 
EU as well as the regions possess different legal political competences in those areas. Whereas 
the European Commission can autonomously carry out legislative initiatives in most competition 
policies without formally involving the Member States through the Council of Ministers, it is 
dependent upon their consent in EU Education. In fact, the German Länder even have exclusive 
competences in this policy field so that they de jure hold a veto-player position. As regards 
environmental policies, both actors are equipped with shared political competences so that no 
one can impose the will on the other. In total, these three policy fields cover all possible legal 
manifestations of the EU’s and the Member State’s constitutional situation. 
In carrying out this research project, I have collected and evaluated data and information 
from three different types of sources. First, academic publications as regards the multi-level 
system of and interest representation in the EU; second, newspaper articles about lobbying and 
democratic concerns; and third, semi-structured expert interviews with policy advisers, heads and 
deputy heads of office of the regions’ representations in Brussels about (a) collecting and 
exchanging information with other organizations, (b) the procedures of lobbying and the 
mechanisms facilitating coalition-building as well as (c) the necessity, frequency and relevance of 
coalition-building. 7  Apart from the regions Saxony and Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, all 
representation offices of the German and UK regions were willing to take part in this study. For 
each policy field, I sent an interview request to the theses offices so that the maximum number 
of interviews for one representation was three. Due to human resource constraints or vacancies, 
only two persons could be interviewed in the case of Hesse, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia and one 
person in the case of Saarland, Berlin, Hamburg, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. In total, 
the overall number of interviews with civil servants from the representation offices were 27. On 
top of that, one director of the Committee of the Regions, four policy advisers of the European 
Commission, three MEPs and three advisers of the Permanent Representation of Germany were 
interviewed in order to cross-check the final results. The interviews were conducted between 
February and July 2014. The interviewees requested discretion so that quotes and references 
need to be anonymized. 
 
                                                          
7 See Appendix A and B 
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1.7 Operationalization 
With regard to independent variable, the following three specifications at the EU and national 
level will be applied:  
1. Exclusive legal political competences 
2. Shared legal political competences 
3. Supporting or no legal political competences. 
 
At the European level, the Treaty of Lisbon has established a division of competences between 
the EU and its Member States. Article 2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
specifies that:  
 “When the Treaties confer on the Union exclusive competence in a specific area, only the 
Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the Member States being able to do so 
themselves only if so empowered by the Union or for the implementation of Union acts.” 
(Art. 2 (1) TFEU) 
 “When the Treaties confer on the Union a competence shared with the Member States in a 
specific area, the Union and the Member States may legislate and adopt legally binding acts 
in that area. The Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union 
has not exercised its competence. The Member States shall again exercise their competence 
to the extent that the Union has decided to cease exercising its competence.” (Art. 2 (2) TFEU) 
 “In certain areas and under the conditions laid down in the Treaties, the Union shall have 
competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of the 
Member States, without thereby superseding their competence in these areas.“ (Art. 2 (5) 
TFEU) 
 
Table 1 provides an overview about the major policy fields and the EU’s corresponding legal 
competences. 
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Table 1: The division of competences between the EU and its Member States 
Exclusive competences of the EU Shared competences of the EU Supporting competences of the EU 
Customs union Internal market Protection and improvement of human 
health 
Establishment of the competition rules 
necessary for the functioning of the 
internal market 
Social policy, for the aspects defined in 
the TFEU 
Industry 
Monetary policy for the Member 
States whose currency is the Euro 
Economic, social and territorial 
cohesion 
Culture 
Conservation of marine biological 
resources (fisheries policy) 
Agriculture and fisheries (except 
conservation of marine biological 
resources) 
Tourism 
Common commercial policy Environment Education, vocational training, youth 
and sport 
 Consumer protection Civil protection 
Transport Administrative co-operation 
Trans-European networks  
Energy 
Area of freedom, security and justice 
Common safety concerns in public 
health matters, for the aspects defined 
in the TFEU 
Source 2: Piris 2010: 75 
 
In Member States that consist of legislative regions, the regional government may possess 
exclusive, shared or no legal political competences in a policy field. Concerning the two selected 
Member States of this research project - Germany and the UK - we can state that their legislative 
regions enjoy different legal-political competences. The Länder have a variety of exclusive and 
shared competences which allow them to even represent the national government in the Council 
of Ministers in a few matters. The legal situation of the legislative regions in the UK, however, is a 
bit more complicated. Since chapter 4 will specifically discuss this aspect in detail, it is sufficient 
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to state that Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland enjoy exclusive competences  in a number of 
policy fields but cannot act independently at the EU level because European affairs remains a 
reserved matter to Westminster Parliament. 
 As regards the operationalization of dependent variable (lobbying strategies of legislative 
regions), this work differentiates between four possible specifications which will be worked out 
in chapter 3 in detail: 
1. Coalition-building with the national government 
2. Coalition-building with regions of the same Member State 
3. Coalition-building with regions from other Member States 
4. Coalition-building with non-governmental actors such as private companies, associations, 
labor unions, NGOs and so forth 
The last three stated strategies are of particular importance because if a legislative regions decides 
to apply one of them, it ‘by-passes’ the national government.  
 
1.8 Structure 
The structure of my study is as follows. Chapter 2 illuminates the lobbying phenomenon in the 
European Union. It not only works out why lobbying is perceived in a negative way by many 
citizens but also why politicians depend on external advice. Afterwards an overview of different 
understandings of the term ‘lobbying’ and a concrete definition thereof will be provided. Then, I 
turn to the main addressees of lobbying in the EU decision-making process: the European 
Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament and the Committee of the 
Regions. I describe how the EU institutions’ structure, composition and legal tasks affect the 
lobbying efforts and strategies of organizations. Since each institution demands different kinds of 
information, it is argued that every lobbyist needs to be perfectly familiar with these features in 
order to make its voice heard. The final section sets out when and how the Commission starts to 
work on a draft and at what stage this draft becomes a legislative proposal which, in turn, is then 
sent to the Parliament and the Council. Since most EU legislation is adopted by the ordinary 
legislative procedure, which sets both legislators on equal legal footing, the various policy stages 
are laid out. This chapter shows that lobbying needs to be carried out as early as possible for 
getting interests accommodated; otherwise it will be extremely difficult for any lobby organization 
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to make substantial changes when the European Commission has already formulated and 
forwarded its legislative proposal to the other EU institutions. 
Chapter 3 outlines how regional governments in EU decision-making can be conceived of in 
an organizational sociology context. The three main paradigms of organizational sociology – 
organizations as a rational system, organizations as a natural system, and organizations as an open 
system – are introduced and it is argued that the open system perspective fits best to the focus 
of this research project. Next, the situational approach, one of the most popular approaches of 
the open system paradigm, is applied in order to identify the factor which makes state by-passing 
most likely. In this regard, Multi-Level Governance and lobbying literature lists a couple of crucial 
factors which have an impact on a region’s capability to influence EU policy-making to its favor, 
but until now scholars have not attempted to relate these factors to a region’s lobbying strategies 
so that their individual importance in this matter is not clear, yet. The analysis concludes that the 
legal and constitutional situation of the EU and the Member State represents this key factor. 
Finally, this chapter develops hypotheses for the three selected policy areas: EU Competition, EU 
Environmental and EU Education policy. It is expected that regional governments need to build a 
coalition with their national government in EU Environmental policies whereas they prefer to by-
pass it in the other two areas. 
Chapter 4 represents the empirical part of this project. I proceed by analyzing the legal and 
constitutional situation of Germany, the United Kingdom on the one side and DG Competition, DG 
Environment and DG Education and Culture on the other. The remainder is subdivided into three 
sections that illuminate the actual role of German and UK legislative regions in EU decision-
making. The first one analyzes the various mechanisms which facilitate coalition-building in 
practice and scrutinizes at what point in time the selected regions start their lobbying activities. 
This section provides evidence that regular state by-passing appears to be rather unlikely because 
most mechanisms are dependent upon close cooperation with the national government. The 
second one illustrates with whom the German and UK regions exchange relevant information for 
defending their regional interests at the European level. Although all selected regions exchange 
information with EU institutions and the other inner-state regions quite often, this section also 
shows that the national government is a crucial source of information. Consequently, a clear hint 
whether regions by-pass their national government is not deductible. The third section assesses 
the necessity as well as the frequency of coalition-building with the national government, inner-
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state regions, legislative as well as non-legislative regions in other EU Member States, profit-
oriented companies, non-profit oriented companies and associations as well as unions. 
Additionally, this part also provides evidence about the perceived relevance of coalition-partners. 
The results demonstrate that the national government is clearly considered as the most important 
and influential actor for promoting regional concerns in EU Competition, EU Environmental and 
EU Education policies which means that by-passing is not carried out on a regular basis in Germany 
or the UK. On top of that, this chapter it provides some reflections on the by-passing phenomenon 
of legislative regions and argues that if by-passing is understood as working against the national 
government rather than working without it, it appears extremely unlikely that future research will 
come up with new evidence that supports the claims made by Multi-Level Governance 
proponents. Finally, the last chapter outlines some concluding thoughts on successful lobbying; it 
is argued that future research should also pay special attention to the personality of civil servants 
because the interviews conducted revealed that civil servant socialization plays an important role 
in defending regional interests. 
 Chapter 5 compares the empirical results presented in chapter 4 and works out similarities 
and differences between the German Länder and the UK regions. Afterwards, it discusses the 
results of the three selected policy areas as regards the hypotheses developed in chapter 3. 
Finally, it pinpoints the strengths and weaknesses of the methodology of this study. 
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2 Lobbying within the EU’s multi-level system 
 
 
 
 
Lobbying at the European level is not a new phenomenon. Already at the end of the 1950s, 
European umbrella organizations such as COPA (Committee of Professional Agriculture 
Organisations), Eurochambres (Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry), or 
UNICE (Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe) started to sprout around 
Belgium’s capital. In the first decades of the European Union, few scholars paid attention to these 
lobby organizations but since Maria Cowles (1995) published her seminal article about the 
influence of the European Round Table of Industrialists on the agenda for the single market 
program, industrial and commercial lobby organizations have been closely surveyed by the media 
and NGOs. 
With the entry into force of the Single European Act in 1986, not only profit organizations but 
also legislative regions realized that a move to Brussels was inevitable since the establishment of 
a single market was getting very close. Particularly the introduction and the gradual expansion of 
the qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers as well as the EU’s continuous 
enhancement of legal political competences caused lobby organizations to lay their focus on the 
European level. As a matter of fact, experts stress that “nowadays, most legislation is done in 
Brussels and not in Berlin, Paris or Madrid” (Kleinfeld et al. 2007:8). Therefore, almost all 
legislative regions and many administrative regions founded a representation office that is located 
closely to the EU institutions. 
At present, the total number of private and public actors that attempt to represent their 
interests at the European level is extremely large. It should come as no surprise that it is nearly 
impossible to quantify their exact number since there is no obligatory register for interest groups. 
In the 1980s scholars estimated that approximately 500 interest organizations disposed of an own 
EU office whereas the latest data show that this figure rose to over 2,000 (Hix and Hoyland 2013: 
162-163). Figure 2 points out that the majority belongs to European interest group associations 
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such as EU trade and professional associations as well as citizen interest associations. With regard 
to the focus of this research project, the same figure shows that regional representation offices 
are clearly outnumbered so that influencing EU policy processes becomes a very challenging task.  
 
Figure 2: Types and numbers of interest organizations active in EU public affairs 
 
Source 3: Greenwood (2011: 10), based on Landmarks Publications (2007) and Dods (2011) 
 
The remainder of this chapter is as follows. First, it will be illuminated that although the term 
lobbying is widely seen as a negative concomitant of politics, politicians could not adopt efficient 
policies without external advice. Then, a precise definition will be introduced which, in contrast 
to other studies, also includes formal means as one crucial characteristic for the lobbying activities 
of legislative regions. Afterwards, the addressees of lobbying at the European level will be laid 
out. This sub-chapter specifically pinpoints the legal powers, the internal structure and the system 
of decision-making of the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European 
Parliament and the Committee of the Regions as well as their roles in relationship to one another. 
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At the same time, this part highlights the different kinds of information each institution requires 
from lobby organizations. The final section lays the focus on how a draft becomes a legislative 
proposal within the Commission and how the most applied legal procedure for adopting EU 
legislation - the ordinary legislative procedure - works in practice. In a nutshell, this chapter 
analyzes how lobby organizations are capable of successfully influencing EU legislation. 
 
2.1 Lobbying - infamous but indispensable 
Scholars still do not agree on the origin of the term ‘lobbying’ which stems from the Latin lobium 
meaning hall or vestibule. The literature provides several explanations such as: 
 The initial term’s origin refers to English stakeholders affected by a certain policy who 
waited in the lobby to the House of Commons and sought favors from Members of 
Parliament. 
 The term has its roots in New York state politics in the early 1800s where association 
representatives pushed forward their case on legislators. 
 The presidency of Ulysses S. Grant in the second half of the 19th century gave birth to the 
term ‘lobbying’. This president possessed a suite in the vicinity of the White House where 
stakeholders waited and attempted to meet and ask him for favors (Thomas 2004: 151). 
During the 20th century, however, lobbying evolved into a very sophisticated set of activities, 
ranging from transmitting relevant information to initiating public events and supporting 
politicians either technically or even financially (van Schedelen 2010: 46). Particularly the latter 
aspect lent the word ‘lobbying’ a negative touch since some people equate it with bribery and 
collusion: “Functionaries, politicians and lobbyists concoct unpopular decisions behind the scenes 
with which they bully citizens” (Bolesch 2006, own translation). A further reason for its negative 
connotation is based on the assumption that in most cases only multi-national companies are able 
to get their interests accommodated although experts highlight that “market power does not 
automatically translate to political power” (Greenwood 2011: 65). Besides, the Commission and 
the European Parliament financially assist small NGOs or civil society organizations in order to 
reduce the imbalance between profit and non-profit organizations and to let those groups express 
their concerns in the EU decision-making processes. In fact, scholarship points out that NGOs and 
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CSOs are not defenseless against large industries and had already successfully made their voice 
heard (Buholzer 1998: 14; Lahusen and Jauß 2001: 66). 
Nevertheless, in the eyes of many citizens the image of lobbying is still a negative one because 
the media has illustrated several cases in which civil servants in ministries as well as 
parliamentarians at the national and European level had been consulted by lobbyists and used 
their pre-formulated text for later negotiations and parliamentary debates. When the German 
Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology aimed to draft a regulation on energy labeling for 
passenger cars at the end of 2009, the corresponding ministry granted special privileges to the 
local car industry. In contrast to other stakeholders, it was allowed to send its opinion to the 
ministry a long time before the official consultation procedure started, and ultimately, the car 
industry’s position was transposed into law (Becker et al. 2013: 34). Another national example 
constitutes the reform of the German Medicine Act in 2005 when the head of department “Public 
and Market Relations” of the pharmaceutical company Sanofi-Aventis successfully lobbied against 
cheap drug imports from non-EU member States. The chef lobbyist sent a proposal with specific 
suggestions for the upcoming reform to Dr. Wolf Bauer – himself a pharmacist and a conservative 
Member of the German Bundestag. Ultimately, not only that the final law permitted individual 
drug imports from non-EU Member States under very strict conditions, it also contained several 
passages of the initial proposal by Sanofi-Aventis (Grill and Hackenbroch 2013: 60-61).  
Yet, successful lobbying does not stop at the national arena. At the European level, MEPs are 
also steadily lobbied by huge international companies and sometimes, the MEPs’ proposal is very 
similar or even identical to the lobbyists’ pre-formulated request. Currently, the EU aims to renew 
the Data Protection Directive of the mid 1990s and Lobbyplag – a platform which compares the 
statements issued by lobby organizations with the MEPs later suggested amendments – has 
shown that a French MEP took over one-to-one the suggestions of the American Chamber of 
Commerce and a German MEP copied parts of the request of Amazon and Ebay (Hecking 2013). 
Although these few examples pinpoint the problematic relationship between lobbying 
conducted by huge international companies that pursue profit-oriented interests of their 
shareholders on the one hand and the democratic elected politicians who are supposed to 
represent the interests of the common good on the other, experts state that “interest 
representation and democracy belong together like piston and cylinder” (Kleinfeld et al. 2007: 7; 
own translation). Politicians are very well aware that for most people lobbying has a bad aftertaste 
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but they stress that “politics need lobbyism and vice versa” (Grill and Hackenbroch 2013: 61; 
trans.) because, nowadays, the vast majority of policies are extremely complex, complicated, and 
interwoven with other policy fields so that the responsible decision-maker is neither capable of 
deploying the necessary amount of resources nor is s(he) able to consider all effects and 
repercussions that come along with the initial policy. For that reason, politicians are dependent 
upon the expertise of third parties (Dagger 2007: 14).   
 
2.2 Definition and characteristics of lobbying 
Scrutinizing the academic literature it becomes obvious that there is no common definition of the 
term ‘lobbying’ (Buholzer 1998: 6). Some scholars have a very broad understanding whereas 
others apply a more concrete explanation. Basically, one can differentiate between goal-oriented, 
process-oriented as well as goal- and process-oriented definitions, as Table 2 shows. 
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Table 2: Definitions of lobbying 
Goal-oriented Process-oriented 
 The overall objective of lobbying is to 
shape content (Wehrmann 2007: 39) 
 Attempting to put issues onto, or up the 
political agenda, influencing policy 
outcomes to their favor, and framing the 
dimensions that define policy issues 
(Kleinfeld et al. 2007: 10; Beyers et al. 
2010: 6) 
 A process in which the members of the 
interest group on the one hand and public 
authorities on the other exchange 
information (Buholzer 1998: 9) 
 Monitoring and analyzing political 
developments and, if necessary, 
participating actively in these 
developments (Michalowitz 2007: 74) 
Goal- and process-oriented 
 A cipher for all forms of direct, informal and in most cases not immediately observable 
attempts by representatives of societal interests to influence policy-makers in order to 
shape policy outcomes to their favor in the short-, mid- or long-run (Wehrmann 2007: 40) 
 The build-up of unorthodox efforts to obtain information and support regarding a game of 
interest in order to eventually get a desired outcome from a power-holder (van Schendelen 
2010: 48) 
Source 4: own compilation 
 
Contemplating all those definitions listed above we get a precise image of what lobbying is about. 
Yet, applying a purely goal-oriented definition and blinding out the necessary processes is not 
helpful to understand how lobbying is carried out so that the final picture would be incomplete. 
The same conclusion goes for process-oriented understanding insofar as the definition does not 
tell us anything about the desired objectives. For that reason, a definition that includes both goals 
as well as processes offers the most accurate picture of the various facets of lobbying and will 
therefore be applied. 
Against this background lobbying will be defined as using formal and informal means with 
the objective to influence policy processes in order to achieve the desired outcome. Consequently, 
this definition is not only process but also goal-oriented and involves three crucial characteristics 
on which a researcher can focus on: 
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1. Influence 
2. Desired outcome 
3. The usage of formal and informal means 
The first characteristic implies that there is “a causal relation between the preferences of an actor 
regarding an outcome and the outcome itself” (Nagel 1975: 29). This element is probably the most 
interesting but at the same time most difficult one to analyze. The obstacles of measuring a 
concrete, straightforward relation between lobbying efforts and the desired final outcome are 
high because many different (and sometimes unknown) actors use many different pathways to 
exert influence (Dür 2008: 1220-1223). Consequently, attributing influence to one actor only is 
almost impossible. 
Desired outcome – as the second characteristic – can result in either introducing something 
new, altering or preventing launched proposals. For realizing the first aspect, actors have to 
establish contacts to the European Commission since this institution is responsible for initiating 
EU legislation; for altering or preventing a launched proposal actors need to carry out legislative 
or even better pre-legislative lobbying activities and get in touch with the relevant decision-
makers in the European Parliament and the Council (see below). A researcher focusing on this 
characteristic also faces challenges because (s)he must get to know the respective lobby 
organization’s objective. It is, for example, not always expedient to take official statements as a 
basis for identifying the actor’s objective because an actor usually does not make its real objective 
public right from the beginning. Consequently, the official objectives mentioned in the statement 
may be over- or underreported in order to have room for maneuver. 
The third and last characteristic contains process-oriented elements and states that lobbying 
is done by formal and informal means. In case an EU institution officially asks organizations for 
input, the resulting actions can be considered formal lobbying activities. The European 
Commission, for example, often conducts public online-consultations in which all actors are able 
to participate. Additionally, the Council of Ministers regularly invites experts from public or private 
organizations, and in similar vein, external experts are frequently invited for European Parliament 
committee meetings. Last but not least, the Committee of the Regions represents an official 
method for regions to make their voice heard in EU affairs. In contrast to these formal ways of 
participation, an organization may also informally take proactive steps and contact EU decision-
makers on its own initiative. This kind of lobbying is mainly carried out by telephone 
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conversations, email correspondence, or even face-to-face at lunch or dinner-meetings and 
events. 
 
2.3 The addressees of EU lobbying 
To understand the different intervention possibilities of lobby organizations in general and 
legislative regions more specifically, a close look on the internal structure and legal powers of the 
European Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, and the Committee of 
the Regions as well as their roles in relationship to one another is necessary. Moreover, it is crucial 
to be aware that these institutions do not request the same kind of information. Studies have 
illuminated that the European Commission is predominantly interested in pan-European 
information whereas the Council primarily requires specific information about the situation within 
the respective Member State (Bouwen 2002). Consequently, if a European-wide operating 
organization strives to establish protectionist measures for one national market only, it must 
lobby the Council. If, however, the same organization pursues this objective for various Member 
State markets, it should better lobby the Commission and provide European-wide solutions (Woll 
2009). 
Since this research project is interested in lobbying activities of legislative regions, it is going 
to include the Committee of the Regions for two reasons. First, this actor is formally included in 
the EU decision-making process and, second, practitioners as well as scholars state that it has 
played a role from time to time for regional actors to promote their interests upwards the EU’s 
main legislators (Bache et al. 2011: 236). The European Economic and Social Committee, however, 
is not included in the analysis because regions hardly use this platform to promote their interests 
and, moreover, “there is little evidence to suggest that Council has ever taken the slightest notice 
of the ESC’s opinion” (Jeffery 2002: 338).  
Although the European Council plays a decisive role in the EU’s institutional architecture - it 
is generally regarded as the main agenda-setter of the EU - it will not be taken into consideration 
because of its composition and tasks. The European Council is composed of the Heads of State or 
Government who “shall meet twice every six months” (Art. 15 (3) TEU) and this institution is 
supposed to use its political weight to “define the general political directions and priorities” for 
the EU (Art. 15 (1) TEU). Because of these two characteristics, most scholars do not mention the 
European Council as a key addressee of EU lobbying (van Schendelen 2010; Matyja 2007, Merkle 
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2003) or conclude that this institution represents a crucial lobbying addressee only for very 
exclusive decisions such as Treaty amendments or crisis management but not for every-day-
politics (Greenwood 2011: 27).8 Since this research project focuses on the latter, this institution 
will be left out.  
The European Court of Justice is not included either because the ‘decision-makers’ in the ECJ 
are independent judges whose main task is to interpret EU law and monitor compliance with it. 
They are neither bound to a Member State’s opinion nor to other interest organizations’ positions 
which means that they do not take up sides with any actor. As a consequence, organizations face 
enormous difficulties and uncertainties if they really attempted to lobby the ECJ. Moreover, going 
to court involves immense financial costs and cases are generally lengthy so that most 
organizations refuse to use this channel (Eising and Lehringer 2013: 186).9  
 
2.3.1 The European Commission 
The European Commission is composed of the two major blocks: the College of Commissioners as 
well as the Directorates General and Services. The college is composed of one Commissioner per 
Member State who is responsible for one portfolio (e.g. Commissioner Cañete for Climate Action 
& Energy or Commissioner Oettinger for Digital Economy & Society). Each Commissioner is 
supported by his cabinet - a special team of normally seven policy advisers plus support staff who 
offer political advice.  
Scrutinizing the internal structure of the Commission, it becomes obvious that there are many 
different departments, the so-called Directorates General (DGs), and several Services. To be more 
specific, there are currently 33 DGs which are structured by sector (e.g. DG Competition, DG 
Energy, DG Mobility and Transport) and 11 special services which are structured by function (e.g. 
Internal Audit Services, European Anti-Fraud Office, Legal Service).  
 
                                                          
8 To provide a complete picture: Fiona Hayes-Renshaw states that the European Council also acts as “the 
final arbiter of disputes that have proved impossible to resolve at lower levels” (Hayes-Renshaw 2009: 72). 
In other words, it may occur that the European Council also decides about EU every-day-politics but there 
are no empirical figures about the frequency.  
9 Yet, if a lobby organization does decide to go to court, it possesses a variety of litigation strategies 
(McCown 2009).  
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Figure 3: Example of a possible composition of a Directorate-General 
 
Source 5: own graph; based on DG Energy 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy/doc/dg_energy_organigram_en.pdf 
 
The inner structure of a DG is a little more complex, though (see Figure 3). At the top level, each 
DG is headed by a Director-General and one or more Deputy Director-General who directly report 
to their Commissioner or to his/her Cabinet. At the medium level and managed by a Director, 
there are different Directorates (e.g. Energy policy, Internal Energy Market, Renewables) that deal 
with rather general areas. The lowest hierarchical level, in turn, is composed of special units (e.g. 
Coordination, Economic Affairs, Int. Market I and II, CCS Policy, Efficiency etc.) which focus on 
more specific tasks. Each unit consists of several policy officers and is headed by a Head of Unit. 
As it will be shown further below, drafts, which will become legislative proposals at a later point 
in time, are worked out at that level. Consequently, lobby organizations need to pay special 
attention to these policy officers.  
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In total, there are approximately about 32,000 employees working in the European 
Commission; most of them are either official administrators (10,000), or official assistants (10,000) 
or contract agents (5,900) (European Commission 2013). Although citizens and the media 
commonly refer to “the” Commission, lobby organizations have to keep in mind that it is not a 
homogenous actor, but consists of many different members who “may have very different 
perspectives and, most importantly, very different interests or preferences” (Cram 2001: 776). 
Moreover, there are a lot of committees inside the Commission such as expert and Comitology 
committees as well as consultative committees that play an important role for the policy 
formulation.  
The Treaties stipulate that the Commission “shall promote the general interests of the Union 
and take appropriate initiatives to that end” (Art. 17 (1) TEU) which means that it is supposed to 
settle the resulting differences between the various actors participating in the EU decision-making 
processes. As a consequence, the Commission’s civil servants are predominantly interested in 
European solutions in order to advance the political, economic and social integration of the EU 
Member States. Every lobby organization needs to bear in mind the Commission’s overall 
objective because purely local, regional or national claims are very unlikely to be taken into 
consideration. Matyja (2007: 159-160) exemplifies this aspect and states that, instead of carrying 
out individual lobbying activities, national interest associations should mainly work through their 
European umbrella association in order to facilitate the work of the Commission. 
The Commission is generally regarded as the sole institution which is equipped with the right 
to propose legislative acts so that most people say that it possesses a monopoly (Article 294 TFEU). 
Although this statement is certainly true, it has to be distinguished, though, because the European 
Parliament (Article 225 TFEU) and the Council (Article 241 TFEU) are capable of setting the agenda 
for a specific policy as well. Since the Commission has continuously stressed the importance of 
increasing the EU’s democratic legitimacy, it almost always follows up these requests. But even if 
the Commission itself initiates a proposal, it does not draft it without taking into account the EP’s 
and the Council’s position simply because it is dependent upon their later consent in most 
circumstances.  
Obviously, the origin of policy proposals is not unimportant because it allows lobby 
organizations to diversify their channels to ‘upload’ their interests. Interestingly, the vast majority 
of the Commission’s proposals do not stem from the Commission itself but from past policy 
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commitments, international agreements or requests of other actors. In this regard, Strohmeier 
(2007: 62) provides a rough overview about the policy proposals’ origin: 
 35% come from international agreements (negotiated by the Member States) 
 between 25 and 35% amend existing legal obligations (among others technological 
innovations, temporary limited laws) 
 20% stem from the Council, the EP, the Member States and industrial actors 
 10% come from changes or amendments of primary or secondary law (among others  
court rulings) 
 the rest constitutes initiatives by the Commission itself which are flanked by Green- and 
White Books10  
If a legislative proposal is supposed to be drafted, the Commission always needs to name the 
specific Treaty Article on which its proposal is based. During the drafting phase, there are usually 
several DGs involved because a lot of policy fields are tightly interconnected. However, there is 
always one ‘leading DG’ which carries the main responsibility so that this DG requires special 
attention (Nugent 2001: 242). More specifically, Broscheid and Coen (2007: 362) have shown that 
in 2005 some DGs were more contacted by lobby organizations than others; they calculated that 
the number of interest group activities is particularly high for DG Enterprise (221), DG SANCO 
(149), DG Environment (132) whereas it is relatively low for DG Regional Policy (24), DG 
Humanitarian (13) and DG Fisheries (10).  
It has already been briefly mentioned that every Commissioner is advised and supported by 
his/her cabinet. The cabinet’s principal task is to be the Commissioner’s eyes and ears: they collect 
information and brief their Commissioner about recent developments. Each cabinet member 
monitors one or more policy areas. Priority is given to coordinate and negotiate their 
Commissioner’s policy proposal with other cabinets because almost every policy proposal cuts 
across other policy fields. Bearing in mind that a DG’s proposal needs to be accepted by the whole 
College of Commissioners, a previous exchange of views between the affected DGs is 
                                                          
10 Although these figures seem to be rather outdated (1998), Strohmeier believes that they are still valid. 
Additionally, one should not neglect that several proposals also stem from the European Council. In this 
regard, the conclusions of European Council summits usually contain the phrase ‘the European Council 
invites the Commission to…’. However, there are no specific figures which quantify the exact amount. 
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paramount.11 To sum it up, a Commissioner’s cabinet attempts to formulate a policy proposal in 
such a way that it not only reflects their Commissioner’s principle ideas but also that it is 
acceptable for the other Commissioners as well (Nugent 2010: 113-121). 
Bearing in mind the structure and composition of a DG it is understandable why one needs to 
grasp the Commission as a heterogeneous actor. If an organization lobbied the responsible 
cabinet member of the leading DG solely, other DGs could exert influence on the draft so that 
changes might occur very quickly. Besides, internal conflicts between DGs happen at times as the 
following example by van Schendelen underlines. This expert has analyzed a piece of legislation 
about genetically modified organisms (GMO) in the late 1990s, in which the diverse attitudes of 
the various DGs become clear.12  
 
“Between 1998 and 2001, the whole dossier has been a clear example of many cleavages 
inside and between the Commission, the EP and the Council. [...] The Commission was 
particularly divided by its DGs, their Cabinets and even inside them. While DG Environment 
was sitting in the driver’s seat, DG External Trade (for settling GMO issues with the US), 
DG Industry (for economic growth) and DG R&D (for new technology) wanted to hit the 
brake pedal. DG Agriculture was divided between traditional and modern farming, and DG 
Consumer Affairs (the forerunner of DG SANCO) between consumer benefits (price, 
quality) and safety (health).  
(van Schendelen, 2010: 191; emphasis in the original) 
 
It has been already briefly mentioned that the Commission has established a variety of 
committees that are crucial for policy formulation. Concerning their composition, one can 
differentiate between two types of committees: there are experts and Comitology committees13 
which are composed of Member State civil servants on the one hand, and consultative 
committees that consist of private interests on the other. The experts and consultative 
                                                          
11 In theory, a simple majority is enough for adopting a proposal; in practice, however, Commissioners 
usually attempt to reach consensus (Hix 2005: 43) 
12 In 1998 the Commission’s DG Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection proposed to revisit the 
old Directive 90/220/EC on the deliberate release into the environment of GMOs to the EP and Council.  
13 The Comitology system is perhaps the most complex organizational feature of the European Commission. 
Since March 2011 only Implementing Acts according to Article 291 TFEU are dealt with by Comitology 
committees which operate under either (a) the advisory procedure or (b) the examination procedure. 
However, recent research has shown that, in practice, this differentiation is considered somewhat irrelevant 
because Commission civil servants attempt to reach consensus among the various Member States experts 
(Hustedt et al 2014: 112). 
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committees are considered most important for lobby organization because they are established 
during the early policy drafting phase (see below) whereas the Comitology committees meet 
during the final implementation phase. Although the opinions and results of the consultative 
committees are not binding to the Commission, scholars do not question their crucial influence 
on the legislative proposal (Bouwen 2009: 30). 
Due to their composition, it does not come as a surprise that legislative regions are more likely 
to affect EU Commission drafts through expert committees. More specifically, a recent study by 
Sannerstedt (2005: 100-101) indicates that members of Commission expert groups – compared 
to Council working committees, or Comitology committees – enjoy a fairly high degree of 
autonomy which means that they are rarely restricted by a negotiation mandate from home so 
that the importance of the respective home ministry as a source of information is relatively low. 
Moreover, the same study shows that Commission expert groups are very open for external 
sources of information, which is particularly interesting for legislative regions and other lobby 
organizations (Sannerstedt 2005: 110-111).14 
Bearing the above in mind, one should not assume that organizations are treated as 
petitioners. Quite the contrary, the Commission highly relies on their input since it possesses only 
very limited human and materialistic resources (Bache et al. 2011: 338). Even more importantly, 
the Commission willingly includes as many actors as possible in order to increase the legitimacy 
for its legislation (Bouwen 2009: 22). For adopting policies that solve specific issues, the 
Commission needs to consider many factors that affect the efficiency of the legislative policy to a 
large extent. This is not as easy as it may sound. When it formulates the legislative proposal the 
Commission is dependent upon very precise information by the affected actors. However, the 
commonly used term ‘information’ consists of many different characteristics; information might: 
 simply describe features of the present environment 
 explain future changes in the environment 
 capture crucial variables and their effectiveness to control the environment 
 inform about alternatives 
 communicate own values and objectives (Buholzer 1998: 228-229) 
                                                          
14 Sannerstedt himself stresses that his conclusions are based on a questionnaire sent to solely Swedish 
members of these groups and committees so that his findings cannot be transferred easily to all Member 
States. 
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These diverse characteristics of the term information demonstrate that the Commission’s task to 
formulate and adopt policies that fulfill their objective without causing too many unforeseen 
effects is a very challenging undertaking. Therefore, the expertise and input of organizations is 
always welcome. What makes the Commission as a whole extremely valuable for lobby 
organization is its omnipresence in nearly all decision-making processes at all stages so that the 
Commission is perfectly aware of the different actors’ positions (Nugent 2010: 121).  
 
2.3.2 The Council of Ministers 
Similar to the European Commission many people think of ‘the’ Council as a homogenous actor, 
whereas it actually consists of ten different configurations with many different divisions and units 
(see Figure 4). The Council of Ministers is composed of one representative per Member State at 
ministerial level (Art. 16 (2) TEU) and contains a central position in the EU decision-making 
process. In fact, for some scholars it represents the EU’s center of political power (Matyja 2007: 
156). Together with the European Parliament, it exercises legislative as well as budgetary 
functions and it shall carry out policy-making and coordinating functions (Art. 16 (1) TEU). 
Depending on the specific Treaty provision, the Council makes decisions either by unanimity 
or qualified majority voting (QMV).15 Since the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty, QMV is 
the general decision-making mode (Art. 16 (3) TEU). If a decision is taken by QMV, theoretically, 
it is conceivable that a Member State gets outvoted. In practice, however, it has to be highlighted 
that Council members do not strive to outvote each other but seek consensus. In this regard 
Heisenberg (2005: 70-79) states that from 1994 to 2002, on average 81% of all decisions were 
adopted by consensus without voting. In his findings Mattila (2008: 27-28) is able to confirm this 
practice and states that even after the big enlargement in 2004 nearly 90% of all votes in the 
Council during May 2004 and December 2006 were taken unanimously which means that in just 
very few circumstances the Council is formally required to vote. Besides, in case several Member 
States are opposed to a decision being made, the Treaties also entail very specific provisions for 
                                                          
15 Article 16 (4) TEU stipulates that “as from 1 November 2014, a qualified majority shall be defined as at 
least 55 % of the members of the Council, comprising at least fifteen of them and representing Member 
States comprising at least 65 % of the population of the Union”.  
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establishing a blocking-minority so that particularly the smaller Member States need not worry 
about being outvoted.16 
 
Figure 4: Internal composition of the Council of Ministers 
 
Source 6: Wessels, Valant and Kunstein 2015 (forthcoming) 
 
If the media covers European news about this institution, it almost always reports about the 
Council’s ministerial level. Yet, hardly any decision is directly made by the top level of the 
respective Council formation itself, but by the Committee of Permanent Representatives 
(COREPER) and various working groups. 17  Indeed, Fiona Hayes-Renshaw emphasizes that 
“insiders have estimated that, in some Council configurations, the ministers only actively discuss 
                                                          
16 According to Article 16 (4) TEU, a blocking minority “must include at least four Council members, failing 
which the qualified majority shall be deemed attained”.  
17 Delicate policy fields may also be discussed in specialized bodies, as for example agriculture (Special 
Committee on Agriculture), foreign policy (Political and Security Committee), or economic and monetary 
issues (Economic and Finance Committee) 
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between 10 and 15 per cent of all of the items on their agendas, with the rest being discussed by 
Coreper and the working groups” (Hayes-Renshaw 2012: 77). Therefore, the ability of the 
ministers to reach consensus is to a large extent based on the efficient system of decision-making 
at an early stage. In this regard, especially COREPER enjoys a decisive strategically position within 
the Council’s architecture since it is located between the ministerial and working group level. This 
crucial committee takes decisions on the basis of the working groups’ reports which draft detailed 
analyses of Commission proposals for legislation. If COREPER is not able to agree on the details of 
a proposal, it will be sent back to the working groups. For that reason, scholars conclude that 
COREPER “is an important de facto decision-making body, evident in the steady stream of pre-
cooked agreements that are sent to the ministers for formal adoption” (Lewis 2013: 148).  
At the lowest level, experts in working groups are the first who elaborate on a Commission’s 
legislative proposal. Simplifying to some extent, these groups primarily concentrate on technical 
rather than controversial or delicate issues which have to be solved at higher levels.18 Depending 
on the EU’s workload there might be approximately 250 working groups in a year, each group 
consisting of four or five representatives per Member State. Since the EU composes 28 Member 
States, the working group meetings are enormously big, and for that reason, effective lobbying at 
this early stage appears to be very costly and challenging. Consequently, it is fair to assume that 
lobby organizations with limited financial and personnel resources prefer to contact COREPER 
officials because they enjoy greater political weight. Some of them – particularly those working in 
COREPER II – are drawn from the diplomatic service and possess valuable contacts to highly 
ranked politicians.  
Generally, however, the earlier a lobby organization takes initiative, the more likely it is that 
its interests will be accommodated. This is particularly true for the Council because the items on 
Council agendas are divided into ‘A’ and ‘B’ points. Items marked with an ‘A’ means that the 
experts at the lowest level have already agreed on all details so that the highest level will adopt 
the item without discussion. Insiders estimate that up to 85% of all dossiers are adopted by 
ministers as ‘A’ points (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006: 79). The medium level - COREPER - will 
                                                          
18 Fouilleux et al. (2005) point out that the dichotomy between ‘technical’ and ‘political’ issues is actually 
misleading since, in practice, this distinction is constantly blurred both within and around Council working 
groups.  
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only become active concerning ‘B’ points which means that lobbying activities aimed at that 
committee only will miss a lot of items marked as ‘A’ points.   
In contrast to small and medium-sized economic lobby organizations, which lack the 
necessary resources, legislative regions do already become active at the working group level for 
two reasons. First, civil servants who are engaged in working groups are also seconded from 
regional administrations from time to time which means that the legislative region in question 
may already have a contact person in place. Second, some legislative regions even possess the 
legal opportunity to send an observer to these meetings.19 Although this person is not allowed to 
speak, (s)he makes notes and informs the regional level about key actors and the latest 
happenings. 
Due to the Council’s composition and tasks, lobby organizations must be aware that this 
institution requires different information in comparison to the European Commission. Whereas 
the Commission predominantly requests European-wide solutions, ministers and civil servants in 
the Council are primarily receptive to national concerns. In his comprehensive study about the 
access of lobby groups to EU institutions, Bouwen (2002: 27-28) could provide evidence for this 
assumption. He found that national and individual firms enjoy the highest degree of access to the 
Council, particularly if the firm constitutes a national champion. European associations, in 
contrast, have a comparatively low degree of access and consultants have clearly the worst access 
to this institution. Sannerstedt’s (2005: 110-111) study contributes some further insight for lobby 
organizations. Concluding from his findings one can state that any lobby organizations needs to 
argue from a strict national perspective because the autonomy of Council working groups is rather 
limited. Civil servants in those groups primarily use information of the home ministry and follow 
national instructions. Consequently, lobbying organizations should establish contacts to the 
corresponding national ministry in the first place in order to make their voice heard in the 
Council’s working groups. 
A recent case, which was heavily debated in the media, underlines the Council’s primarily 
receptiveness to national concerns. In June 2013, the European Commission, the representatives 
of the Member State’s government and the European Parliament already agreed to adopt a 
regulation on limiting car emissions by 2020. Yet, shortly before the legal act was supposed to be 
                                                          
19 Whereas the German Länder can rely on their “Länderbeobachter” in this regard, the UK legislative 
regions do not have such an option at their disposal. 
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rubber-stamped in the Council, Germany’s chancellor Angela Merkel was successfully lobbied by 
German premium automobile producers which argued that the newly agreed provisions would 
have far-reaching negative consequences for the national economy. The chancellor, in turn, 
managed to win a blocking minority in the Council so that the already agreed details of the 
regulation had to be re-negotiated.  
Bearing in mind that national arguments are vital to gain access to the Council, it appears 
likely that legislative regions have an advantage over economic lobby organizations. If, for 
example, a powerful economic region is negatively affected by a legislative proposal, the 
economic effects could extend to the Member State’s total economy as well so that the national 
government is better advised to support its region.  
 
2.3.3 The European Parliament 
The Parliament itself declares on its webpage that it will be the “guardian of EU citizens' new 
catalogue of civil, political, economic and social rights - the Charter of Fundamental Rights” 
(European Parliament 2014a). In contrast to the other EU institutions, EU citizens themselves are 
able to determine its composition by universal adult suffrage every five years, so that from a 
democratic point of view it constitutes the most important institution for the people within the 
EU’s architecture.  
In its infancy, the Parliament was equipped with very little legal political competences so that 
it constituted a weak legislator. The Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon, however, 
have continuously increased its competences so that nowadays it is called a “genuine co-
legislator” (Burns 2013: 163) vis-à-vis the Council. Yet, the EP’s influence depends on the 
respective procedure. In this regard, Michael Mezey differentiates between three policy-making 
categories: 
 A legislator with strong policy-making power which is capable of modifying or rejecting 
proposals. 
 A legislator with modest policy-making power which is able to modify but which cannot reject 
proposals. 
 A legislator with little or no policy-making power which cannot modify or even reject policy 
proposals (Mezey 1979: 26). 
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In this regard, Article 289 TFEU provides the European Parliament with two different procedures: 
the special legislative procedure (SLP) and the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP), formerly 
known as the co-decision procedure. The SLP, in turn, is divided into the consultation procedure 
where the EP is only asked for a legally non-binding opinion, and the consent procedure which 
grants the EP veto but no amendment powers. The OLP, in contrast, allows the EP to veto as well 
as to amend legislative proposals. Applying Mezey’s categorization to the EP’s legal situation, one 
can conclude that solely the OLP provides the EP with strong policy-making power which means 
that, de jure and de facto the Parliament does only constitute a real co-legislator vis-à-vis the 
Council in those policy fields that fall under this procedure.  
Since every successive Treaty has enhanced the EP’s political rights, it has steadily gained 
more and more confidence so that the Commission faces difficulties to make any precise 
predictions about the EP’s voting behavior (Michalowitz 2007: 66). In order to speed up and 
facilitate the entry into force of EU legislation as well as to produce a ‘capacity-to-act’-image, the 
Commission, the EP and the Council have established the so-called trialogue-meetings. In these 
informal meetings, key persons of the three institutions discuss possible issues at an early stage 
so that the vast majority of legislation can be adopted in the EP’s first reading. Indeed, in the 
second half of the mid 1990s fewer than 20% of proposals were agreed on at the first reading 
whereas by the 2004-2009 Parliament approximately two thirds of proposals were concluded at 
this early stage (Judge and Earnshaw 2008: 233). According to the European Parliament’s “Activity 
Report on Codecision and Conciliation” during the 7th legislative term (July 2009 – June 2014), this 
figure has even increased: 85% of the files had been adopted at the first reading stage (European 
Parliament 2014b: 8). 
When the Commission decides to become active, it always needs to name the specific Treaty 
Article on which its proposal is based. The respective Treaty article, in turn, specifies the 
corresponding procedure for the EP. At present, most Commission proposals fall under the OLP 
so that the EP is able to have a say in many circumstances. In this regard, Nugent (2010: 179) 
shows that the EP is an extremely active legislator: between 2004 and 2009 it approved a total of 
2,924 texts, nearly half of which – 1,355 – were legislative documents. Consequently, the 
expansion of rights caused a rising workload for MEPs and led to a change of perception among 
the various lobbying organizations at the European level. Many companies, associations, NGOs 
and other interest groups have built up and maintain close contact to the MEPs. For the past two 
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decades, thousands of interest groups have requested accreditation so that the EP decided to 
establish a Joint Transparency Register in June 2011 in which organizations and entities are 
required to accede to this Register prior to requesting access rights from the EP.  
Recent EU media coverage has demonstrated that economic lobby organizations value the 
European Parliament as a crucial actor for changing or even stopping legislation. In 2013, the 
European Parliament’s Committee on Environment, Health and Food Safety debated on several 
occasions about the Commission’s Tobacco Products Directive which was supposed to oblige 
tobacco companies to put large health warnings on their products, to ban slim cigarettes and to 
ban special flavors such as menthol. The tobacco industry, in turn, attempted to persuade MEPs 
to vote against this strong position. In order to increase its chances Philip Morris created short 
biographies about most of the EU-parliamentarians which contained explicit details about their 
occupational background, and additionally, each relevant MEP was given a priority, ranging from 
‘low’ to ‘high’ (Berndt 2013: 19). This way, the corporation had a very accurate idea about each 
MEP’s voting behavior so that still indecisive politicians could be quickly identified and specifically 
targeted.  
Like in most other parliaments, the lion’s share of the EP’s work is prepared and done within 
various standing and ad-hoc committees. Indeed, Simon Hix emphasizes that “it is in the 
committees that the real scrutiny of EU legislation takes place. The committees propose 
amendments to legislation in the form of a report and a draft resolution, which are then submitted 
to the full EP plenary session in more or less a ‘take it or leave it’ form. Amendments to the 
proposed committee resolutions can be made in the full plenary, but without the backing of a 
committee and the EP party support that goes along with this, amendments are less likely to be 
adopted by the parliament” (Hix 2005: 93). To be more precise, the EP’s workload in the past 
provides evidence that some committees produce far more reports than others; experts 
calculated that between 2004 and 2007 the standing committees on Environment, Transport and 
Legal Affairs dealt with over 50% of all co-decision reports (Judge and Earnshaw 2008: 170). As a 
consequence, lobby organizations need to establish contact with those MEPs who sit on the 
relevant committees for the respective legislative proposal.  
 Practitioners and scholars agree that the most relevant persons within the diverse 
committees are the rapporteur and the ‘shadow’ rapporteurs (Farrell and Hèritier 2004: 14; 
Interview 19). A rapporteur is the selected MEP by the respective committee coordinator 
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responsible for drafting a report on the Commission’s legislative proposal whereas the ‘shadow’ 
rapporteurs of the other political groups play a supportive and an informative role. First, they 
assist the ‘principal’ rapporteur and, second, they provide their own party with up-to-date 
information about the latest developments. After the committee’s members have discussed and 
voted on a Commission’s proposal, it is forwarded to the entire parliament and, usually, the 
plenary adopts the committee’s position (Burns 2013: 166). 
This brief description of the rapporteur’s tasks exemplifies that they constitute a central 
bridge between the EP, the Council and the Commission. For that reason, they represent the 
favored contact persons of the Presidency because rapporteurs possess a huge amount of 
information and, furthermore, they are capable of selecting what to pass on to the other 
committee members. Usually, a normal committee member does not raise complaints if a deal 
between the Council and the Parliament has been struck in an informal trialogue (Farrell and 
Hèritier 2004: 14-15). Because of this central position, they play a striking role in shaping the party 
group’s position so that they are of primary interest of lobby organizations. 
It has to be pointed out, though, that the relationship between lobbyists and MEPs is based 
on mutual dependency. For both parties the fundamental logic behind this relationship is to 
maximize their potential influence. On the one hand, the lobby organization wants to increase its 
chances of getting its interests accommodated and adding a further channel of interest 
representation to its portfolio certainly helps to achieve that goal. MEPs, on the other hand, only 
possess very limited financial and personnel resources so that they actively consult with lobby 
organizations on a regular basis (Hix and Hoyland 2011: 183). Yet, MEPs are very well aware that 
they need to use the provided information with caution because the organization’s interests do 
not always tie in with the European citizens’ interests and the common good.   
As in the case of the Commission and the Council, lobby organizations also must be aware of 
the specific information required by the actors within the EP. On the one hand, the MEPs have to 
evaluate the Commission’s proposal from a European perspective for two reasons. First, their 
genuine task is to assess the possible positive and negative effects of the proposal on the 
European internal market (Bouwen 2001: 29), and second, the European Parliament itself claims 
to be the guardian of all EU citizens. For these reasons, research has revealed that European 
associations have higher access to the MEPs than national associations (Bouwen 2002: 22-24). On 
the other hand, one should not forget that the decision-makers in the Parliament are not civil 
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servants but politicians who would like to get re-elected so that effective interest presentation 
also requires taking the concerns of the MEP’s electorate into consideration. In this regard, it is 
crucial to bear in mind that the voting practices of the European elections vary from country to 
country; some Member States split their territory into regional electoral districts whereas others 
have a single electoral district. To be more precise, Judge and Earnshaw point out that in 2004, 18 
Member States based their elections upon a single national electoral district; 5 Member States 
used regional constituencies (Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy and the UK); and Germany and Poland 
used hybrid systems (Judge and Earnshaw 2008: 69-70). However, own research has revealed that 
priority is usually given to EU relevant information because if every MEP defended regional or 
national interests only, it would be nearly impossible to reach a consensus. Besides, in case of 
party political incongruence, the individual MEP might pursue different political objectives 
(Interview 35, 36, 37). In a nutshell, there are several reasons to assume that the European 
perspective outweighs the regional one. Consequently, lobby organizations should primarily 
provide EU relevant arguments so that the respective MEP is better able to convince other MEPs.  
 
2.3.4 The Committee of the Regions 
The Committee of the Regions (CoR) constitutes the EU’s Assembly of Regional and Local 
Representatives and currently it is composed of 353 members. The CoR was founded in 1994 by 
the Treaty of Maastricht on the initiative of German and Belgian regions in order to provide sub-
national authorities with the direct voice in the EU’s multiple decision-making processes. Since 
former regional competences had been transferred to the European level and bearing in mind 
that most EU legislation is implemented at the regional and local level, particularly the German 
Länder demanded the establishment of a body in which they could get regional interests 
accommodated. 
Until today, the successive Treaties have strengthened the role of the CoR so that the 
Commission is obliged to consult it in a number of policy areas which have an impact on the 
regional level such as health, education and culture, social policy, environment, energy, transport 
and many more (Art. 307 (1) TFEU). Moreover, the CoR is able to issue an opinion on its own 
initiative if it deems such action appropriate (Art. 307 (3) TFEU). On top of that the Lisbon Treaty 
has granted the CoR the right to bring an action before the Court of Justice of the European Union 
if the principle of subsidiarity has been breached (Protocol No. 2, Art. 8 (2)). 
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Although legislative regions had been very enthusiastic about this new channel of interest 
representation in the beginning, only a very limited number of regions actually used it for lobbying 
purposes in the following years for a variety of reasons. Firstly, as described above, the CoR only 
plays a consultative role which means that it cannot oblige the other EU institutions to give 
feedback regarding its opinions. As a consequence, not all of the EU institutions took the CoR 
seriously. For example, the Council of Ministers refused to provide feedback on CoR opinions 
several times (Jeffery 2002: 341), and until 2002 the European Parliament tended to support the 
CoR only if it did not interfere in anything the Parliament was doing (Millan 1997: 10). Afterwards, 
the Parliament started to consult the CoR more often; nonetheless the CoR was still considered a 
potential ally and rival at the same time (Christiansen and Lintner 2005: 9). Next, the CoR’s diverse 
membership divides rather than unities the members around a specific issue. There are regional 
as well as local representatives, but there are also actors from administrative and legislative 
regions. Therefore, the result usually presents the lowest common denominator only (Hooghe 
and Marks 2001: 82). On top of that, the CoR membership divides along party political lines too, 
as it is not composed of neutral experts but elected politicians.  
Having said this, it does not mean that the CoR constitutes an ineffective body which does 
not have any impact on EU legislation at all (Warleigh 2002: 183-185). Some scholars explicitly 
state that it has played a role from time to time for regional actors to promote their interests 
upwards the EU’s main legislators (Bache et al. 2011: 236). As a matter of fact, some legislative 
regions - as for example North-Rhine Westphalia or Bavaria - have established a special 
department for the Committee of the Regions at their home base. Consequently, one can expect 
that this comparative case study of German and UK regions might reveal different opinions about 
the importance and effectiveness of the CoR. 
 
2.4 Understanding EU legislation: from draft to act 
There is no doubt among scholars or practitioners that good timing is a critical aspect for lobby 
organizations to influence EU decision-making: “It is common knowledge among lobbyists that as 
long as no formal documents are produced during the policy formulation stage, changes to the 
legislative proposals can be made much more easily” (Bouwen 2009: 20). Simplifying to some 
extent, there are two basic explanations as to why a lobby organization has been successful: either 
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it has done its homework and was well prepared, or it was simply lucky. As it has been already 
pointed out, it is extremely difficult to prove empirically how the final wording of a proposal did 
come about and which organization(s) exerted influence, but what we can be sure of is that any 
lobby organization attempts to minimize uncertainty and luck. For that reason, any organization 
that wishes to increase its chances of getting its interests accommodated needs to be familiar 
with the internal procedures of the European Commission as well as the legal procedures in the 
Council and the Parliament. Therefore, the remainder will explicitly focus on how a draft is created 
within the Commission and how the most applied legal procedure for adopting EU legislation - the 
ordinary legislative procedure - works. Only if a lobby organization understands the different 
stages of how a draft becomes an act it may influence EU legislation on a regular basis.  
 
2.4.1 From draft to proposal 
At the European level, there are a number of different stages that a draft needs to go through 
before it turns into a proposal (see Figure 5). 
59 
 
Figure 5: The different stages of a policy draft 
 
Source 7: own graph 
 
As soon as a new law is meant to be required, the general policy objectives and priorities need to 
be put down by the responsible DG. This is done by several top-level meetings between the 
Director General, Directors and the Commissioner’s cabinet. Afterwards, one person within the 
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DG will be selected as rapporteur20 who is supposed to write the dossier (draft) and monitor it in 
the further stages of the decision-making processes (Nugent 2001: 242). As it will be shown, the 
chef de dossier is of particular importance for lobby organizations because this person decides 
whether possible amendments made by the Council or the European Parliament should be 
rejected or accepted.  
  Before the chef de dossier begins to work on the first draft of the proposal, it is necessary to 
include and evaluate external advice in order to increase the acceptability among the affected 
stakeholders, to make the policy making-process more legitimate and to avoid unforeseen 
consequences. Therefore, communications, Green or White papers are published which pinpoint 
the general objectives and call for further opinions. Not only through workshops, forums and 
expert advisory groups but also through public consultation on an open web portal, the 
Commission receives valuable input for the final legislative proposal (Gillies 1998: 179-180). This 
procedure constitutes one of the few formal means by which every lobby organization is able to 
participate within the EU’s decision-making process. Since no draft has been created at this early 
stage, yet, the chances for a lobby organization of getting its interests accommodated are 
comparatively high.  
 Meanwhile, the chef de dossier gets in touch with the cabinet members of other relevant 
Directorates-General (DG) because, ultimately, they need to approve the final draft collectively. 
These so-called ‘inter-service consultations’ are very important in order to avoid possible turf 
battles and to present a coherent approach. It has been shown above that coherency is not always 
guaranteed because each DG concentrates on different aspects of an identified problem. 
Therefore, early coordination is of utmost importance and as soon as an agreement has been 
reached among the experts within the different cabinets, the general agreed items of that deal 
are not supposed to be altered during the drafting phase once again. For the very same reason, 
scholars underline that “cabinets are crucial points of access for governments, lobbyists and other 
actors and institutions keen to influence the Commission” (Egeberg 2013: 134-5). 
Before the draft becomes a legislative proposal, the Commission’s Secretariat General needs 
to check whether an Impact Assessment (IA) has to be conducted. The IA evaluates the potential 
                                                          
20 Note that some scholars use different names for this person such as ‘desk officer’ (Gillies 1998: 179) or 
‘chef de dossier’ (Karr 2006: 156). In order to better differentiate this person from the rapporteur in the 
various EP committees, the term chef de dossier will be used. 
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economic, social and environmental effects of a proposal. In this regard, the Commission 
(European Commission 2009) has published guidelines that provide some rough indicators when 
such a measure is necessary. According to these guidelines, the following Commission initiatives 
require an IA: 
 all legislative proposals of the Commission's Legislative and Work Program (CLWP) 
 All non-CLWP legislative proposals which have clearly identifiable economic, social and 
environmental impacts (with the exception of routine implementing legislation) 
 Non-legislative initiatives such as white papers, action plans, expenditure programs, 
negotiating guidelines for international agreements 
 Certain implementing measures (so called ‘Comitology’ items) which are likely to have 
significant impacts (European Commission 2009: 6) 
Depending on the scope and complexity of the respective initiative, there might be more than one 
DG responsible for elaborating on the IA. In any case, the Secretariat General provides support by 
establishing an Impact Assessment Steering Group (IASG), which brings together policy specialists 
from other affected DGs for offering advice. Finally, the Impact Assessment Board will scrutinize 
the submitted draft and control the quality of the IA. In some occasions it may ask the responsible 
DG to provide additional information, change some details and resubmit the IA.  
After having conducted the IA, the final draft is sent to all Commissioners and their Cabinets, 
interested DGs and the Commission’s Legal Service for final suggestions. Ultimately, when all DGs 
have almost agreed on the formulation, the draft is sent to the Cabinets where pending issues are 
tried to be resolved. Very delicate and controversial elements that cannot be solved at that stage 
will be forwarded to the College of Commissioners. Once agreement has been reached and the 
final draft has been approved, the text becomes an official proposal for a decision, a directive or 
a regulation (Gillies 1998: 180).  
This short summary of how a draft becomes a proposal should not create the impression that 
this process happens overnight as the following example about the White Paper on Transport21 
demonstrates. When the Commission decided to set up a long-term strategy at the end of 2008 
to solve future issues in the transport sector it, first, initiated an online public consultation, several 
                                                          
21 The full official title was a “Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area - Towards a competitive and 
resource efficient transport system” (European Commission 2011a) 
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expert group meetings and a High-Level Stakeholders’ conference from January to March 2009. 
Within the following months it evaluated the obtained results and presented a Communication in 
June which once again asked for further input through a second public consultation and a High-
Level Stakeholders’ conference. Afterwards, the Commission started the preparation for the 
White Paper on Transport Policy and set up an inter-service group which met between November 
2009 and June 2010 in order to coordinate the different views of various DGs.22 Then, an IASG 
had to carry out a comprehensive Impact Assessment until the middle of December and submitted 
it to the Impact Assessment Board (IAB).23 The IAB, in turn, requested the responsible DGs in the 
beginning of January to make changes. After having re-submitted the draft, the IAB once again 
asked to DGs to revise it in the beginning of February. Finally, at the end of March 2011 the 
Commission released its White Paper on Transport. As a result, it took 2 years and 3 months until 
the initial draft became a proposal for a White Paper (European Commission 2011b: 5-8).  
Bearing in mind these various time-consuming procedural steps, it seems logical that so many 
experts steadily stress that lobbying at an early stage is crucial. It does not come a surprise that 
the higher the draft goes within the Commission, “the more reduced is the capacity for interest 
representation because of the mechanics of seeking change, the increasing politicization of 
measures, and the trade-offs that form part of reaching agreement” (Greenwood 2011: 37). 
Consequently, if the respective interest organization has not managed to include its position in 
the drafting phase, it appears very unlikely that it will find its interests being represented in the 
Commission’s legislative proposal. 
In order to minimize the likelihood that the legislative proposal will be amended various times 
or even rejected by the European Parliament or the Council, the chef de dossier also establishes 
informal contacts with the key persons in these institutions (‘trialogue’). From a legal perspective, 
neither the Council nor the Parliament are in a position to revise any items within this draft. 
However, in light of the later following ordinary legislative procedure, in which the Parliament as 
well as the Council may reject the legislative proposal, the Commission does not ignore their input. 
Consequently, it is crucial for any lobby organization to get to know the responsible persons at 
this stage. To wait until both institutions are formally included in the decision-making process is 
                                                          
22  The number of involved DGs within the inter-service consultations had been 17 (!) (European 
Commission 2011b: 5) 
23 The Impact Assessment Steering Group involved 16 DGs (ibidem) 
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too late since their concerns are already taken into account much earlier. Therefore, the 
probability of success will be highest only if contacts are established to all key persons 
simultaneously and as early as possible. 
Finally, it should be pointed out one more time that the Commissioner’s Cabinet and 
especially the chef de dossier are constantly in touch with the Member States during the whole 
drafting phase through the above mentioned ‘expert committees’. This means that before the 
Commission adopts a proposal it has already discussed the proposal’s basic and general 
components with the most relevant actors. This way, the Commission does not only gather 
important information at an early stage, it also increases the chances of a future successful 
implementation. As a consequence, although the Commission is legally not obliged to follow the 
committees’ recommendation, it usually attempts to embed their suggestions as far as possible 
in order to face fewer obstacles in the later decision-making process.  
 
2.4.2 From proposal to act 
Only the application of the ordinary legislative procedure, formerly known as co-decision 
procedure, turns the EP into a co-legislator vis-à-vis the Council so that both institutions are 
equally important for adopting legislative acts. The specific details are laid out in Article 294 TFEU 
and are illustrated in Figure 6. 
Before the actual legislative process begins, the Commission formally and informally contacts 
different interest groups from the private and public sector, civil servants from the Member States 
as well as MEPs with the objective to gather relevant information concerning the future proposal. 
This way, it becomes less likely that the proposal will encounter serious issues at the later stages. 
After collecting and assessing the gained data, it formally initiates a proposal. 
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Figure 6: Co-decision procedure (Ordinary legislative procedure) 
 
Source 8: Based on European Parliament 2012: 51 
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At the first stage, the Council’s working groups and the EP’s committees scrutinize the 
Commission’s proposal (see Figure 6). On issues such as environment, education or transport the 
Treaties legally require the Commission and the Council to consult the Committee of the Regions. 
Moreover, national parliaments might also play a role in this phase if they detect a breach of the 
principle of subsidiarity.24 As it has been stated above, there have been only a few cases in which 
national parliaments have actually made use of this right. One reason for this is that the 
Commission does not elaborate on its proposals in isolation, but includes various actors right from 
the beginning, which, as a consequence, reduces the unintended violation of the principle of 
subsidiarity. Afterwards, the EP starts to hold its first reading in which it decides whether it should 
approve the proposal or propose amendments to it. The Commission, in turn, may change its 
proposal and forward it to the Council. If the Council does not suggest any new changes and 
approves all the EP’s amendments, it can adopt the act as amended. At present, this working style 
is the rule rather than the exception (Duff 2009: 52). In light of the past relationship in the 1990s 
when the Council considered the Parliament a rival rather than a co-legislator this development 
is quite remarkable. At that time, the majority of proposals were adopted in the second or even 
in the third reading so that legislation took more time to be passed. In case the EP and Council 
cannot agree on a common position the Commission could act as a mediator and give its opinion 
so that the decision-making process does not consume so much time. 
If no agreement has been reached, the second reading in the EP begins. Within a time 
limit of three months the EP either has the option to approve the Council’s position or to take no 
decision at all which then automatically leads to the adoption of the legislative proposal. Nugent 
reports that at this stage normally 90% of all proposals are in an acceptable form for the EP so 
that no further debate is needed (Nugent 2010: 183). This impressive figure has its roots in the 
above mentioned inter-institutional negotiations (‘trialogues’) and demonstrates that all three 
parties – the Commission, the Council and the EP – are able to reach consensus without going 
through all possible readings (Fouilleux et al. 2005: 618; Lewis 2012: 329). In case the EP aims to 
reject or amend the proposal an absolute majority is needed. If the Council accepts the EP’s 
                                                          
24 Protocol No. 1 on the role of national parliaments and Protocol No. 2 on the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality in the Treaty on the EU stipulate that national parliaments may issue a reasoned opinion 
within eight weeks if they consider that the Commission’s proposal has breached the principle of 
subsidiarity.   
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amendments, the act is deemed adopted, but if the Council rejects them the so-called Conciliation 
procedure will be convened. 
The Conciliation committee consists of representatives of the 28 Member States and an equal 
number of Members of the European Parliament, grouped in an EP delegation which respects the 
relative strength of the political groups. The procedure will be canceled if the committee does not 
find a consensus within the next six months. If it is successful, it forwards the joint text to the EP 
and Council which have to approve it within six weeks with the majority of votes cast and QVM, 
respectively. 
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3 Regions in an organizational sociology context   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Until the present day, Multi-level governance proponents have not been able to provide hard 
evidence about regular state by-passing in policy fields other than structural and cohesion policy. 
This fact constitutes one major reason why these scholars cannot convince liberal 
intergovernmentalists about their perception of the functioning of the European Union. Since this 
debate has not progressed for quite some time now, this research project applies a theoretical 
approach from a different subject with the objective to generate new insights. To the author’s 
knowledge no other study has approached this topic from an organizational sociology perspective, 
yet. For that reason, the first section does not only briefly introduce this sub-discipline but it also 
elaborates on a definition for regional governments in the context of the EU in order to 
understand how they should be conceived of.  
Afterwards, the basic structure of the situational approach, an approach which enjoys 
great popularity among sociologists, as well as its major points of criticisms will be illustrated. In 
its basic form, it consists of three interrelated concepts: the organization’s goals, the 
organization’s external situation and the organization’s internal situation. In this research project, 
the organization’s internal situation refers to a region’s lobbying strategies (dependent variable) 
whereas the external situation includes external factors such as the legal and constitutional 
situation of the EU and the Member State, the demographic and economic situation, leadership 
etc. which all impact on the region’s choice of strategy. Bearing the debate between Multi-level 
Governance proponents and liberal intergovernmentalists in mind, this chapter differentiates 
between two strategies: either the regional government works with the national government in 
order to defend its interests at the European level or it works without it (“by-passing”).  
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The situational approach provides a useful analytical structure which allows to the 
identification of the most important external factor that exerts a strong influence on the region’s 
preferred lobbying strategy. The following analysis will demonstrate that the legal and 
constitutional situation of the EU and the Member State constitutes the key factor (independent 
variable) which makes by-passing most likely. In the end, this chapter develops hypotheses which 
depict the cause-effect link between the EU’s and the Member State’s legal and constitutional 
situation and the regions’ lobbying strategy in EU Competition, Environmental and Education 
policies.  
 
3.1 Organizational sociology 
Organizational sociology is a very young discipline whose roots lay in the United States after World 
War II. In the 1960s and 1970s it also became widely known in Europe, especially Germany and 
France. Nowadays, it is considered a subject of international importance with a broad scientific 
community from many different subjects: business administration, psychology, public 
administration, and economics. Because of this interdisciplinary characteristic organizational 
sociology is capable of contributing significantly to science. Analyzing specific topics from different 
academic angles helps to enhance our knowledge about the diverse interdependent casual 
processes at work which affect the organization’s structure, its members as well as its goals. 
Sociology as a discipline is a very large field which is usually distinguished between 
’general sociology’ and ‘special sociologies’. The first category specifically concentrates on 
theories that attempt to explain the relationship between people and systems as well as the 
change of systems. Topics that are usually dealt with by scholars are power, rule, social conflicts, 
social inequality, social milieus, change of cultures, division of labor in a society, differing norms 
and values and so forth. Special sociologies, in contrast, lay the focus on structures and processes 
in societal sub-systems such as sociology of religion, sociology of education, sociology of labor or, 
sociology of military in order to work out regular patterns (Scott 2006: 206). As a consequence, 
special sociologies describe and analyze narrow subjects with the aim to generate practical results 
for the respective sub-system. 
Most researchers grasp organizational sociology as a special sociology (Mayntz 1963: 31; 
Pfeiffer 1976: 9; Preisendörfer 2011: 11) which is relevant for both theory and practice. The 
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theoretical relevance refers to possible generalization problems of the final results. 
Understanding organizational sociology as a special sociology implies that empirics or statements 
which are valid for the concerned sub-discipline cannot be transferred easily to general sociology 
in every circumstance, whereas the opposite is true for general sociology: here, observations can 
be applied to special sociologies (Endruweit 2004: 9-10).  
The above mentioned theoretical issue is strongly connected with decision-making in the 
‘real world’ because grasping organizational sociology as general sociology can lead to wrong 
decision-making in practice with profound implications for organizations. Such an understanding 
would imply that a managing authority of an organization in sub-discipline A could smoothly adopt 
the characteristics of an organization in sub-discipline B in order to create higher incentives for its 
employees, to increase its efficacy or generally to reach its objectives more efficiently. Yet, not 
surprisingly such a simple adoption is very likely to fail in most circumstances and for that reason, 
classifying organizational sociology as general sociology appears to be problematic. Against this 
background, this work understands organizational sociology as a special sociology like most 
sociologists.  
Studying organizational sociology it becomes obvious that there is no single, clear-cut 
definition of ‘organization’ (Endruweit 2004: 17; Scott and Davis 2007: 27-32; Abraham and 
Büschges 2009: 55-62; Preisendörfer 2011: 13). In sociological terms, organizations can be literally 
everything as for instance car producers, chemical companies, schools, churches, hospitals, 
shopping malls, banks, environmentalist groups, associations and much more. The reason for 
having introduced such a broad understanding of that term in organizational sociology relates to 
the fact that – in spite of all the differences – most organizations are confronted with similar issues 
such as defining objectives, hiring and training staff, setting incentives for their members, 
choosing a central or decentralized system of decision-making and so on (Ebers 1981: 1-2). 
Depending on the disciplinary background of the researcher and the specific theoretical 
perspective an organization can be a means towards increasing efficiency, an instrument to 
safeguard power, an apparatus which sets boundaries for people, an opportunity to generate 
individual freedom, a system of agreements, a hub for communication and many more (Kieser 
and Walgenbach 2010: 1).  
The breadth of definition is very useful for this research project because it allows the 
analysis of a regional government from an organizational sociology point of view. Since the 
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repertoire of approaches and theories of that subject is quite extensive, the following section 
needs to elaborate on the understanding of regional governments in the context of EU lobbying 
first.  
 
3.1.1 Three paradigms of organizations 
The fact that academics have not treated regional governments as organizations in EU decision-
making to this day has two implications. First, a sociological understanding for regional 
governments in the EU’s multi-level system does not exist, and second, academics have not 
applied organizational sociology theories or approaches in this context, yet. For that reason, we 
have to approach this sub-discipline step by step. In the first instance, the three main paradigms25 
of organizations in organizational sociology will be introduced. Each one lays the focus on different 
organizational aspects which reduces the total number of applicable theories and approaches. 
Afterwards, the regional government of legislative regions will be linked with one paradigm. It will 
be argued that the open system perspective fits perfectly well to the nature of regional 
governments in the European Union in general and to the focus of this research project in 
particular.    
It has already been mentioned that in sociology the term organization is not very precise 
so that nearly everything can be considered an organization. Although all organizations share 
several characteristics such as setting-up goals, establishing a managing authority, delegating 
tasks or stating formal rules (Abraham and Büschges 2009: 19-29), they vary in size, structure, or 
operating procedures. Additionally, there are also diverse types of organizations such as economic 
organizations (companies, banks), public organizations (theatre, opera), voluntary organizations 
(political parties, civil society groups), governmental organizations (Scottish Executive, Land of 
Bavaria) coercive organizations (prisons, mental hospitals), law-maintaining organizations (police, 
courts) and many more.26 Bearing in mind the omnipresence of organizations it is fair to say that 
they constitute an essential part of our daily life and because of that fact, studies about them are 
regarded as so important.   
                                                          
25 Note George Ritzer’s (1975: 157) definition of a paradigm: “A paradigm is a fundamental image of the 
subject within a science. It serves to define what should be studied, what questions should be asked, how 
they should be asked, and what rules should be followed in interpreting the answer obtained.” 
26 Some examples of how to categorize organizations are provided by Parsons (1960), Etzioni (1961) or 
Watson and Shackleton (2008). 
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Since this project is the first one that places the regional governments’ lobbying strategies 
in an organizational sociology context, it is necessary to work out how such actors can be 
understood in that subject. Organizational sociologists usually apply one of the three following 
paradigms in order to investigate organizational characteristics such as the internal structure, 
behavior of members, decision-making, authority, compliance and so forth:  
1. “Organizations as a rational system” 
2. “Organizations as a natural system”  
3. “Organizations as an open system” (Blumberg 1987: 12-17; Scott and Davis 2007: 29-32; 
Blaschke 2008: 7-57; Anderson et al. 2009: 103-124) 
Scott and Davis (2007) point out that each system or paradigm consists of several ‘schools of 
thinking’ which highlight different organizational characteristics. The rational system perspective 
is represented by Taylor’s scientific management approach (Taylor 1911), Fayol’s administrative 
theory (Fayol 1949), Weber’s bureaucracy approach (Weber 2010: 703-738), and Simon’s theory 
of administrative behavior (Simon 1997). Although each school puts the emphasis on a different 
organizational aspect, they also share certain assumptions. Generally, they perceive organizations 
as a rather closed system in which the main focus is laid on achieving specific goals by choosing 
efficient structural arrangements. As a consequence, the primary concern of these schools is 
effectiveness and efficiency; it is argued that decisions are made and goals pursued because of 
rationality (Blaschke 2008: 8). The influence of the external environment or irrational behavior on 
the organization’s structure or goals, however, are not taken into account. Particularly the latter 
deficit – the exclusion of irrational behavior – was criticized and led to the natural system 
perspective. 
In comparison to the previous paradigm, the natural system perspective concentrates on 
the informal structures, norms and values within an organization, thereby focusing on its 
members and their behavior. Proponents admit that formal guidelines may restrict or even limit 
certain interactions, but they never determine the behavior of any member because employees 
are not machines. Everyone differs with regard to his or her qualifications, socialization, 
personality etc., and since the organization’s managing authority is not willing or capable of 
supervising everyone, unofficial methods are usually established in order to deal with daily 
occurrences and unforeseen issues (Blumberg 1987: 13). The main schools of thought in this 
regard are the human-relations-theory (Mayo 1945), Barnard’s Cooperative System (Barnard 
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1938), and Selznick’s Institutional Approach (Selznick 1948). The bottom line of these schools is 
that human beings within an organization are of utmost importance for reaching the 
organization’s objectives and therefore, the emphasis is placed on the individuals’ behavior and 
interaction (Anderson et al. 2009: 104; Blaschke 2008: 19). 
Finally, the open system perspective criticizes the previous two paradigms because none 
of them takes the (external) environment as a significant influential factor into account. If both 
previous paradigms have something in common, it is their focus on the interior. Open system 
proponents envision that an organization cannot be seen as an isolated isle in the sea which is 
sealed off from its surroundings; quite the contrary, they argue that organizations constitute 
components in larger systems of relations (Scott and Davis 2007: 31). As a consequence, open 
system theorists specifically illuminate the interdependence between the organization’s 
environment on the one hand and the organization’s internal characteristics and goals on the 
other and stress that the former exerts a strong impact on the latter. Neither formal rules or 
procedures nor the behavior of members can be completely understood without explicitly 
including environmental characteristics. Influential schools of thinking of this paradigm constitute 
the Systems Design (Burton and Obel 2004; Nissen 2006), the Contingency Theory/Situational 
Approach (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Kieser 2002), and Weick’s Social Psychology of Organizing 
(Weick 1979). 
 
3.1.2 Regional governments as open systems 
After having introduced the three main definitions of organizations the question of which 
paradigm fits best to regional governments arises. Yet, one cannot state that one perspective is 
more important than the other since each system is able to make valuable contributions to science 
and practice. In fact, some scholars have even combined the rational or the natural system 
perspective with the open system perspective (Scott and Davis 2007: 107). Therefore, the answer 
depends on two criteria. The first criterion refers to the actual focus of the research project and 
the second one relates to the organization’s goals.  
The first and most important criterion is linked to the research question. If the researcher 
conducts a comparable study of various regional governments in EU Member States about their 
recruitment processes, formal structure or hierarchies, the rational system perspective appears 
to be a fruitful paradigm. Weber’s bureaucracy approach, for example, underscores that 
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functionaries are hired on grounds of their qualification, that each one fulfills a specifically defined 
number of tasks and that functionaries should receive a decent salary in order to safeguard their 
future on a long-term basis (Weber 2010: 162-164). If, however, the focus is laid on the interaction 
and behavior of the organization’s members we could certainly adopt a natural system 
perspective since it stresses that those characteristics cannot completely attributed to rationality. 
From time to time, many people behave irrationally, do not follow guidelines or are simply 
unmotivated. In such a study, Barnard’s Cooperative System might offer valuable insights because 
this theory helps to explain the employees’ the lack of compliance (Barnard 1938).  
Since this research project is dedicated to the lobbying strategies of legislative regions in 
the multi-level system of the EU, the third paradigm seems to be the promising one because, in 
general, developing strategies is always dependent upon the inclusion of environmental 
characteristics such as customer behavior, competitors, technology, legal provisions and so forth. 
The open system perspective explicitly states that the environment is a crucial factor that exerts 
strong influence on the organization’s interior. Therefore, one can conclude that the first criterion, 
which refers to the focus of a research project, points to the open system perspective. The second 
mentioned criterion lays the focus on the organization’s goals because a look on this aspect helps 
to assess whether an inclusion of the environment constitutes a fundamental aspect for the 
organization. 
Without running risk of oversimplification it is fair to say no organization exists without 
goals. Setting-up goals is probably the most basic and, at the same time, the most essential 
characteristic of any organization because they guide, motivate, symbolize, justify and evaluate 
behavior (Scott and Davis 2007: 185). As already described above, the sociological term 
organization is very vague so that the overall goals provide a good impression about the possible 
relationship between the organization and its environment. Not surprisingly, goals differ from 
organization to organization. Whereas the primarily goal of a prison is to re-socialize people, an 
environmentalist group may aim to save the rainforest. Compared to a business company whose 
major goal is to make profit, public institutions such as libraries, museums, theatres but also 
municipal garbage disposals or national post offices primarily offer services for citizens. Bearing 
these diverse goals in mind, it becomes obvious that each type of organization faces different 
environmental challenges and opportunities. For achieving monetary goals any business company 
must strictly consider the consumers’ preferences, the number of competitors, and future 
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technological innovations as essential environmental characteristics whereas many public 
organizations are financed by the state so that their focus is a different one.  
When it comes to EU politics, the official tasks and goals of many regional governments in 
legislative regions usually include lobbying to shape European legislation whereas the objectives 
of administrative regions concentrate on networking and acquiring EU-funding opportunities. In 
order to fulfill their mission, the German Länder have established representation offices near the 
EU institutions. They constitute an early-warning-system which means that they inform the home 
administration about the latest developments and topical issues in the EU. Moreover, they are 
expected to promote regional concerns and interests directly upwards to the EU institutions and 
to build-up alliances with other actors. French regions, which as administrative regions do not 
enjoy legislative competences, fulfill rather vague tasks such as assisting regional and local 
politicians in their European initiatives or developing European projects. To be more precise, Table 
3 pinpoints the major tasks of two legislative as well as two administrative regions in EU politics.  
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Table 3: Overview of the tasks of different regional representation offices  
Regional representation offices of… Tasks/goals 
Baden-Württemberg (legislative region)  Early-Warning-System: informing the regional 
government about topical issues and 
developments in the EU 
 Addressing regional interests directly in European 
decision-making processes at all stages by 
contacting the European Parliament, the 
Commission, the Committee of the Regions, as 
well as the different Council formations.  
 Forging alliances with other regional 
representation offices 
 Communication-forum: connecting all kinds of 
actors to European decision-makers 
 Promoting the region’s cultural specialties, history 
and art  
Burgenland (legislative region)  Identifying and observing relevant subjects in 
order to get Burgland’s regional interests 
accommodated at the European level 
 Coordinating and preparing the agenda for the 
Committee of the Regions 
 Helping all kinds of actors to get in touch with 
European decision-makers 
 Cooperating with other regional offices 
 Promoting the region’s cultural specialties, history 
and art 
Ile-de-France (administrative region)  Informing and raising the awareness on EU 
policies and programs 
 Increasing the value and promoting the interests 
of its members to the European institutions 
 Assisting regional and local politicians and players 
in their European initiatives 
 Representing the Ile-de-France regional and local 
authorities to the European institutions 
West Midlands (administrative region)  Networking with partners or other business from 
across Europe 
 Developing European projects 
 Profiling other organizations, their products, 
services or projects to a European audience 
Source 9: http://www.stm.baden-wuerttemberg.de/de/Aufgaben/110857.html; 
http://www.burgenland.at/politik-verwaltung/landesverwaltung/landesamtsdirektion/60; 
http://www.iledefrance-europe.eu/index.php?id=57; http://wmie.wordpress.com/west-midlands-
european-centre/ 
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It becomes obvious that for any regional government that somehow interacts with the EU, the 
inclusion of the environment represents a fundamental criterion for achieving the respective 
goals. This observation has an important theoretical implication for the sociological understanding 
of regional governments as organizations because the applied paradigm should treat the 
(external) environment as a crucial factor that significantly influences organizational 
characteristics. In other words, if the research project addresses the activities of regional 
governments in the EU, the theory or the approach should not consider them as a closed system 
which is isolated from its environment but, quite the contrary, it should regard such organizations 
as open systems whose actions vis-à-vis other actors cannot be understood without incorporating 
environmental characteristics.   
The foregoing has demonstrated that for theoretical and practical reasons the open 
system perspective is the most suitable paradigm for this research project. As mentioned above, 
several theories and approaches exist within this paradigm, each of them laying the focus on 
different organizational aspects. The situational approach27 appears to represent the best option 
for analyzing and explaining the lobbying strategies of regional governments in legislative regions, 
because it specifically concentrates on the organization-environment relation (Pfeiffer 1976: 120; 
Allmendinger and Hinz 2002: 12; Preisendörfer 2011: 78).28  
 
3.2 The situational approach 
The situational approach has its origin in two traditional theories. On the one hand, it draws on 
insights from management theory which stresses that the internal structures of an organization 
have a strong impact on the behavior of the organization’s members as well as on the 
organization’s efficiency (Preisendörfer 2011: 80). On the other hand, the situational approach is 
heavily marked by Weber’s bureaucracy approach which emphasizes, among others, that the 
organization’s efficiency is strongly affected by a clear hierarchy, a precise division of labor, 
                                                          
27 In Anglo-Saxon literature, this approach is called “The Contingency Theory”. The reason for using the 
German expression is because the term “theory” appears to be somewhat misleading in this context, as it 
will be shown in the following section. 
28 The System Design theorists, in contrast, concentrate on improving work flows, control systems and 
information processing whereas Weick’s Model of Organizing scrutinizes the organization’s members and 
their collective perception of the environment which leads to informal rules or routines (Scott and Davis 
2007: 99-106). 
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codified formal rules and procedures which must apply to all members, and the mandatory 
written documentation of oral declarations and decisions (Weber 2010: 160-166). 
Until the 1950s most people did not question Weber’s work and some even considered it 
wrongly a universal model for private and public organizations alike. However, empirical research 
revealed that in reality many private organizations did not adhere to Weber’s ideal type of 
bureaucracy because it was regarded as inappropriate or even inefficient in some circumstances 
(Senge 2011: 34). Some organizations, for example, chose to create flat hierarchies with a 
decentralized system of decision-making whereas others have established steep hierarchies with 
a centralized system of decision-making. In similar vein, some organizations indeed established a 
precise division of labor whereas others assigned their members vague tasks so that they enjoyed 
considerable leeway. Due to this diversity, sociological research began to investigate more closely 
the different internal characteristics of organizations and attempted to answer the question of 
which organizational structure would be most efficient in what situation. For the first time, 
sociologists explicitly included the external environment of the organizations into their analysis 
because they assumed that the latter exerts a strong influence on the organization’s internal 
characteristics. Furthermore, by developing clear concepts, these ‘situational sociologists’ were 
the first who operationalized organizational variables such as hierarchy, standardization, 
centralization, division of labor and so forth in order to make these features comparable for future 
empirical research. Although the total number of these concepts may vary from subject to subject, 
sociologists have usually applied four specific ones but in its most basic form, the situational 
approach contains three principle concepts (see Figure 7).29 
                                                          
29 These four concepts are: “the organization’s situation”, “the organization’s structure”, “the behavior of 
the organization’s members” and “the organization’s efficiency” (Kieser and Kubicek 1978: 112). 
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Figure 7: The situational approach 
 
Source 10: own creation; based on Olavarria 1999: 224 
 
The first one constitutes the organization’s external situation which contains all relevant features 
that cannot be altered by an organization in the short run such as a country’s constitution or laws, 
the number of people who live in a certain territory, or consumer behavior. Depending on the 
respective research topic the number of possible factors might vary significantly. If, for example, 
the researcher focused on an economic organization whose aim is to develop marketing strategies 
for its clients, it would be almost impossible to enumerate all conceivable factors of the 
organization’s external situation that somehow affect the client’s success (Olavarria 1999: 227-
228). The second depicted concept represents the organization’s internal situation which 
includes, among others, the organization’s structure, the behavior of its members, the decision-
making procedures or any form of action taken by the organization. In contrast to the external 
situation, the organization is able to control or influence these factors in the short run. The 
organization can choose its own structure, it can set rules which stimulate members’ behavior, it 
decides whether decision should be taken unanimously and it is also free to select the most 
appropriate strategy. In other words, the regions’ lobbying strategies belong to the organization’s 
internal situation. The last concept is the organization’s goals which might involve anything that 
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the organizations wishes to achieve such as a high turnover, a high degree of efficiency, a high 
reputation among consumers or simply a favorable outcome of EU decision-making processes.  
The principle aim of this research project is to work out the preferred lobbying strategy of 
legislative regions or to put it differently: the main question is which type of lobbying strategy is 
considered most successful in what situation. In order to do that it is necessary to identify the 
most important factor of the organization’s external situation that predominantly impacts on the 
choice of a region’s lobbying strategies. 
Besides, analyzing this key factor is also very helpful for future research because scholars 
can bundle their efforts and come up with new evidence more easily. As this chapter will show, 
the legal and constitutional situation of the EU and the Member State represents the most crucial 
factor in this matter which can be distinguished between exclusive, shared and supporting or no 
legal competence. Consequently, this factor represents the independent variable and the regions’ 
lobbying strategies the dependent variable.  
This objective is compatible with the situational approach because its central thesis is that 
there is not just one single valid decision for acting but various situation-specific alternatives 
(Staehle 1981: 215). To be more specific, situational sociologists generate hypotheses such as ‘if 
an organization faces situation X1, the most promising course of action is Y1 whereas if an 
organization faces situation X2, the most promising course of action is Y2’. In other words, the 
proponents of the situational approach reject the overall validity of more general theories. 
Instead, their aim is to identify all conceivable courses of action in a given situation in order to 
then detect the most promising one (Staehle 1976: 36). Applying that thought to this research 
project, it means that we have to work out the conceivable lobbying strategies and determine the 
most promising one for EU Competition, Environmental and Education policies.  
But how do we do this? First of all, it is necessary to elaborate on the causal relationship 
between the organization’s external and internal situation. To put it differently, the researcher 
has to examine which factor of the organization’s external situation affects the organization’s 
lobbying strategies the most. This is done by plausibility assumptions (Olavarria 1999: 119; Kieser 
2002: 175). As outlined above, the lobbying strategies will be distinguished between working with 
the national government on the one side and working without the national government on the 
other (“by-passing”). Both strategies share coalition-building as a common feature but the “by-
passing strategy” explicitly excludes the national government as a potential coalition-partner (see 
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below). Since the situational approach alone is not capable of making any assumptions concerning 
a regional government’s preferences about coalition-partners, it is necessary to combine it with 
another model that explains and predicts actors’ behavior (Tomczak 1989; Gussek 1992; Olavarria 
1999). For that reason, this work is going to combine it with rational choice theory in order to 
develop situation-specific hypotheses. 
Comparing this research design with other studies which have applied the situational 
approach, it becomes obvious that this project concentrates on one independent variable only - 
the legal and constitutional situation of the EU and the Member State. Various works have, in 
contrast, investigated the impact of two to five independent variables of the organization’s 
external situation on its internal situation (Lawrence and Lorsch 1969; Tomczak 1989; Olavarria 
1999). As these studies focused on economic organizations such as business companies, the 
analysis of more than one external factor is deemed necessary because this type of organization 
pursues different goals and faces a far more complex situation than some governmental 
organizations do. For example, an international automobile manufacturer whose major goal is to 
achieve a high return on investment needs to consider an innumerable amount of factors such as 
consumers’ behavior and preferences, the total number of possible buyers and competitors, the 
competitors’ current market position, available technology, suppliers, infrastructure, 
environmental and geographical factors, the national tax system and many more, so that an 
analysis about economic organizations concentrating on only one factor would produce superficial 
and low-content results at best. EU lobbying strategies of governmental organizations, in contrast, 
are hardly or less affected by any of the above mentioned external factors but by just a few ones 
which have already been identified by MLG and interest group literature (see below).  
 
3.2.1 Critique 
Although the situational approach has constantly gained popularity among sociologists, 
economists and political scientists, it has received a lot of criticism so that its shortcomings should 
be brought up also (Staehle 1981: 223-226; Kieser 2002: 183-191; Kieser and Walgenbach 2010: 
432-435; Preisendörfer 2011: 92-94). First, the situational approach’s postulated one-way 
relationship between the organization’s external and internal situation is not always correct 
because some organizations may indeed have enough power to exert influence or even control 
their environment (Aldrich 2008: 144-145). Yet, these sorts of organizations are either monopolies 
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or oligarchies or they are international corporations which generate immense profit and employ 
a huge number of people so that they are able put pressure on other organizations. Clearly, 
regional governments do not fall into this category so that this critique can be neglected. 
Second, the operationalization of variables in various empirical studies is inconsistent. 
Studies which refer to each other have either used different scales or some researchers asked 
about perception whereas other focused on hard, measurable facts. This crucial difference makes 
comparisons very difficult if not impossible. However, the selected independent variable of this 
project - the legal and constitutional situation of the EU and the Member State – can be easily 
operationalized; in this regard, legal-political experts differentiate between exclusive, shared and 
supporting or no competences (Piris 2010: 75).  
Third, the empirical evidence which has been produced so far is not representative 
because all studies took samples without making reference to the total population. This weakness 
can be ascribed to the fact that for most organizations, particularly economic ones, it is almost 
impossible to estimate or even calculate the total population. This issue does not touch 
representation offices of legislative regions since almost all maintain one.30 Besides, this study 
does not work with samples but includes all legislative regions of Germany and the United 
Kingdom.31 
Fourth, the quality of information produced by most studies applying the situational 
approach has not been very high because they analyzed the structure of organizations. Typical 
results are ‘the larger the organization, the more decisions are taken on a decentralized basis‘ or 
‘the stronger the pressure of competition, the more decisions are taken on a decentralized basis’ 
(Kieser 2002: 184). Since this project does not focus on the organization’s structure but on the 
regions’ strategies to influence EU legislation this study is expected to reveal more interesting 
results. 
Fifth, and closely related to the previous aspect, it is noted that the situational approach 
lacks explanatory power since it does not say anything about the actor’s preference for strategy 
selection. Scholars compensate for that deficit by combining the situational approach with 
another model which is capable of explaining and predicting actors’ behavior so that clear-cut 
                                                          
30 The only exception constitutes the Austrian region Vorarlberg. Besides, Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein 
share one representation in Brussels (Hansa-Office). 
31 With the exception of Saxony and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania which refused to take part in this 
project. 
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hypotheses can be produced (Tomczak 1989; Gussek 1992; Olavarria 1999). Since this critique also 
applies to this study, the situational approach will be combined with rational-choice theory.  
To sum up, the situational approach has been criticized with good cause but its deficits, 
which in most cases refer to economic organizations, are negligible for this study. 
 
3.2.2 Lobbying strategies of regions in EU decision-making 
Chapter 1 has pointed out the high importance of the EU for regions so that it does not come as 
a surprise that legislative regions do not remain passive but become active players at the 
European level whose major objective is to have a say in EU decision-making. In this regard, liberal 
intergovernmentalists underline that the Member State government holds a gate-keeper position 
so that regions are only able to influence EU policies by liaising with their national government. 
Multi-level governance proponents, in contrast, not only stress that “regions play an important 
role in the EU system of multi-level governance” (Bauer and Börzel 2010: 260) but also that they 
“have the opportunity to become relevant players in the Brussels policy-game even against the 
wishes of their sometimes inextensible gate-keeping central governments” (Tatham 2008: 511). 
These opinions are based on the fact that regions may establish direct communication with (a) 
the European Commission, (b) the Council of Ministers, (c) the European Parliament, (d) and the 
Committee of the Regions in order to influence policy processes to their favor. However, whether 
legislative regions really by-pass their national government in policy fields other than structural 
and cohesion policy on a regular basis is not known. For that reason, this study distinguishes the 
regions’ lobbying strategies as follows: either they work with their national government in order 
to promote their interests at the European level or they work without it (“by-passing”). 
 Although the national government is either included or excluded, both strategies have 
something in common: they rely on coalition-building. Coalition-building is a process in which 
actors at different levels exchange information, coordinate their activities and cooperate with 
each other in order to increase their chances to make their voice heard. The basic rationale behind 
this idea is to boost the region’s political weight in meetings with EU decision-makers. To put it 
differently, instead of lobbying the decision-makers of EU institutions individually or 
autonomously, a region liaises closely with other actors and confronts the European Commission, 
the Council or the European Parliament with an aggregated viewpoint. Chapter 2 has worked out, 
inter alia, that the Commission explicitly demands European solutions and hard, verifiable facts 
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so that this institution is more receptive to one statement of ten actors than to ten single 
statements. Since the European Commission is a key decision-maker in EU politics, coalition-
building appears to be mandatory in almost all circumstances. 
In case the regional government decides not to work with the national government, it may 
build a coalition with three potential types of actors. The first possible coalition-partners, who 
might allow the region to by-pass the national government, constitute other regions within the 
same Member State. This type of coalition is probably the easiest one to build because a regional 
government is often aware of the interests of its regional counterparts. Especially if consistent 
intergovernmental-institutionalized procedures (see below) are already in place, it neither takes 
much effort or time to coordinate and cooperate with other inner-state regions. For that reason, 
such a coalition appears to be very fruitful to promote regional interests at the European level. 
Second, a region could consider a coalition with regions from other Member States. In comparison 
to the previous type of coalition, this one is difficult to forge because of possible communication 
problems and a lack of institutionalized procedures. The advantage of this coalition type is that it 
allows a regional government to convincingly argue from a European perspective and to present 
EU-wide solutions. In this regard, European platforms such as REGLEG may provide legislative 
regions in different Member States a forum where they can coordinate their views. Third, a region 
could also forge ad-hoc coalitions with non-governmental actors such as private companies, 
associations, labor unions, NGOs and so forth. As the European Commission especially requests 
expertise from actors that are directly affected by its proposals, a coalition with those 
organizations may provide the regional government with concrete, verifiable facts which make it 
more likely that Commission personnel take the region’s point of view into consideration. In 
contrast to the second coalition-type, this one seems to be easier to build because either the 
regional government already knows the key persons in international business companies, 
employers’ associations, labor unions etc., or those organizations establish contact with the 
regional government on their own. 
Intuitively, one may also think that the European Parliament and the European 
Commission constitute potential coalition-partners with whom the region could by-pass its central 
government. This conclusion, however, would be premature in the case of the European 
Parliament and it would be wrong with regard to the European Commission. Although each region 
has ‘its own’ MEPs in the Parliament, one should not assume that these MEPs support their 
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regional government in any circumstance. Chapter 2 has already pointed out that although MEPs 
are receptive to national and regional concerns, each MEP has to argue from a European 
perspective in order to convince other MEPs. If no other region is negatively affected by a 
proposal, the MEPs cannot assist their regional government. The European Commission 
constitutes a political neutral institution which does not build coalitions at all (Interview 1, 
Interview 2, Interview 3). To be more specific, a civil servant in this institution stressed that “it is 
correct that we establish contact to all kinds of actors and take their concerns into consideration 
before we elaborate on a draft. But we would never ever build any kind of coalition or even change 
proposals simply because the content is unpleasant for one individual organization only. In fact, 
our proposals are always unpleasant for some organizations and if we backed down in such a 
situation, we could stop making proposals once and for all” (Interview 2). On top of that, one 
should bear in mind that both actors are not homogenous but heterogeneous institutions. Even if 
a region was able to convince one DG or a number of MEPs about its perspective, this would be 
meaningless unless the remaining DGs and the other for a majority needed MEPs would support 
it as well. For these reasons, neither the European Parliament nor the European Commission are 
treated as potential coalition-partners for regional governments. As a result, they only remain key 
addressees of lobbying. 
The idea that regions could build coalitions with other actors in order to make their voice 
heard at the European level is not a pure theoretical thought. Although it is certainly true that the 
majority of regional cooperation agreements in the past focused on economic and cultural 
matters, there are also several examples that prove that political cooperation has become an 
important instrument to influence the European political agenda. For instance, Christian Engel 
(2005: 127) states that North-Rhine Westphalia and Scotland have concluded several agreements 
with the aim to establish a close political cooperation in European matters, as both regions are 
aware that they can achieve more by working together. Hooghe and Marks (2001: 87) report that 
Saxony-Anhalt preferred to cooperate more closely with Spanish regional offices than with West 
German Länder because it shared more economic features with the former. Moreover, Peter 
Bursens and Jana Deforche (2008: 8) point out that trans-regional cooperation helped Flanders 
considerably to shape the development of the Council Regulation on the European Sugar Reform 
in 2006 to its favor. On top of that, North Rhine-Westphalia has forged alliances with industrial 
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actors in order to amend the Commission’s proposal concerning the REACH regulation (Stein 
2007: 142-144). 
This section has worked out the different possible coalition-partners of a regional 
government, but which one will be chosen by a regional government to boost its political weight? 
When does a region prefer to build a coalition with inner- or outer-state regions? It is likely that a 
region forges a coalition with a business company, a labor union or a NGO? Or does a region even 
attempt to use all possible types of coalitions simultaneously? It has been stated above that the 
situational approach can only reveal the most promising course of action in a given situation if it 
is combined with another model. Therefore, the following section will elaborate on this aspect by 
applying rational choice theory. 
 
3.2.3 Regional governments as rational actor   
Ideally, an organization may attempt to forge as many coalitions as possible in order to increase 
the pressure on EU institutions. As it will be argued below, however, coalition-building requires 
human and materialistic resources in order to find the right partners. Yet, it is fair to say that no 
organization possesses an unlimited pool of resources and compared to most economic 
organizations, governmental organizations have to work with a relatively small budget. Moreover, 
coalition-building usually implies that the initial position with regard to concerned EU legislation 
has to be altered in order to reach a compromise. Taking this dilemma into account, this work 
assumes that regional governments are rational actors. Using rational choice arguments for 
predicting the behavior and actions of governmental actors as regards EU lobbying appears to be 
legitimate because scholars have already highlighted the importance for interest groups of 
employing scarce resources effectively (Dür 2008: 1218). 
A core assumption of rational choice theory is utility maximization by weighing opportunities 
and constraints (Opp 1999: 173; Abraham 2001: 3) which means that a rational acting organization 
is tended to choose the most effective and efficient course(s) of action. Effectiveness refers to a 
high degree of target attainment and efficiency relates to optimal resource consumptions which 
keeps materialistic and personnel costs as low as possible. In the context of EU lobbying strategies 
of legislative regions this means that a regional government will not forge coalitions with all 
possible candidates but only with the most influential coalition-partner. 
86 
 
With regard to effectiveness, it is necessary to bear in mind that there are many actors at the 
European level that also try to shape EU legislation to their favor. Even experts are not able to 
quantify the exact number of lobbyists but it is assumed that there are more than 15,000 (Beise 
2014: 17). Particularly, international enterprises, global corporations and consulting agencies that 
possess immense financial resources and political power are part of the ‘EU game’. Every day, the 
EU-institutions receive a flood of emails, opinions, statements, assessment reports etc. so that 
the influence of one single actor appears to be negligible. Therefore, many small- and medium-
sized companies make use of EU-umbrella associations (so-called Eurogroups) which consists of 
groups with similar interests closely located at the EU institutions. The overall objectives of such 
a collective are the creation and maintenance of a platform for observing each other, the bundling 
of specific interests for increasing the likelihood of shaping EU policies, and the reduction of costs 
stemming from lobbying activities. But not only regions face immense competition in EU politics; 
the Commission itself is predominately interested in pan-European solutions so that individual 
opinions are of minor importance. Taking these aspects in account, one can conclude that with a 
very high level of probability a region is almost always obliged to forge coalitions with other actors 
in any circumstance.  
Concerning efficiency it is fair to assume that no organization possesses an unlimited number 
of human and materialistic resources, and therefore, a rational actor always seeks to reach its goal 
with an optimal resource management. In comparison to other legislative regions, the German 
Länder are well staffed and continue “to set a benchmark in regional representation” (Rowe 2011: 
129), but only a handful employ enough personnel to cover all policy fields. Consequently, several 
civil servants handle more than one policy area so that they cannot invest much time for finding 
and contacting all possible coalition-partners. Besides, coalition-building is usually resource 
intensive. Therefore, a coalition is only forged if the interests of both parties are similar but it 
requires time and effort to find this out. In the case of a potential coalition partner being 
identified, contact will be established. In politics it is widely known that the devil lies in the detail 
which means that both sides often disagree about some aspects. As a result, a compromise is 
needed and since more coalitions usually require more compromises, the final position may only 
represent the lowest common denominator. Therefore, an organization’s priority is to seek the 
most influential coalition-partner in order to save time, resources and to reach the highest utility.  
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Since rational actors are interested in achieving a high degree of target attainment and 
keeping resource consumption as low as possible, the question arises of whether a regional 
government is supposed to concentrate its lobbying efforts on the European Commission, the 
Council or the Parliament. Clearly, no institution can be considered unimportant but from a 
rational actor’s perspective it makes sense to particularly focus on the potential veto-players in 
the concerned policy field.32 A veto-player is a single actor (or a group of actors) who has certain 
preferences over policy outcomes which is capable of blocking a change in the status quo. 
Obviously, this definition already indicates that the EU’s and the Member State’s legal and 
constitutional situation is particularly helpful in this regard because it specifically scrutinizes which 
actor possesses what competences to adopt laws. As a consequence, the regional government’s 
strategy and possible coalition-partner(s) heavily depend upon this external factor. 
As it will be shown further below, the European Commission represents the veto-player in 
most EU Competition policies whereas the Council and the Parliament constitute the potential 
veto-players in EU Environment and EU Education policy. But which actor will be specifically 
targeted by regional governments in the last two mentioned policy areas? From a rational choice 
perspective, the answer is the Council of Ministers for a couple of reasons. First, the regional 
government does not have to spend much time and effort to get in touch with the national 
government so that it gets to know its standing easily. This point does not apply to the European 
Parliament because the region only possesses close access to ‘its own’ MEPs. In other words, if 
the regional government wants to be thoroughly informed about the other MEPs’ opinions, it 
needs to invest far more resources in comparison to the ‘Council-route’ which would be 
inefficient. Besides, if the MEP belongs to a different political party, establishing contact might be 
considered burdensome for some regional politicians. 
 The second reason relates to the voting behavior in both institutions so that this argument 
takes the effectiveness aspect into consideration. With regard to the system of decision-making 
in the Council, it has been shown that it is based on consensus which means that it is very unusual 
to outvote other Member States. Consequently, if the national government picks up the region’s 
                                                          
32 The qualifier ‘potential’ has to be used because since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the 
Member State government de jure constitutes a veto-player in only a very limited number of policy fields, 
such as Common Foreign and Security Policy. In the vast majority of policy areas, however, one Member 
State could be outvoted in the Council if it does not meet the criteria for a reaching a blocking-minority. 
According to the Treaty Article 16 TFEU “A blocking minority must include at least four Council members, 
failing which the qualified majority shall be deemed attained.” 
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concerns, it is not unreasonable to assume that its interests will be accommodated to some 
extent. Concerning the European Parliament, however, no MEP can solely defend its region’s 
interests because, in total, there are 751 MEPs who represent more than 200 regions in the EU. 
For that reason, the MEPs have to think European and promote the public wellbeing of all EU 
citizens. Besides, the two largest political parties – the EEP and the S&D – almost always forge a 
coalition (in party political terms) which requires many informal meetings and negotiations so that 
it is extremely difficult to anticipate the MEPs final voting behavior. As a result, the ‘EP-route’ 
appears to be less effective than the ‘Council-route’. 
 The third and last argument considers the Council’s configuration which also refers to the 
effectiveness aspect. Sometimes, legislative regions have the possibility to represent the Member 
State government in this institution because the region is particularly affected by the 
Commission’s proposal, as for example Scotland in EU Fisheries policy. Moreover, some legislative 
regions even possess the legal right to represent its national government if their exclusive 
competences are touched, as for example the German Länder in EU Education policy. Although 
the region is not allowed to defend its regional interests solely, it seems obvious that this route 
promises a higher degree of target attainment than the ‘EP-Route’.  
 
3.3 The external factors’ influence on the regions’ lobbying 
strategy  
The MLG and interest group literature specifies several factors which all have an impact on a 
region’s capability to influence EU policy-making to its favor (see Figure 8). Until now scholars 
have not attempted to relate these factors to the region’s lobbying strategies so that their 
individual importance in this matter is not clear, yet. Therefore, this section is not only going to 
describe these external factors but it will also analyze their effect on the two different lobbying 
strategies. It has been argued that a region either works with or without its national government 
in order to defend its interests. Since one of the objectives of this research project is to investigate 
whether regions actually by-pass their national government in policy areas other than structural 
and cohesion policy, this section is going to identify the factor which increases a region’s chances 
of defending its interests without including the national government. In other words, we are 
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looking for the factor which makes state by-passing most likely. It will be shown that the legal and 
constitutional situation of the EU and the Member State represents this key factor.  
 
Figure 8: Factors influencing a region’s impact on EU legislation  
 
Source 11: own graph 
 
3.3.1 The legal and constitutional situation of the EU and the Member State 
The legal and constitutional situation of the EU and the Member State is regularly stated as an 
important factor influencing a region’s activities at the European level because EU decisions could 
lead to a further erosion of the region’s political competences (Jeffery 2000: 12). Generally, the 
more constitutionally guaranteed rights a region enjoys the more relevant this factor gets. 
Especially the German Länder experienced this kind of competence lost when the federal 
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government gradually transferred regional competencies to the European institutions in the 
1990s, thereby weakening their political situation in the domestic system of decision-making.  
The legal and constitutional situation lays the focus on which actor possesses what 
competences to adopt laws (Bomberg and Peterson 1998: 219; Jeffery and Palmer 2007: 221; 
Bauer and Pitschel 2008: 77; Sturm and Bauer 2010: 24). Depending on the legal basis of the 
concerned EU policy field, this factor may scrutinize the European Commission, the Council, the 
European Parliament, and the Committee of the Regions, and depending on the constitutional 
situation of the Member State, the national government as well as the regional governments 
needs to be included into the analysis. At both levels, legal experts differentiate between 
exclusive, shared or supporting/no political competences. Particularly in federal systems, 
legislative regions possess shared and even exclusive competences in several policy fields, so that 
the central government is legally obliged to negotiate those policies with its subnational 
authorities. 
With regard to the factor’s influence on the regions’ lobbying strategies, it is almost 
impossible to deny its importance. To begin with, regions that are legally or constitutionally 
equipped with political competences may represent the Member State in the Council of Ministers 
which means that they probably possess the best channel of interest representation at all. Usually, 
legislative regions complain about not being included in EU decision-making processes so that this 
opportunity would eliminate this deficit. In case the concerned region enjoys exclusive political 
competences in the respective policy field, the likelihood of having the right to use this channel is 
comparatively high. In this regard, especially federalized states such Germany, Austria and 
Belgium grant their region this possibility. Moreover, even regionalized states such as the UK do 
not deny its legislative regions the ability to represent the Member States in the Council. Although 
regions are legally forbidden to address particular regional-specific interests, Tatham’s quote of a 
DG Director demonstrates that one must not underestimate the regional minister’s psychological 
impact on the member state minister and on the Commissioner: 
 
In Councils you also have frequent bilateral meetings: so the Commissioner would meet 
bilaterally with the UK delegation and if it is at political level then it would be Ross Finnie 
and Ben Bradshaw who are in the meeting. And Ross Finnie would speak about the 
Scottish points. I think it does make a difference. I don’t think you can say that a regional 
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Minister, because of the rule of the Treaty that regional Ministers don’t have a say, that 
therefore their role is limited. I think it is very much a psychological impact that he has 
but, at the end of the day, it is a real impact. (Tatham 2008: 501)   
 
Additionally, it is plausible that regions with legally codified rights enjoy greater significance in the 
eyes of the EU-institutions because they play a very decisive role for the voters and the political 
system of their Member State. Although hard evidence is rare, experts stress that legislative 
regions are “qualitatively different to those relations established between the Commission and 
the representatives of non-constitutional regions. Policy positions delivered via constitutional 
regions’ representations in Brussels carry the weight of their formal political power in domestic 
arena” (Rowe 2011: 93; emphasis in the original). Interestingly, interviews with civil servants of 
representation offices and the European Commission, which had been conducted before and 
during this research project, confirmed this assumption. A policy adviser of DG Education and 
Culture stressed that “in my policy field there is a huge difference between administrative and 
legislative regions because the latter have exclusive policy competences. As a matter of fact, we 
pay close attention to the opinion of those regions and we also follow their invitations more 
frequently” (Interview 1). This perception already indicates that a coalition with other legislative 
regions appears to be very promising. 
 On top of that, the system of decision-making at the European level, which is specified in the 
Treaties, exerts a considerable impact on the region’s lobbying strategy. If, for example, the EU 
enjoys exclusive legal competences in a policy field, the Council of Ministers and the European 
Parliament usually cannot cast their veto on a planned initiative. Therefore, one can assume that 
a region concentrates its energy on building a coalition with those actors that are especially 
helpful in this situation to convince the European Commission. If, however, the concerned policy 
only belongs to the EU’s shared competences, the ordinary legislative procedure has to be applied 
in most circumstances so that the Council and the Parliament constitute potential veto-players. 
For the reasons stated above, a regional government is probably tempted to work with its national 
government because the latter plays an essential role in the Council. 
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3.3.2 Intergovernmental institutionalized procedures 
Intergovernmental institutionalized procedures (IIP) refer to the existing formal mechanisms 
between the various governmental levels in a Member State for exchanging information (Agranoff 
2004: 34-42; Sturm 2009: 18). Such formal procedures are important for regions in a number of 
ways; firstly, they provide a forum that is conducive to negotiation and consultation, so that the 
regional government is able to make its voice heard, and secondly, it may have the chance to 
persuade other governmental actors of its position. In Germany, for example, regional ministers 
meet their counterparts of the other Länder on a regular basis in standing conferences such as 
the Conference of Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs, the Conference of Ministers of 
Environmental Affairs or the Conference of Ministers of Justice. Regional ministers use these 
official conferences to coordinate their positions in order to increase the efficiency of later 
decision-making in the Bundesrat – the legislative body that represents the sixteen Länder at the 
federal level. Moreover, IIP also constitute some sort of safety net for regional governments in 
case of party political incongruence. In case national elections lead to a change of government, 
already established formal mechanisms are very useful for future cooperation in European Affairs 
because the different parties are ‘forced’ to meet, exchange their viewpoints, and get used to 
each other so that, ultimately, a trustful relationship can be established. However, one should 
also be aware that IIPs alone do not say much about the region’s capability of affecting EU policies 
positively, as they could also be ineffective if the other governmental actors are opposed to 
support the region. Portraying it from a different angle, even in the absence of IIP, a legislative 
region could get its interests accommodated at the European level if, for example, it knows the 
central government or other actors at its side.  
Concerning the factor’s influence on a region’s lobbying strategy, one can state that due 
to regular meetings and conferences, coalition-building with the other governmental actors is 
facilitated because of two reasons. First, IIPs ensure that networks are developed between 
regional counterparts, and secondly, consistent IIPs result in greater exchange of knowledge and 
understanding between governments. In other words, IIPs speed up coordination and save 
valuable time so that a region can establish contact with key EU decision-makers more easily. 
Consequently, one can argue that IIP indirectly increase the region’s scope of action at the 
European level so that this factor might affect the lobbying strategy to some extent. 
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Finally, one may also highlight that IIP is influenced by the EU’s and the Member State’s 
constitutional and legal situation which provides an additional argument for the importance of 
this factor. For example, a constitution which grants regions exclusive legal-political rights leads 
inevitably to the establishment of consistent formal mechanisms that facilitate cooperation and 
coordination between the various governmental levels. In federal states such as Germany, Austria 
or Belgium, regions possess state-like quality so that they even have the obligation to establish 
the necessary formal mechanisms and institutions - otherwise, they could not fulfill their overall 
responsibility for the state as a whole. Yet, regionalized Member States such as Spain or the United 
Kingdom have less IIP at their disposal. Consequently, intra-regional coalition-building is rendered 
more difficult so that the national government takes on a key position for promoting regional 
interests upwards the European level (Nagel 2010: 153). 
 
3.3.3 Legitimacy 
Several political scholars have stated that legitimacy is a powerful variable which might strengthen 
the bargaining position of an actor during negotiations. Keating links legitimacy to the presence 
of a civil society and claims that a “regional government operates best where there is a well-
developed civil society, a sense of identity, civic traditions, an associative life, and relationships of 
confidence and exchange within the territory (Keating 1997: 394). The same author illustrates the 
increasing importance of regional civil society due to the weakened position of many nation states 
so that people within a certain territory assume regional rather than national values (Keating 
2001). Jeffery (2000: 17-18) takes up that argument and enumerates some examples which 
demonstrate that several regions with a strong civil society played a bigger role in EU policies than 
other regional governments within the very same Member State. In the case of Spain he refers to 
Catalonia and the Basque Country which were capable of influencing European policies better 
compared to their regional counterparts. Moreover, he names the Ardèche and the Drôme 
departments in France which were more successful in acquiring EU structural funds than their 
French counterparts. On top of that, he also provides the negative example of the English region 
West of England which was not successful in ‘region-building’ because of the absence of a regional 
civil society. Jeffery does not specify how these regions were capable of doing that but he indicates 
that central state institutions are less likely to ignore or deflect the articulated interests of such 
regions (Jeffery 2000: 17). 
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As regards the factor’s impact on the region’s lobbying strategy, one can argue that it may 
facilitate establishing contact to EU decision-makers on the one hand but that it also aggravates 
coalition-building on the other. Starting with the latter assumption, a long regional history, special 
traditions and local folklore are features that are unique for one specific territory. If a legislative 
proposal or an EU matter somehow touches these characteristics it appears very unlikely that 
other actors are affected to the same extent or in the same way. Consequently, the chances of 
building a coalition with other regions are relatively low. For example, when the EU statistical 
agency Eurostat prohibited Scottish kilt-makers to register the traditional dress as men’s clothing, 
Scotland could only build a coalition with the local and regional clothing industry since no other 
actors were affected. However, the small number of affected organizations also had an 
advantage: the Scottish government was the sole actor that intervened at the European level so 
that, in turn, EU authorities could not and did not ignore the Scottish request.33 
Admittedly, this example does not refer to EU decision-making but it illuminates that 
legitimacy might aggravate rather than facilitate coalition-building with other regions or the 
national government. Moreover, this anecdote has shown that the UK Government was not 
involved in this matter and that Scotland solved this issue on its own. In view of these contrasting 
results, we cannot conclude with certainty that legitimacy increases or decreases the chances of 
by-passing the national government. 
 
3.3.4 Leadership 
Another factor that helps to increase the likelihood of getting regional interests accommodated 
is a charismatic leader who is able to win peoples’ trust (Jeffery and Palmer 2007: 222). The 
sociologist Max Weber defines charisma as “a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue 
of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, 
superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities” (Weber 1968: 48).  
Arguably, it is very challenging to pick a leader who is ‘supernatural’ or ‘superhuman’, but 
lobby organizations may choose a brilliant negotiator who shows empathy and is capable of 
conducting complex negotiations and is convincing others. Besides, as Jeffery points out 
leadership does not need to be high profile. To be more specific, he refers to Rembert Behrendt, 
                                                          
33 In the end, the statistical forms of Eurostat were amended. 
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the permanent Secretary for the Ministry of Economic Affairs in Saxony-Anhalt in the second part 
of the 1990s, who personifies effective behind-the-scenes networking (Jeffery 2000: 16). Another 
example would be Edmund Stoiber, the former Minister-President of Bavaria, who put a lot of 
effort to strengthen Bavaria’s role in the EU and established a very effective internal organization 
(Bulmer et al. 2000: 37). 
In general, efficient leadership can be performed by any region regardless of its size and 
political power so that particularly small regions such as Saxony-Anhalt or Rhineland-Palatinate 
might ‘punch above their weight’. So far this factor has been applied to the inner regional context 
only but one could also transfer the understanding of leadership from the regional to the 
supranational level. If a legislative proposal by the Commission, for example, caused negative 
effects for a region, the charismatic leader might use his/her influential contacts in the European 
institutions to defend regional interests. Enjoying the rapporteur’s support of the respective 
committee in the European Parliament or having a civil servant in COREPER on its side can 
certainly help to make changes to the Commission’s initial proposal. Nonetheless, it should be 
emphasized that this leader still needs concrete and verifiable evidence in order to defend 
regional-specific interests. This fact applies to negotiations and discussions at the regional and 
national level, but it is even more important in the European context. EU officials are steadily 
contacted by all kinds of lobbyists and each of them wants to exert influence. In this regard, each 
lobby organization has to bear in mind that the Commission, the Council and the European 
Parliament require different kinds of information as Chapter 2 has already demonstrated. 
Consequently, if the lobbyist is a charismatic leader but does not take the demanded information 
into account, (s)he will probably not be heard and the lobbying attempt will not be successful. 
 
3.3.5 The demographic and economic situation 
The previously presented factors are widely accepted among experts and there is no doubt about 
their relevance concerning EU decision-making. However, there are some further factors such as 
the demographic and the economic situation which are comparatively rarely stated in the 
academic literature (Nielsen and Salk 1998). In fact, in most cases they are only mentioned 
indirectly (Bouwen 2002: 10; Jeffery and Palmer 2007: 222). The reason for this is probably 
because there is no empirical proof of a direct cause-effect-relationship or that contradicting 
results have been produced. For example, some scholars have shown that a sound economic 
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situation stimulated greater subnational activity at the European level, whereas others have 
demonstrated that the opposite is true (Sturm and Bauer 2010: 24). Since both the demographic 
and economic situation are interconnected to some extent, they will be analyzed together. 
Demography or size refers to the number of people who live in a Member State’s region. 
Particularly in the context of interest representation in democratic societies, the demographic 
situation usually becomes an essential factor which increases the bargaining position of an actor. 
Therefore, large regions within a federal Member State possess more seats in the second chamber 
than smaller ones. Although one cannot apply this national rule to the European level one-to-one, 
it seems very likely that Bremen or Hamburg exert less political influence on an EU initiative than 
Bavaria or North Rhine-Westphalia. However, whether the region’s size really affects policy 
processes at the European level has not been proven, yet. In fact, even a heavily populated region 
such as North Rhine-Westphalia is comparatively small to the rest of Europe. Besides, the 
Commission demands European-wide solutions so that the voice of one single region appears to 
be very weak. Within the national context, however, small regions are more likely to follow the 
larger ones because the latter are more influential thanks to their substantial relative size (Nielsen 
and Salk 1998: 244). 
The economic situation focuses on the economic structure of a region and is to some 
extent connected with the demographic situation. An often used indicator is the region’s gross 
domestic product which constitutes the market value of all officially recognized final goods and 
services produced within a certain territory. Usually, the higher the region’s GDP the more people 
are employed in that territory. The lower the region’s employment rate, in turn, the more people 
move and live there. Scholarship has shown that an organization with political and economic clout 
is more likely to gain access to the EU institutions which means that its scope of action is higher 
compared to economic weak organizations (Eising 2007). Furthermore, one may argue that a solid 
economic situation might provide a region with the opportunity to pay off other regions for 
supporting its request. However, there is no empirical proof that regions have done that in EU 
politics.  
 
3.3.6 Conclusion 
The aim of this section was to work out which factor makes state by-passing most likely. Although 
each factor has an impact on by-passing, the above analysis has demonstrated that the legal and 
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constitutional situation of the EU and the Member State constitutes the most important factor in 
this regard. Its overall significance is based on the following arguments: 
 regions may legally be allowed to represent the Member State government in the Council 
of Ministers, 
 the European Commission considers legislative regions as important actors in some policy 
fields due to their legal political role in the Member State 
 the EU’s legal system of decision-making impacts on the regions’ lobbying strategy and  
 the regions’ own legal-political competences have a strong influence on the choice of 
coalition-partners as well.  
 
It has also been pointed out that this factor positively impacts on the intergovernmental-
institutionalized procedures which facilitate coalition-building with other governmental actors. As 
a result, the legal and constitutional situation of the EU and the Member State represents the key 
factor which impacts on the region’s choice of lobbying strategy so that it constitutes the 
independent variable of this research project.  
 
3.4 Hypotheses 
After having worked out the independent variable of this research project, the question arises of 
which is the preferred lobbying strategy of German and UK regions in EU Competition, 
Environment and Education policies. For theoretical and analytical reasons, it makes sense to 
subdivide it into the following two questions: 
1. Which legal and constitutional situation of the EU and the Member State is likely to cause 
the regional government to work with or without its national government? 
2. Which coalition-partner is deemed most important if the EU’s and the Member State’s 
legal and constitutional situation tempt the regional government to work without its 
national government (“by-passing”)? 
The answer to the first question is that if the regional level possesses only shared or no political 
competences in the concerned policy field and the national government constitutes a potential 
veto-player through the Council, the majority of regions within the Member State will work with 
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their national government because it represents the most effective and efficient coalition-partner. 
From the three selected policy areas in this research project, EU Environmental policy depicts such 
a legal constellation for both the German Länder and the UK legislative regions. It should be 
emphasized that the expression “the majority of regions…”34 is important and must be included 
in each hypothesis because one cannot expect that all regions within a Member State will behave 
similarly. Consequently, without a threshold any hypothesis has to be rejected as soon as one 
single region sheers out of line. After all, the situational approach underlines that the external 
situation does not determine actors’ behavior but provides incentives or obstacles. By accepting 
that a threshold is necessary, the question arises of how high it is supposed to be. As stated in 
chapter 1, this work argues that if MLG scholars seriously want to challenge liberal 
intergovernmentalists, state by-passing needs to occur on a regular basis. If in practice state by-
passing is the exception rather than the rule, it appears unlikely that more scholars will be 
convinced by MLG proponents. Therefore, if more than 50% of the population respond in the 
designed questionnaire that ‘in no cases’ or just ‘in a few cases’ coalition-building with the 
national government is necessary, one can argue that the regularity criterion is met.35 With 
regard to the legal and constitutional situation in EU Environmental policies, the first hypothesis 
is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  If the region possesses shared or no political competences in the concerned policy 
at the national level and the Member State government constitutes a potential veto-player 
through the Council at the European level, the national government represents the most 
important coalition-partner for a regional government to defend its interests. As a consequence, 
the majority of regions are going to work with the national government so that state by-passing 
will not occur. 
 
Hence, in any legal or constitutional situation other than in hypothesis 1, it is expected that regions 
will work without their national government which brings us to the second question stated above. 
Assuming that regional governments constitute rational actors who are predominantly interested 
                                                          
34 The majority represents more than half of the total population of regions in a Member State. In the 
case of Germany, there are 16 legislative regions so that the majority is nine and since the UK consists of 
three legislative regions, the majority is two. 
35 See question 5 in the questionnaire, Annex A 
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in a high degree of target attainment and optimal resource management, it has been argued that 
they primarily seek those coalitions that are deemed necessary for convincing the potential veto-
player in the EU decision-making process. In the case of EU Competition policy, the potential veto-
player is clearly the European Commission because, from a legal point of view it may adopt 
legislation without formally involving the Council or the European Parliament.36 Chapter 2 has 
been worked out that the European Commission is primarily receptive to precise information and 
expertise stemming from the affected organizations as well as arguments which are of European 
nature. Consequently, it seems reasonable to expect that regions build coalitions with non-
governmental actors such as business companies, NGOs and worker associations in order to 
obtain the demanded information. Additionally, one can assume that they also attempt to forge 
coalitions with regions from other EU Member States so that they are capable of arguing from a 
European perspective. To put it differently, regions will work without their national government 
in order to defend their regional interests because the latter does not constitute a potential veto-
player at the European level. As a result, the second hypothesis is as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 2:  If the EU possesses exclusive competences in the concerned policy and the 
Member State government is not involved in the decision-making process through the Council, 
regions from other EU Member States and non-governmental actors such as business companies, 
NGOs or employer associations represent the most important coalition-partners for a regional 
government to convince the European Commission from its viewpoint. As a consequence, the 
majority of regions are going to work without the national government so that state by-passing 
will occur. 
 
In comparison to the two previous policy areas, the case of EU Education policy is more nuanced 
and complicated because the legal and constitutional situation in Germany and the UK differs. 
Whereas the German Länder not only enjoy exclusive competences but also the legal right to 
represent the Member State government in the Council of Ministers, the UK legislative regions 
are legally not allowed to do so because they only possess shared competences in this matter. 
                                                          
36 Chapter 4 works out that EU Competition policy can be distinguished between five sub-fields and that 
regions only become active in two of them. Therefore, this research project solely refers to the liberalization 
of public or state controlled undertakings and the control of state aid. 
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Although the legal and constitutional situation is a different one, this case is still very interesting 
because it scrutinizes the only situation in which some regions are legally as strong as the Member 
State government or perhaps even stronger. In other words, such a legal situation significantly 
increases the scope of action for regions at the European level so that state by-passing is to be 
expected.  
   
Hypothesis 3:  If the regional level possesses exclusive competences in the concerned policy and 
if it enjoys the legal right to represent the Member State government in the Council, regions from 
the same Member States represent the most important coalition-partners for a regional 
government to defend its regional interests. As a consequence, the majority of regions are going 
to work without the national government so that state by-passing will occur. 
  
Table 4 illustrates the different legal constellations of legal political competences and the 
expected strategy selection. 
 
Table 4: Constellation of legal political competences and expected strategy 
Region 
EU  
Exclusive legal political 
competences 
Shared legal political 
competences 
No legal political 
competences 
 
Exclusive legal political 
competences 
 
Impossible Impossible  
By-passing 
(coalition with outer-
state regions and non-
governmental actors) 
 
Shared legal political 
competences 
 
 
Impossible 
 
Working with the 
national government 
Working with the 
national government 
 
Supporting legal 
political competences 
 
By-passing 
(coalition with inner-
state regions) 
Working with the 
national government 
Working with the 
national government 
Source 12: own table 
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4 German and UK regions in EU decision-making 
 
 
 
 
 
In the context of regional lobbying activities, contrasting and analyzing the constitutional and legal 
situation of Germany and the United Kingdom appears to be a very interesting undertaking 
because the German Länder had already been granted exclusive legal competences after World 
War II whereas Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have only gained their political competences 
since 1999. In the eyes of an EU official one can detect two groups of actors with very different 
attitudes towards the EU: on the one hand, the German Länder which heavily complained about 
their continuous loss of competences due to European integration, and on the other, the UK 
regions which remained completely silent for most of the time since they were only administrative 
regions without having ‘special interest’ in the EU. Since the beginning of the devolution process, 
however, their legal status has changed and they have become legislative regions which have to 
cope with new challenges. Although the Westminster Parliament has granted them the right to 
exercise political competences in a variety of policy fields the EU restricts their scope of action at 
the same time. From one day to another, the EU has turned from an organization which once 
solely subsidized the UK economy to something that curbs regional self-determination rights 
(interview 28). As a result, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland face similar constraints as the 
German Länder but without the possibility to rely on a firm legal power base so that their room 
for maneuver is limited and comparatively small. After having analyzed the legal and 
constitutional situation of Germany as well as the United Kingdom on the one side and DG 
Competition, DG Environment and DG Education and Culture on the other, the remainder is 
subdivided into three sections.  
The first one analyzes the various mechanisms which facilitate coalition-building in practice 
and scrutinizes at what point in time the selected regions start their lobbying activities. This 
section provides evidence that regular state by-passing appears to be rather unlikely because 
most mechanisms are dependent upon close cooperation with the national government. The 
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second one illustrates with whom the German and UK regions exchange relevant information for 
defending their regional interests at the European level. Although all selected regions exchange 
information with EU institutions and inner-state regions quite often, this section also shows that 
the national government is a crucial source of information. Consequently, a clear hint whether 
regions by-pass their national government is not deductible. The third section assesses the 
necessity as well as the frequency of coalition-building with the national government, inner-state 
regions, legislative as well as non-legislative regions in other EU Member States, profit-oriented 
companies, non-profit oriented companies and associations as well as unions. Additionally, this 
part also provides evidence about the perceived relevance of coalition-partners. The results 
demonstrate that the national government is clearly considered as the most important and 
influential actor for promoting regional concerns in EU Competition, EU Environment and EU 
Education policies which means that by-passing it not carried out on a regular basis in Germany 
or the UK. 
 
4.1 The constitutional situation of Germany and the United 
Kingdom and the legal situation of the European Union in 
competition, environment and education policies 
In order to better understand the similarities and differences as regards the constitutional and 
legal situation, this section is going to deal with the information and participation rights of the 
German Länder and the UK legislative regions in European Affairs. In the German context, these 
rights are mainly laid down in three different sources of law:  
1. The Basic Law 37  (BL) which not only lists the legislative political competences of the 
Federation and the Länder but which also contains a specific Article on European Affairs. 
2. The ‘Law on cooperation between the federal government and the Länder in matters 
concerning the European Union’38 (LoC) specifies, among others, the information rights of 
the Länder about official and unofficial documents produced by the European Commission 
and the Council, as well as reports and communications generated by the European Council, 
                                                          
37 Grundgesetz (GG) 
38 Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit von Bund und Ländern in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union 
(EUZBLG) 
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the Council, COREPER and the Permanent Representation of Germany. On top of that, the 
LoC provides details about the Länder’ participation rights in national preparatory meetings 
for interest coordination and in EU committees and Council meetings. 
3. The ‘Cooperation Agreement between the Federation and the Länder’39 (CA) supplements 
Art. 9 LoC. It is subdivided into two chapters; the first one provides further details about the 
participation rights of Länder representatives in EU committee negotiations and the second 
chapter contains additional information about the cooperation between the Permanent 
Representation of Germany and the Länder.  
In addition to these sources, the Rules of Procedure of the Bundesrat and the ‘Agreement about 
the Länderbeobachter’ 40  also provide useful information about Länder engagement at the 
European level.  
In comparison with the German Länder, the legal situation for Scotland, Northern Ireland and 
Wales is very different because the information and participation rights of these regions are not 
constitutionally codified but are only Acts of Parliament. Basically, there are two important 
sources of law: 
1. The Act of Parliament which defines, among others, the legal competences of the respective 
devolved administration and possible resolution mechanisms in case of political disputes. 
2. Non-legally binding agreements such as the Memorandum of Understanding and the 
Concordats. Those agreements lay out, among others, the day-to-day operations and 
procedures in European Affairs as well as the relations between the UK Government and the 
devolved authorities. 
 
4.1.1 Germany 
Politically, one of Germany’s striking features is federalism which is constitutionally codified in 
Article 20 (1) BL: “The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state”. In its 
most basic form, federalism is a political concept that establishes a system of different levels of 
government in which the legal-political power is divided between a central authority and several 
                                                          
39 Vereinbarung zwischen der Bundesregierung und den Regierungen der Länder zur Regelung weiterer 
Einzelheiten der Zusammenarbeit von Bund und Ländern in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union (§ 9 
Satz 2 EUZBLG) 
40 Abkommen über den Beobachter der Länder bei der Europäischen Union 
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constituent units who constitutionally retain certain individual political competences. As a 
consequence, each of the sixteen Länder possess their own elected regional parliament with 
diverse political competences so that they fall into the category of ‘legislative regions’. Since 
Germany does not only have a horizontal division of power between the legislative, executive and 
the judiciary, but also a vertical separation of powers among different levels of government, 
experts commonly refer to the Länder’ Eigenstaatlichkeit or statehood (Bogumil and Jann 2009: 
76; ) in order to emphasize their significant scope for ‘self-rule’. 
Due to this state structure the German Basic law differentiates between exclusive and 
concurrent legislative powers which are specifically enlisted in the Articles 72, 73 and 74 BL.41 
However, in comparison to the Federation, the Länder’ exclusive legislative powers are not 
specifically numerated so that according to Article 70 (1) BL, “The Länder shall have the right to 
legislate insofar as this Basic Law does not confer legislative power on the Federation”. More 
specifically, “On matters within the exclusive legislative power of the Federation, the Länder shall 
have power to legislate only when and to the extent that they are expressly authorized to do so 
by a federal law” (Article 71 BL). Hence, de jure the exclusive legal competences of the Länder’ are 
as follows: 
 Admission to institutions of higher education and requirements for graduation in such 
institutions 
 Press and broadcasting 
 Municipal law 
 State-level planning 
 Police law 
 State-building order 
 Law of public streets and roads 
 Law relating to water (Bogumil and Jann 2009: 78) 
The German law-making system consists of two entities: the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. The 
former is the national parliament and the latter is the legislative body that represents the sixteen 
Länder at the federal level. In other words, if the Länder want to make use of their legislative 
                                                          
41 See Appendix C 
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powers in order to get their regional interests accommodated, they exercise their constitutionally 
guaranteed rights through the Bundesrat. The number of votes a Land is allocated is based on the 
size of its population.42 In all the above mentioned areas, the Länder have a very strong standing 
vis-à-vis the Member State government because without their consent a legislative proposal 
cannot become law. As regards its roles and functions concerning matters dealing with the EU, 
the Bundesrat itself declares that “it defends the interests of the Länder vis-à-vis the Federation 
and indirectly vis-à-vis the European Union” (Bundesrat 2014). 
If the Länder want to make sure that their voice is heard, they predominately make reference 
to the Europaartikel (Article 23 BL) which has been recently incorporated in the German Basic 
Law. Most scholars agree that before the Europaartikel came into effect in 1992, the European 
integration process caused a gradual erosion of regional autonomy for the German Länder 
(Keating 1998: 164; Lorz and Lindart 2005: 75; Große Hüttmann 2005; Grünhage 2006: 178; Jeffery 
2007: 3; Green et. al 2008: 69). Until that date, the central government grasped EU politics as 
foreign policy so that only the Federation was legitimized to conduct relations with the EU (Art. 
32 (1) BL). Furthermore, in combination with Article 24 BL, which was generally referred to as the 
“opening clause” (Suszycka-Jasch and Jasch 2009: 1231), the federal government could delegate 
national (and regional) competences to the European level without the consent of the Bundesrat. 
From a regional point of view, the delegation of competences stood in stark contrast to the 
division of power of the German law-making system, as at that time the Länder neither had any 
formal participation rights in European policy-making processes nor did they receive any 
compensation for such loses. Although Länder competencies had already been transferred to the 
federal level several times in the 1960s and 1970s, the Länder were always compensated through 
the participation of the Bundesrat in the formulation of and decision-making on federal policies. 
This means that until 1992 the Länder had not only been deprived of their co-determination rights 
in those areas, but also that their role was reduced to the formal ratification and application of 
European policies. For that reason, they regarded themselves as the ‘losers’ in the process of 
European integration (Moore and Eppler 2008: 493). 
                                                          
42 A Land with less than two million inhabitants has three votes. A Land with more than two million 
inhabitants has four votes. A Land with more than six million inhabitants has five votes. A Land with more 
than seven million inhabitants has six votes. In total, there are 69 seats.  
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Yet, when the EU and the Member States were on their way to establishing a Common 
Market through the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s, an amendment of the German Basic Law 
was mandatory. According to Article 79 (2) BL, a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag as well as 
the Bundesrat was necessary so that the Länder exploited this opportunity and “struck back” 
(Jeffery 1994). They successfully fought for a new understanding of EU politics in the sense that 
the federal government acknowledged the heavy impact of EU laws on the Länder’ domestic 
affairs. As a result, the German constitution was revised and the above mentioned Europaartikel 
was incorporated which explicitly states that “the Federation may transfer sovereign powers by a 
law with the consent of the Bundesrat” (Art. 23 (1) BL; emphasis added). In other words, since that 
date the Länder hold a veto-player position for future Treaty amendments that confer new 
competences upon the European level.43  
With regard to EU day-to-day politics this new article obliges the national government to 
include the Länder in European matters and it has to inform them via the Bundesrat 
“comprehensively and at the earliest possible time” (Article 23 (2) BL). This legal basis highlights 
that, among others, the Länder are supposed to receive all Commission proposals’ for EU 
regulations and directives, and that they have to be capable of getting involved in the 
deliberations on EU decision-making. This means that the Bundesrat is legally allowed to 
participate in EU decision-making of the Federation if the corresponding subject belongs to the 
domestic competences of the Länder (Art. 23 (4) BL). To be more precise, the Länder may attend 
negotiations in the European Commission and the Council if it is deemed necessary (Art. 6 (1) LoC). 
In fact, the federal government and the government of the Länder are supposed to keep and 
update a list of Commission and Council committees that deal with initiatives affecting the 
domestic competences of the Länder (Section I, Art. 2 CA). Although the cooperation between the 
Federation and the Länder “works rather unproblematic in most areas other than education” 
(Interview 8), the above stated legal basis is of particular importance for the Länder because it 
provides the opportunity to establish unofficial contacts with the responsible persons of the 
institutions of the EU. An official of the Permanent Representation of Germany commented on 
that as follows: “It is correct that the Länder have access to our protocols of Council and 
                                                          
43 For a more detailed analysis on the role of the Länder concerning Treaty amendments, which also 
provides information on the Simplified Revision Procedure (Art. 48 (8) TEU) and the ‘Brückenklauseln’ 
(bridging clauses) (Art. 48 (7) TEU), see Panara 2011 
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Commission meetings, but if their representative sits at the same table with us and EU officials, 
the Länder can contact the responsible person more easily afterwards” (Interview 4). 
Yet, the actual degree of influence of the Bundesrat differs as regards the respective subject. 
More specifically, the power of the Bundesrat’s decision is based on the domestic legal 
competences of the Länder so that one can distinguish between three cases. First, if the European 
Commission’s legislative proposal touches the exclusive competences of the Federation or any 
other field in which it possesses legislative power, the decision of the Bundesrat is legally not 
binding because the federal government only has to “take it [the Bundesrat’s position] into 
account.” Second, if the legislative competences of the Länder, the structure of their regional 
authorities or their administrative procedures are “primarily affected” (“Schwerpunkt”), the 
Bundesrat’s decision must be given the “greatest possible respect in determining the Federation’s 
position” (“maßgeblich zu berücksichtigen”) (Art. 23 (5) BL). In case the federal government’s 
opinion differs from that of the Bundesrat, both parties shall make efforts to come to an 
agreement. If, however, an agreement cannot be reached and the Bundesrat confirms its position 
with a two-thirds majority vote, its standpoint shall prevail (Art. 5 (2) LoC).44 
On a first glance, the two expressions of Article 23 (5) BL “primarily affected” and “greatest 
possible respect” might seem to be self-explaining and easy to interpret in the sense that the 
Länder are able to impose their will on the federal government. Yet, legal scholars as well as 
practitioners stress that this conclusion is oversimplified and would, therefore, fall short of reality. 
Whether the primarily focus (“Schwerpunkt”) of a legislation actually touches the legislative 
competences of the Länder, the structure of their regional authorities or their administrative 
procedures is usually a matter of controversial debate (Interview 8). And moreover, whether the 
expression “greatest possible respect” is legally binding has not been fully clarified (Suszycka-
Jasch and Jasch 2009: 1242; Panara 2011: 142). Consequently, in practice the legal basis provides 
for different ways of reading and interpreting it.  
Finally, if the European Commission plans to become active in areas that fall primarily within 
the Länder exclusive competences concerning matters of school education, culture or 
broadcasting, the “exercise of the rights [...] shall be delegated [...] to a representative of the 
Länder designated by the Bundesrat” (Art. 23 (6) BL). It should be stressed that this passage does 
                                                          
44 With the exception of matters that may result in increased expenditures or reduced revenues for the 
Federation. 
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not imply that the representative of a Land is able to make decisions autonomously or to solely 
represent regional interests in the Council meetings. In fact, the regional representative must act 
“with the participation of and in agreement with the representative of the Federal government” 
(Art. 6 (2) LoC) and (s)he “shall be bound by the decisions of the Bundesrat” (Rule 45l (1) Rules of 
Procedure of the Bundesrat) which means that the official cannot defend the sole interests of 
his/her region but has to represent the Member State as a whole. With regard to Commission 
proposals’ touching other exclusive Länder competences than those stated in Art. 23 (6) BL (school 
education, culture or broadcasting), the Länder representative has the right to participate in the 
Council meetings and Council working groups and make declarations in consultation with the 
representative of the federal government (Section 1, Art. 7 & Art. 9 CA). Although the Länder do 
not have the right to participate in COREPER meetings, the representative of the federal 
government has to abide by the Länder’ mandate which has been formulated in previous 
preparatory meetings (Section 1, Art. 2 CA). Moreover, the Länderbeobachter (‘Observer’) is 
legally allowed to participate in COREPER and Council meetings and to make notes so that the 
Länder possess an additional channel of information (Art. 2 (2) Agreement about the 
Länderbeobachter). This official, however, is not permitted to speak or to vote. 
 
4.1.2 The United Kingdom 
In contrast to the German Länder, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales cannot point to 
constitutionally codified information and participation rights in EU affairs because, in fact, the UK 
does not have a written constitution. This is quite a unique situation in Europe which requires 
these legislative regions to mainly rely on informal arrangements and procedures. On top of that, 
the three legislatures do not enjoy the same legal political competences so that experts commonly 
describe the devolution process as “asymmetric” (Jeffery 2009: 207). To be more precise, Wales 
was not even considered a legislative region until the recently revised Government of Wales Act 
2006 because the initial Government of Wales Act 1998 granted it only executive but not primary 
legislative powers. Although the legal situation among the three devolved authorities differs, 
there are also some similarities as for example, no regional administration is permitted to break 
EU law and in case of political dispute Westminster remains sovereign which means that it has the 
last word about legislation. In other words, it retains the constituent power and could 
theoretically dissolve all three regional parliaments, although for political reasons it appears very 
109 
 
unlikely that the Labour or Conservative Party would do that.45 Scotland, Northern Ireland and 
Wales have received their legislative powers through a referendum in the mid-1990s, and 
therefore the Acts of Parliament enjoy high legitimacy among the population. It should be 
highlighted, however, that due to political reasons the UK government had already suspended 
devolution in Northern Ireland between February 2000 and May 2000 as well as October 2002 
and May 2007 (Varney 2011: 279). During these two periods the Northern Ireland Office, a British 
government department in Belfast, took over the devolved powers. These two incidents exemplify 
that the Westminster Parliament remains sovereign and that a devolved administration might 
experience a (temporary) loss of political competences if Whitehall deems it necessary. 
The Scotland Act 1998 provides the overall basis for Scotland’s legislative powers.46 Similar 
to the German Basic Law, the Scotland Act does not specify the exact areas of political competence 
of the Scottish parliament but lays out those matters which remain with the Westminster 
Parliament (Schedule 5, Scotland Act). To be more specific, Section 29 (1) of the Scotland Act 
generally stipulates that “An Act of the Scottish Parliament is not law so far as any provision of 
the Act is outside the legislative competences of the Parliament” and Section 29 (2b) specifies that 
“A provision is outside that competence so far as [...] it relates to reserved matters”. Concerning 
EU politics, paragraph 7 (1) of Schedule 5 states that “International relations, including relations 
with territories outside the United Kingdom, the European Union (and their institutions) and other 
international organisations, [...] are reserved matters”, so that, formally, all meetings, discussions, 
negotiations etc. held at the European level are led and controlled by the UK government. 
Consequently, the Scotland Act does not provide any possibility for Scotland to force the UK 
government to be included in EU decision-making so that the Scottish Government is dependent 
upon the goodwill of Whitehall. 
Very similar to the Scotland Act, the Northern Ireland Act 1998 serves as the legal basis for 
Northern Irish political competences. The Northern Ireland Act grants the Northern Ireland 
Assembly the right to adopt laws if it is not “outside the legislative competence of the Assembly” 
(Section 6 (1) Northern Ireland Act) and Paragraph 2 of Section 6 clarifies that this is the case if “it 
[the provision] deals with an excepted matter and is not ancillary to other provisions (whether in 
                                                          
45 In fact, David Cameron even permitted Scotland to hold a referendum about independence in September 
2014. 
46 The Scotland Act 2012, which amends the Scotland Act 1998, will not be part of the analysis because it 
predominately grants Scotland new fiscal rights and has hardly any effect on foreign and EU affairs. 
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the Act or previously enacted) dealing with reserved or transferred matters”. As in the case of 
Scotland, the Act of Parliament specifies that ‘excepted matters’ refers to, among others, 
“International relations, including relations with territories outside the United Kingdom, the 
European Communities (and their institutions) ...” (Schedule 2 (3) Northern Ireland Act) so that 
potential Northern Irish representation activities at the European level are not covered by law. 
For that reason, the government of Northern Ireland faces an identical situation as Scotland if it 
comes to European affairs. 
In contrast to the previous two mentioned devolved authorities, the legislative powers for 
Wales have been recently revised and are laid down in the Government of Wales Act 2006. 
Comparing this Act with those of Scotland and Northern Ireland, two differences become obvious. 
First, Schedule 5 of the Government of Wales Act enlists precisely in which fields of competence 
the Welsh Assembly is allowed to legislate. This scheme is the exact opposite to Scotland and 
Northern Ireland where both entities are capable of passing laws in all policy areas apart from 
those which remain with the Westminster Parliament (‘reserved’ or ‘excepted’ matters). This list 
of competences is quite broad and encompasses fields such as agriculture, fisheries, forestry and 
rural development; culture; education and training; health and health services and many more. 
Foreign Affairs, however, is explicitly not a part of Welsh competences so that the Welsh 
government is confronted with the same representation issue in EU matters as the other two 
devolved administrations. Second, the Act does not speak about passing “laws” but “Assembly 
Measures” (Section 93 Government of Wales Act) because until 2011 the Welsh Assembly needed 
the agreement of the UK Parliament to pass laws in the devolved areas. After a successful 
referendum on 03 March 2011, however, this system was rendered obsolete. In other words, the 
Welsh Assembly is now capable of passing laws on all subjects in the devolved areas so that any 
proposed law will be called ‘Bill’, and an enacted law will be called ‘Act’.  
It becomes obvious that none of these Acts of Parliament specifically make reference to the 
devolved institutions’ information and participation rights concerning EU affairs. For completing 
this picture, it is necessary to scrutinize the legally non-binding ‘Memorandum of Understanding 
and Supplementary Agreements between the United Kingdom, the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh 
Ministers, and the Northern Ireland Executive Committee’ (2002) (MoU) which lays out the day-
to-day operations and procedures in EU politics as well as the relations between the UK 
government and the devolved authorities.  
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In its first part the MoU points out that all four administrations - the United Kingdom 
Government, the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers, and the Northern Ireland Executive 
Committee - are committed to the principle of good communication which means that each 
administration is supposed to provide full and open access to almost all information to the other 
devolved authorities. This procedure primarily aims at facilitating cooperation in all matters, 
including ‘International and EU Relations’. With regard to the latter, the MoU clarifies that the 
“the UK Government will involve the devolved administrations as fully as possible in discussions 
about the formulation of the UK’s policy position on all EU and international issues which touch 
on devolved matters” (Section 20, MoU). Yet, this passage is still somewhat vague and is defined 
more precisely in the Concordats. 
The second part of the MoU consists of the Concordats and provides, among others, more 
specific information on coordination of European Union policy issues. Most relevant for this 
research project are the following three aspects: (1) provision of information, (2) formulation of 
UK policy and (3) attendance at Council of Misters and related meetings. 
Concerning the first point - the provision of information - the Concordat on “Coordination of 
European Union Policy” set outs that the devolved authorities need to receive information on 
relevant EU business including proposals for Treaty change in order to increase the effectiveness 
of the UK’s decision making. Therefore, the “UK Government will provide the devolved 
administrations with full and comprehensive information, as early as possible, on all business 
within the framework of the European Union which appears likely to be of interest to the devolved 
administrations, including notifications of relevant meetings within the EU” (Section B4.1, MoU, 
p.29). In addition to that, it continues “This is likely to mean all initiatives within the framework of 
the EU which appear to touch on matters which fall within the responsibility of the devolved 
administrations” (Section B4.1, MoU, p.29).  
As regards the second above stated aspect - the formulation of UK policy - the respective 
Concordat underlines that it is the “Government’s intention” that Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland “should be fully involved” in discussions within the UK government concerning the 
formulation of the United Kingdom’s policy position on all matters which belong to their 
responsibility. More specifically, it is written that “consultation with Devolved Administrations 
includes the upstream opportunities to influence EU proposals in the period before they emerge 
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as well as the period after formal proposals are made and includes the period before approval is 
sought for a UK line from the European Affairs Committee” (Section B4.3, MoU, p.29). 
The third and last important aspect outlined above - the attendance at Council Ministers and 
related meetings - the Concordat makes clear that the devolved authorities are not supposed to 
attend Council meetings but that this decision will be taken on a “case-by-case basis” by the lead 
UK minister. It goes on and specifies that “The role of Ministers and officials from the devolved 
administrations will be to support and advance the single UK negotiation line [...] The emphasis in 
negotiations has to be on working as a UK team; and the UK lead Minister will retain overall 
responsibility for the negotiations and determine how each member of the team can best 
contribute to securing the agreed policy position” (Section B4.15, MoU, p. 32). These passages 
underline that the devolved institutions have a weak standing vis-à-vis the UK government 
because they are not supposed to perform any actions that run contrary to the official UK line. In 
all circumstances, they must cooperate with the respective UK minister so that individual and 
autonomous lobbying activities are very limited.   
In case bi- or multilateral communication and cooperation is not working smoothly, the 
Concordat makes reference to some resolution mechanisms. First and foremost, the respective 
matter is supposed to be resolved through correspondence (B4.6, MoU, p.30). If this mechanism 
has failed, the matter will be forwarded to the Joint Ministerial Committee Europe (JMC (E)) where 
the affected parties attempt to solve the issue on a higher official level. It should be emphasized, 
however, that the JMC is not an executive but a consultative body which means that it does not 
reach decisions but agreements (A1.10, MoU, p. 13). As a matter of fact, its agreements do not 
create any obligations for the UK government. In addition to that body, it is highlighted that 
“informal communications and meetings at official level will continue to make a major 
contribution to the resolution of EU issues“ (B4.11, MoU, p. 31). Consequently, if the UK 
government does not defend particular regional interests at the European level, the respective 
devolved administration has no legal instrument in any circumstance at its disposal to get its 
interests accommodated. Besides, one can conclude that the devolved entities do not have much 
formal mechanisms at their side so that they predominately rely on informal inner-state 
instruments to make their voice heard. 
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4.1.3 DG Competition 
Compared with the other two selected policy fields of this research project, EU Competition policy 
had already been enshrined in the Treaty of Rome in 1957. This should not come as a surprise 
because one of the basic objectives of the founding fathers of the European Union was to create 
a Single Market. In order to achieve that aim, it was deemed necessary to avoid any possible 
distortion mechanism such as cartels or monopolies that could reduce or even neutralize free 
trade benefits. Competition policy is a very broad policy field that pursues a number of objectives 
as for example increasing consumer welfare, protection of the consumer, redistribution of wealth, 
protection of small and medium-sized enterprises, regional, social and industrial considerations, 
market integration, and promotion of competitiveness (Cini and McGowan 2009: 4-5). As a matter 
of fact, competition policy started to become one of the EU’s most effective methods of regulating 
and integrating markets so that this policy area is possibly the most powerful Community 
competence at present (Wilks 2005: 431). 
Indeed, there is probably no other policy field in which the Commission has had a greater 
impact on the daily lives of EU citizens as the following examples illustrate. In the 1990s the 
European Commission successfully fought to liberalize the national electricity and gas markets 
which promoted competition and improved efficiency, thereby offering more services at lower 
prices to consumers. Moreover, it started to supervise possible market concentrations that could 
have been the result of mergers. In this regard, it stopped the planned merger between the two 
Portuguese energy companies EDP and GDP in 2004 and the Commission also imposed specific 
provisions for the mergers between the French companies GDF and Suez as well as the German 
companies E.On and MOL in 2006. On top of that, it adopted the legislative package “Connected 
Continent: Building a Telecoms Single Market” on 11 September 2013 which introduces a new 
market approach for the telecommunication sector that aims to reduce and ultimately abolish 
roaming charges. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the European Commission published a 
legislative proposal on the award of concession contracts in the end of 2011 which was supposed 
to improve the legal framework applicable to the awarding of concessions, thereby establishing 
better access to the concession markets (European Commission 2011c)47. Unexpectedly, however, 
more than one million people in more than seven EU Member States signed a petition against this 
                                                          
47 Although this directive stemmed predominantly from DG Internal Market and Services, the basic idea of 
this proposal was to improve competition in this field. Therefore, close cooperation with DG COMP was 
highly necessary (see corresponding impact assessment; European Commission 2011d: 1-7) 
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proposal which resulted in the first successful European citizens’ initiative (Right2Water). The 
protesters feared that the European Commission attempted to privatize water in municipalities 
through the backdoor which probably would have led to higher consumer prices. In mid-2013 the 
Commission changed the proposal and explicitly excluded water supply from the award of 
concession contracts.  
These examples demonstrate that legislation from that policy field significantly affects our 
daily lives. In order to exercise its rights and adopt these and other legislative proposals, the 
Commission acts within the framework of primary and secondary law. Scrutinizing the Treaties as 
well as Council regulations, one can differentiate between five sub-fields of competition policy: 
1. The Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings (the EC 
Merger Regulation, No 139/2004) that regulates the specific conditions under which 
companies may merge with one another. 
2. All agreements between undertakings that restrict or distort competition as laid out in Article 
101 TFEU. 
3. Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant market position as specified in Article 
102 TFEU. 
4. The liberalization of public or state controlled undertakings entrusted with the operation of 
services of general economic interest as stated in Article 106 TFEU. 
5. The control of state aid granted undertakings as specified in Article 107 TFEU. 
 
As interviews have revealed, the first three competition fields are not relevant for any of the 
scrutinized legislative regions for two reasons. First of all, they are reluctant to engage in quasi-
legal processes because they represent a regional authority which has been democratically 
elected so that an intervention by the state would run contrary to the basic principle of separation 
of powers. Second, they are supposed to defend the overall regional interests and being the 
mouthpiece of one particular (economic) organization would, therefore, be illegitimate. Besides, 
it would make future negotiations with European Commission more difficult because after such 
an engagement Commission officials would certainly see those regions in a different light 
(Interview 20, Interview 22, Interview 25). As one official put it: “Our greatest advantage 
compared to lobby organizations is that we do not represent single, particular economic interests 
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but common welfare. The Commission officials are aware of our special status as a democratically 
elected authority and I believe that because of this feature they treat us differently than the usual 
lobbyists” (Interview 23). 
The last two fields of EU Competition policy, however, directly affect regional interests so 
that almost all scrutinized German and UK regions carry out lobbying activities in these areas. It 
has already been pointed out that the Commission’s recent liberalization activities have had a 
considerable effect on the economy as well as the peoples’ daily life. In similar vein, state aid 
constitutes an important or in some cases even a fundamental financial basis for infant 
enterprises. The EU Treaties prohibit “any aid granted by a Member State or through State 
resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favoring 
certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between 
Member States” (Art. 107 (1), TFEU). In other words, there are four principle features that have 
to be met so that a measure is legally qualified as state aid: 
1. An intervention by the state or through state resources such as grants, tax reliefs, 
government holdings of all or part of a company and so forth 
2. The beneficiary obtains an advantage on a selective basis for example to specific companies 
or industry sectors 
3. Distorted competition 
4. An expected effect on trade between Member States (European Commission 2013b) 
Since the Commission acknowledges the need to grant state aid to some industries in specific 
circumstances in order to maintain a well-functioning economy and to avoid social hardship, the 
Treaties also enlist several exceptions (Art. 107 (2), (3) TFEU). In addition to these ‘hard-law’ 
mechanisms, the Commission also makes use of ‘soft-law’ instruments such guidelines and 
notices. Although they do not possess any legal binding character, they always cause great tension 
in the EU Member States. In 2014, for example, the Commission adopted new guidelines for state 
aid to airports and airlines (European Commission 2014a) and it has also published guidelines on 
environmental and energy state aid (European Commission 2014b). A civil servant in a German 
representation office confirmed the relevance of these ‘soft law’ mechanisms: “My contact 
person in Berlin, who represents us in the Bundesrat, told me that the federal ministries were 
quite nervous about the final wording of the two guidelines [state aid to airports and airlines; 
environmental and energy state aid]. High-ranking federal officials and even ministers traveled to 
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Brussels and spoke with the Commission, promoting the German position and persuading the key 
decision-makers about the importance of state aid in the energy and aircraft sector” (Interview 
17). As a consequence, participants highlight that the term ‘soft-law’ is somewhat misleading 
because, in practice, these guidelines are de facto used as a basis for approving or rejecting future 
state-aid requests (Interview 6).   
With regard to policy-making in EU Competition policy, one can state that, generally, the 
Commission is “the most important actor” (Blauberger and Töller 2011: 128) but one has to keep 
in mind that its actual power depends upon the respective competition field. If, for example, the 
Commission decides to become active in the liberalization field, it is able to autonomously adopt 
legislative acts such as decisions and directives so that it is even capable of taking decisions against 
the EU Member States. It should be emphasized, however, that the Commission almost always 
includes national representatives in order to avoid public and political indignation (Blauberger and 
Töller 2011: 138). 
In similar vein, if the European Commission revises former guidelines about state aid, the 
Member States cannot cast their veto since the Council does not play any role in this context; the 
legislative process begins and ends with the Commission. Again, this does not mean that the 
Member States are excluded from the decision-making process. Not only that the Commission 
always initiates open public consultations for state aid guidelines, its civil servants are constantly 
in touch with Member State officials. If necessary the Commissioner for Competition even travels 
to Berlin in order to negotiate the details for the new state aid guidelines in the energy sector with 
the German government. In this regard, the Permanent Representation of Germany in Brussels 
explains that “although the Commission enjoys exclusive legal competences in most competition 
matters, it never isolates itself from us. The Commission is perfectly aware about the necessity to 
work with us in order to avoid unforeseen consequences. Especially state aid is a very delicate 
topic - wrong decisions could cause tremendous social effects and since the Commission has no 
intention to ruin whole industrial sectors, it is open for compromises and makes concessions to 
us” (Interview 20). 
Since, officially, the Council is not heard in these competition fields, it does not come as a 
surprise that the European Parliament cannot force the European Commission to alter or even 
discard the legislative initiative. However, to conclude that the Parliament does not play any role 
would be premature. Undoubtedly, MEPs do not have any legal power base at their side, but they 
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can bring pressure upon the Commission by making use of the media. Usually, MEPs stress that 
they are the elected representatives of the people and if the Commission intends to ignore them, 
this could create the impression that the Commission is not interested to listen to concerns of the 
citizens either (Interview 36). As a consequence, Commission officials are also in close contact 
with key MEPs in order to include their viewpoints as much as possible in EU Competition policy.  
 
4.1.4 DG Environment 
In contrast to competition, EU Environmental policy was not already part of the Treaty of Rome 
in 1957 - environmentalists had to wait until 1972 when the Heads of State or Government finally 
decided to establish a Directorate for Environment.48 Scholars underline two reasons why the EU 
Member States advocated for an inclusion of environmental policy at the European level. First, in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s an increasing number of experts highlighted the necessity to take 
proactive international measures against global environmental issues such as pollution and 
inefficient resource consumption (Burns and Carter 2012: 512). The former, for example, was 
particularly brought up by the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972 and 
the latter received attention by the Club of Rome that published the highly debated book ‘The 
Limits of Growth’ in the same year. Second, and more importantly, the Heads of State or 
Government aimed at reducing and abolishing trade barriers that somehow affected market 
activities. Undoubtedly, different national production, quality and health standards in industrial 
sectors had the potential to distort free trade among the Member States so that, in fact, 
environmental and competition policy complemented one another (Knill and Liefferink 2013: 14). 
In other words, the former political leaders in the EU were more concerned about creating a Single 
Market than reducing pollution or increasing resource efficiency.  
In the following years, it was acknowledged that this policy field was not supposed to solely 
serve market principles but that it should rather concentrate on protecting the environment. With 
the enactment of the Single European Act in 1988, the Heads of State or Government took the 
next step and established a solid legal footing for environmental policy in which they codified the 
general principles, objectives and decision-making procedures (Lenschow 2010: 309). The coming 
into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 went one step further; from that moment on, 
                                                          
48 This Directorate was part of DG Industry at that time. A fully-fledged Directorate-General was established 
in 1981. 
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environmental policy legally constituted a separate policy field so that DG Environment was truly 
capable of elaborating on own political initiatives in terms of secondary legislation. The 
consecutive Treaties initiated some changes in the decision-making rules and with the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the European Union’s objectives in environmental policy are: 
- preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment, 
- protecting human health, 
- prudent and rational utilization of natural resources, 
- promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental 
problems, and in particular combating climate change (Art. 191 (1) TFEU). 
 
In addition to the legal wording of the Treaties, DG ENV also works out so-called Community 
Environment Action Programmes (EAP) which identify key issues and priorities. In its sixth EAP 
(2002-2012), the Commission identified the following four areas of major interest:  
1. Natural resources and waste 
2. Environment and health 
3. Nature and biodiversity 
4. Climate change (European Commission 2001b). 
Bearing in mind that all these ‘hard’ and ‘soft-law’ changes occurred in a comparatively short 
period of time, it does not come as a surprise that scholars conclude that “the European 
environmental policy has achieved to develop from a ‘flanking policy’ for the creating of the Single 
Market into one of the most central policy areas of the Union” (Knill and Tosun 2011: 184). 
A crucial feature of environmental policy is its sectoral interconnectedness: it affects a huge 
number of other policy fields as for example agriculture, health, industry, maritime affairs, 
transport, trade and many more. As a consequence, not only stakeholders from many different 
industrial sectors but also a couple of other Directorate-Generals need to be thoroughly included 
in the decision-making process. In similar vein, close horizontal coordination among the different 
Council configurations as well as the diverse committees in the European Parliament is essential. 
Not surprisingly, this characteristic renders the whole policy formulation process extremely 
complex and complicated so that it may even take years until a legislative proposal becomes an 
act. Most widely known is probably the legislative procedure for the REACH regulation; the 
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Commission adopted its legislative proposal in October 2003 but it took more than three years 
until the European Parliament and the Council agreed on it in December 2006. Besides, one should 
not forget that before the Commission was able to formulate its proposal, intensive consultation 
processes with affected stakeholders had been conducted. The first consultation started in 
February 1999 and the last one ended in July 2003, which means that, in fact, the whole policy 
formulation and decision-making process took more than seven years (European Commission 
2003: 31). 
The previous example is, of course, an extreme one. Not every legislative procedure in 
environmental policy takes so much time, but since so many stakeholders are possibly affected, a 
great deal of lobbying takes place. But which EU actors are actually lobbied by the various lobby 
groups? In the two selected sub-fields of EU Competition policy, it was highlighted that the 
Commission represents the most dominant actor. In EU Environmental policy, however, the legal 
and constitutional situation is a different one. Article 192 TFEU sets out the relevant decision-
making process; it states that: “The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance 
with the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions, shall decide what action is to be taken by the Union” (Article 
192 (1) TFEU). Whereas the European Parliament only has a consultative role in most competition 
policies, it possesses legal power in EU Environmental policy; without its approval a proposal 
cannot become law. As a consequence, the Parliament and the Council represent the key actors 
in this policy area so that one can expect lobbying organizations to establish contact to the officials 
in these institutions. Moreover, also the Committee of the Regions is legally involved in the EU 
decision-making process which might constitute an additional channel for some actors to upload 
their interests at the European level. 
To draw a complete picture, it should be mentioned that the same Article also provides an 
exception; the Council acts unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure in the 
following areas: 
(a) provisions primarily of a fiscal nature; 
(b) Measures affecting: 
-town and country planning, 
-quantitative management of water resources or affecting, directly or indirectly, the  availability 
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of those resources 
-land use, with the exception of waste management 
(c) Measures significantly affecting a Member State’s choice between different energy sources 
and the general structure of its energy supply (Art. 192 (2) TFEU) 
 
In case a proposal falls into one of these three exceptions, the Council is the most decisive actor 
and the European Parliament turns from a co-legislator to a mere consultative institution. 
Although the real power of these two institutions vary from topic to topic, practitioners stress 
that, normally, both institutions only constitute the lender of last resort for changing details rather 
than stopping or preventing the whole proposal: “if we start to intervene when the proposal has 
been sent to the Council working groups and to the MEPs, then it is almost too late for bringing in 
our interests. We need to represent our interests even before a single word is written down” 
(Interview 18). As it has been worked out in Chapter 2, lobbying has to be conducted at the earliest 
stage possible which already starts before the actual draft for a proposal has been circulated in 
the DGs. In fact, some legislative regions even lobby the European Commission before it publishes 
its annual Work Program in which is identifies key challenges and priorities for the following year. 
Although the annual Work Program is not a legally binding document, practitioners stress that 
one should not underestimate its real power for the proposals which follow later. Within the 
environmental context German legislative regions, for example, several regions fought to get the 
expression “green economy” (European Commission 2013c: 5) included into the Work Program 
2014 as a crucial sector for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (Interview 15). The reason why 
they fought for this inclusion is quite straightforward: Germany constitutes a pioneer in 
environmental technologies and the acknowledgment by the European Commission that green 
technology is crucial for sustainable economic development will provide the Länder and the 
German federal government with better arguments for maintaining state-aid in this industrial 
sector (Interview 15). 
In EU Environmental policy, a Commission official reports that it is not unusual that DG 
Environment elaborates on proposals drafted by lobby organizations not only because they 
possess the necessary expertise in this area but also because DG ENV is heavily understaffed 
(Interview 2). Indeed, whereas DG ENV only employees 455 people (or 1.9% of the total staff), 731 
employees work for DG Competition (or 3.1% of the total staff) which means that DG COMP is ⅓ 
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larger than DG ENV (European Commission 2014c). Bearing in mind that DG ENV is highly 
interconnected with the other DGs, this difference is considerable and explains why it is 
dependent upon external advice. In fact, scholars underline that “most notably in the area of 
environmental policy, it appears that the Commission is frequently more preoccupied with 
reacting to the initiatives of individual states than playing an own active role on its own” (Knill and 
Liefferink 2007: 80). As a consequence, one can state that lobby organizations in general and 
legislative regions in particular are only able to upload their interests in this policy field if they 
take proactive steps and deliver crucial information at the earliest stage possible. 
 
4.1.5 DG Education and Culture 
Comparing the historic and legal development of EU Education policy with EU Environmental 
policy, one can detect a few similarities. To begin with, education policy was not enshrined in the 
Treaty of Rome either. Similar to environmental policy, the process of slowly integrating education 
policy in EU decision-making started in the late 1960s when the Heads of State or Government 
agreed on developing higher education further in order to establish a “centre of development, 
progress and culture” (European Commission 2006b: 23). However, due to the lack of legal 
competences the European Commission could not go ahead and initiate its own educational 
agenda. For that reason, it had always been dependent upon the will of the Member States to 
move one step further but since this area was and still is a very delicate and sensitive one, the 
Heads of State or Government were keen to ensure that they would not lose their prerogative in 
this field. On the other hand, the political leaders were aware that in times of increasing 
globalization and more international competition, education policy had to be integrated in a 
concrete EU framework so that Europe would not be pushed into the background. 
Finally, in 1992, higher education as well as school education were legally incorporated into 
the Treaty of Maastricht which demonstrated the political will to put education on the next level. 
Yet, this willingness does not mean that the “competing leadership for reform in EU higher 
education” (Corbett 2011) between the Commission on the one side and the Member States on 
the other has come to an end. In fact, the Heads of State or Government made clear right from 
the beginning that the Union was supposed to only have supporting competences in this area and 
that no harmonization would take place. And indeed, this legal foundation has not changed until 
this day: the Lisbon Treaty not only stipulates that the European Union is solely allowed to take 
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“supporting and supplementing” action for improving the quality of education but also that it 
must “fully respect the responsibility of the Member States” for determining the content of 
teaching and the organization of education systems (Art. 165 (1) TFEU). Additionally, the same 
Article explicitly excludes any harmonization of laws and regulations (Art. 165 (4) TFEU). With 
regard to objectives that the European Union aims to reach in EU Education policy, the Treaty 
enlists the following ones:  
- developing the European dimension in education 
- encouraging mobility of students and teachers  
- promoting cooperation between educational establishments  
- developing exchanges of information and experience on issues common to the education 
systems of the Member States, 
- encouraging the development of youth exchanges and of exchanges of socio-educational 
instructors, 
- encouraging the development of distance education (Art. 165 (2) TFEU)  
 
Bearing the unambiguous legal background as well as the sensitivity of this area in mind, one could 
expect that the Commission might only play a passive role in this policy field and leave it to the 
Member States. This assumption, however, would be premature. In the late 1990s, for example, 
the Heads of State or Government and the national education ministers agreed on establishing a 
European Higher Education Area in the scope of the Bologna process. Before and during these 
negotiations the European Commission had made various proposals and since some of them were 
accepted by the Member States, it expected to play a role in the following implementation process 
also. However, this project was initiated outside EU law which means that it had been 
intergovernmental. As a consequence, the Commission did not have any means of legal pressure 
so that it could only request the Member States to be included. But despite of its initial support, 
UK and French ministers insisted that the Bologna process is supposed to remain purely 
intergovernmental and rejected the Commission’s plea to become a member. Due to huge 
organizational and financial issues in 2001, however, the Heads of State or Government realized 
that an active involvement of the Commission was necessary so that it was allowed to join the 
Follow-up Group as a special member (Corbett 2011: 42). 
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Since the Commission cannot strive to establish harmonizing rules, it predominantly makes 
use of the so-called Open Method of Coordination (OMC) which has been introduced with the 
Lisbon Strategy in 2000.49 This new form of EU governance is based on voluntarily cooperation in 
selected policy fields with the aim to identify and define common objectives at the European level 
as well as to set-up benchmarks which are monitored by the Commission. In this context, the 
Commission is very often the driving force and initiates programs that, in the eyes of practitioners, 
supposedly aim at enhancing its own sphere of competences (interview 1, interview 4). An official 
of a German representation office commented on that as follows: “The Commission is quite 
clever. It is aware that the Member States are very cautious if it comes up with new ideas in the 
educational sector and in order to find allies, it provides financial assistance. We [the Länder] are 
mostly very critical about initiatives in this area because it directly affects our sovereign 
competences. In light of the EU sovereign debt crisis, however, we have noticed that more and 
more Member States are open for the Commission’s education programs so that we are rather 
isolated” (Interview 8). 
The latest example which illustrates that the European Commission acts indeed as an 
“engine” (Linsenmann 2006: 333) rather than a passive player in EU Education policy, is its 
communication “Rethinking Education: Investing in skills for better socio-economic outcomes” 
(European Commission 2012). This and other communications led to an intense debate among 
the German Länder because the Commission would consciously overstretch its competences in 
this area (Interview 31). The Commission not only addresses a variety of points that fall into the 
competences of the Länder such as ensuring appropriate curricula through public-private 
partnerships or assessing the effectiveness of curricula, but it also sets out a priority list for the 
Member States including possible key actions undertaken by the EU. To be more precise, 
Commission officials suggest carrying out regular peer-reviews in the framework of the OMC with 
the objective of strengthening the analytical base of country-monitoring and to establish a 
ranking-system concerning the performance of the education system of the Member States. 
Länder representatives not only complained about these far-reaching proposals, which would 
encroach on their competences, but they also stressed that they were not included 
                                                          
49 The Lisbon Strategy was drafted at the European Council meeting in March 2000 in Lisbon. The Heads of 
State or Government agreed on a new strategic goal for the Union in order to strengthen employment, 
economic reform and social-cohesion (European Council 2000). 
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comprehensively into the decision-making process that produced this Communication (Interview 
14). 
Bearing these examples in mind, it becomes obvious that the Commission does indeed play 
a crucial role in EU Education policy. Due to the already mentioned legal prohibition to harmonize 
rules, the procedure to adopt decisions or regulations is somewhat different compared to the 
other two described policy fields above. The Commission makes use of either soft-law 
(communications, recommendations, white books) or hard-law (decisions, regulations). In case it 
has decided to publish a soft-law instrument, it delivers it to the Council and the European 
Parliament. Those institutions scrutinize the document thoroughly and send a report with 
suggestions to the Commission which, in turn, includes as much amendments as possible. Since 
education policy is a very sensitive area and some regions even possess exclusive competences in 
this matter, the coordination and communication with the officials from the Member State and 
its legislative regions is particularly close (Interview 1). Interestingly, legislative regions even enjoy 
a privileged status compared to administrative regions which is reflected by the fact that 
Commission officials attend more frequently podium discussions and meetings of those actors 
(Interview 1).  
In most circumstances, soft-law precedes hard-law because this way the Commission is 
better able to gather and compare relevant data on a regional, national as well as international 
level so that topical and future challenges are easier to identify. Moreover, soft-law instruments 
provide the affected stakeholders with enough time to make their voice heard and to take part in 
discussions and negotiations so that the later legislative proposal is more likely to be adopted in 
the Council and the European Parliament. To win the necessary majorities in both institutions is 
elemental because the ordinary legislative procedure has to be applied (Art. 165 (4) TFEU).  
The main difference between decision-making in EU Education policy and EU Environmental 
policy is its overall objective: the EU is legally capable of drawing up regulatory rules in 
environmental policy whereas it may only set up distributive polices in education. Yet, every DG 
only disposes of limited financial resources and if DG Education and Culture has already spent its 
reserves, the respective program can only be introduced after the Member States have agreed on 
the EU’s next budget for the following seven years (the Multi-annual Financial Framework). For 
that reason, the vast majority of decisions on EU Education programs are initiated in the beginning 
of the seven year period. As a consequence, for any attempt to exert influence on the content and 
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the scope of future educational programs, it is paramount to establish close contacts with the 
Commission on the one side, which indeed constitutes an ‘engine’ in education policies, and with 
the national representatives in and outside of the Council on the other.  
 
4.2 Promoting regional interests upwards within the EU 
The overall question of this research project is whether legislative regions attempt to influence 
EU secondary legislation by working with or without the national government. In order to answer 
this question, this section is divided into three parts.  
The first one is going to scrutinize at what point in time the selected regions start their 
lobbying activities and it analyzes the various mechanisms which facilitate coalition-building in EU 
Competition, Environmental and Education policy in practice. This part provides evidence that 
regular state by-passing appears to be rather unlikely because most mechanisms are dependent 
upon close cooperation with the national government.  
The second part illustrates with whom the German and UK regions exchange relevant 
information for defending their regional interests at the European level. The interviewees were 
asked to indicate how often and at what stage they exchange information with the following 
actors: the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, the 
Committee of the Regions, the national government, inner-state regions, legislative as well as 
non-legislative regions in other EU Member States, profit-oriented companies, non-profit 
oriented companies and associations as well as unions. If regions, for example, do not exchange 
information frequently with the EU institutions but receive them only from their national 
government, one can hardly argue that the regional level by-passes the national level. In other 
words, establishing contact with EU institutions constitutes the first step of working without the 
national government. Although all selected regions exchange information with EU institutions and 
the other inner-state regions quite often, this section also shows that the national government is 
a crucial source of information. Consequently, a clear hint whether regions by-pass their national 
government is not deductible.  
The third part assesses the necessity as well as the frequency of coalition-building with the 
above stated actors with the exception of the EU-institutions. As it has been argued in chapter 3, 
neither the Commission, the Council, the Parliament or the Committee of the Regions can be 
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treated as a homogenous actor who defends the interests of one region only. Additionally, this 
part will also provide evidence about the perceived relevance of coalition-partners. It will be 
shown that the national government is clearly considered as the most important and influential 
actor for promoting regional concerns upwards the EU which means that by-passing is not carried 
out on a regular basis in Germany or the UK. 
 
4.2.1 Lobbying procedures of the German Länder and mechanisms facilitating 
coalition-building   
Irrespective of the policy area, the vast majority of the German Länder attempt to defend their 
interest at the earliest stage possible: the Commission’s annual Work Program. It has already been 
demonstrated above that the inclusion or exclusion of specific words are of high importance for 
some because it may improve the future bargaining position of the regions vis-à-vis the 
Commission. Although the annual Work Program is not a legally binding document that will be 
entirely worked through in the following year, one must not underestimate its potential impact: 
“Sometimes, the Commission cannot follow-up all items that are on the list. Sometimes, it seems 
that an item has been forgotten. However, it will come up sooner or later and if it already reflects 
our interests, it will be much more likely that things will end up well” (Interview 22). In this regard, 
it is interesting to note that the number of people working in the regional representation office is 
not a crucial factor; almost all German Länder try to intervene at this early stage. The only 
difference is that the larger regions, which employ more personnel, can work on more items 
simultaneously. Rhineland-Palatinate, for example, particularly focuses on anything that 
somehow affects its wine-industry whereas Baden-Württemberg applies a broader approach and 
takes care of any items that may impact on their regional car- and environment-sector. What 
becomes obvious is that the German Länder act independently from each other. The reason for 
this is straightforward: coordination with other actors is simply too time-consuming at such an 
early stage because this is the very first document about future proposals which means that the 
Commission has not yet started to work out its general standing. As soon as it becomes predictable 
in which way the Commission attempts to approach a topic, coordination among the German 
Länder takes place in Brussels (Interview 20). 
 When the Commission publishes its annual Work Program, each representation office 
analyzes as well as comments on it and sends it to the home base. The cabinet of the regional 
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government, in turn, identifies crucial points and determines which items should be followed-up 
by its Brussels office. Generally, what all representation offices have in common is that they 
constitute the ‘eyes and ears’ of the home base; the concrete positioning is worked out by the 
Land’s capital. Afterwards, the regional government turns to its team in Brussels and asks for 
advice how to best promote the objectives upwards the EU level (Interview 9, 21, 23).   
In order to get a better idea about the content, the objective and potential aftermaths of the 
future proposal, the Commission takes recourse to formal and informal methods. Formally, it 
initiates a public consultation which is accessible for all people and organizations. Each 
consultation consists of a document with six elements: a title, the concerned policy field(s), the 
affected target group(s), the period of consultation, the objective of the consultation and a 
questionnaire. Especially the last element is of high importance because the questionnaire allows 
everyone to provide input on the concerned matter, thereby increasing public involvement, 
transparency and efficiency. At the same time, the Commission uses informal methods such as 
hearings and discussions where all stakeholders are free to attend. Additionally, it also responds 
to invitations from organizations (including regions) and attends all kinds of events where 
participants seek the opportunity to unofficially speak with Commission officials. Meanwhile, the 
representation offices also try to obtain as much information as possible so that they are able to 
assess whether the later draft and the future proposal will reflect their interests. From that 
moment on, the various mechanisms of the German Länder that facilitate coalition-building start 
to work.  
When the Commission makes use of its formal and informal methods of information 
gathering, the Länder representations start to arrange multi-lateral meetings and establish 
Arbeitsgruppen (‘working groups’). Depending on the concerned policy field, the number of 
affected Länder varies. If the draft is about education policy, it is very likely that all the Länder are 
affected to the same extent but if it specifically deals with seaports or major international airports, 
the number of affected Länder is much smaller. In the latter case, the responsible persons meet 
for dinner and discuss the topic on that occasion but in the former case, the meeting usually takes 
place in a conference room of a representation office since more space is needed. This first multi-
lateral meeting forms the basis for the following Arbeitsgruppe. The elected group coordinator 
will invite the European Commission as well as the Permanent Representation to attend the next 
(unofficial) meeting. Since the Commission itself is very much interested in explaining its point of 
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view and receiving further input, it always accepts the invitation. One or two Commission officials 
are sent to that meeting and hold a presentation about the basic objectives and afterwards, the 
Länder have the opportunity to comment on the first ideas. In order to assess possible socio-
economic effects and to provide specific information on the concerned topic, the Länder take 
recourse to reports by companies, employer associations, labor unions and so forth. In most cases, 
the Länder have the impression that their concerns are taken into consideration so that all of them 
stress the importance of that mechanism (Interview 21, 26, 33).  
As long as the European Commission has not produced the legislative proposal, the main 
coordination activities between the Länder take place in Brussels. On rare occasions, the 
responsible Länder representatives in Berlin also meet and discuss the topic in order to have a 
vague idea about the standing of each Land.50 When the legislative proposal has been accepted 
by the College of Commissioners, it will be circulated to the European Parliament and the Council 
of Ministers. At that stage, the next coalition-building mechanism comes into place: the European 
Affairs Committee of the Bundesrat. This committee is used for cooperating with each other, 
developing a common opinion as well as decision-making if their exclusive competences are 
touched. On average, this committee meets every fourth Friday so that it constitutes a very useful 
place for effectively building coalitions (Interview 23, Interview 21). Indeed, a common decision 
of that institution is considered quite powerful by the federal government and the European 
Commission because it is hard to ignore the concerns of sixteen regional elected governments 
(Interview 1, 21, 24, 32). Although not each Land sympathizes with the position of its regional 
counterparts in every circumstance, all parties are very well aware that official disagreement is 
counterproductive in any case (Interview 24, Interview 26). This is one reason why the final 
formulation of the decision is sometimes a bit vague so that nobody rejects it. Besides, this 
imprecision is also helpful at the European level because it allows participants to stay flexible in 
negotiations. A strict mandate, in contrast, would seriously limit the scope of maneuver with the 
consequence that a compromise is hard to reach (Interview 14). For these two reasons, the Länder 
almost always agree on a common decision very often in order to strengthen their political 
leverage vis-à-vis the national government and the Commission.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, the political weight of a Bundesrat decision depends on the policy 
field. As analyzed above, Bundesrat decisions are only legally binding for the national government 
                                                          
50 Each Land has set up a representation office in Berlin as well. 
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if the Länder enjoy exclusive political competences in the concerned policy field. For the three 
selected policy fields of this project, this is only the case for EU Education; most decisions in this 
matter de jure constitute a mandate for the federal government if it represents the Länder in the 
Council of Ministers. Although the federal government is officially expected to adhere to the 
Länder position, the federal representative is granted some leeway in practice; otherwise it would 
be extremely difficult to strike any deals (Interview 8, 14). Due to their very own experience in 
Council meetings, the Länder are aware that flexibility is a crucial element in EU negotiations. 
The next mechanism which facilitates coalition-building is the above mentioned Länder 
representative for the Council working groups. Although this person is not permitted to speak, 
the written report constitutes a very useful source of information for the Länder because it 
provides a good overview of whether they are isolated or whether the federal government 
deviates too much from the agreed position. In any case, the Länder might be encouraged to put 
the concerned topic on the agenda of the European Affairs Committee of the Bundesrat once 
again or, in case this takes too long, they contact the federal government right away.  
In addition to that, the Länder can also take recourse to the so-called Draht-Berichte (‘cable-
report’ or diplomatic cable) which constitutes another mechanism. Every time a representative of 
the federal government attends a Council working group, a CORPER or a Council meeting, the 
participant has to draw such a report and sends it not only to the affected official federal 
authorities such as the Federal Foreign Office, the Federal Ministry of Education, the Federal 
Ministry of Environment etc. but also to the Bundesrat. This document contains two sections: the 
first one shortly summarizes the results of the meeting whereas the second section provides 
detailed information. To be more specific, the first section might simply pinpoint, for example, 
that the Member States have revised the Commission’s draft on “New forms of competition in the 
vegetable industry”, but the second part specifically states that Germany has raised serious 
concerns about the formulation “as soon as possible” on page 3 whereas France and Belgium have 
stressed the importance of that expression. In other words, the Draht-Berichte provide an 
additional source of information which, once again, could cause the Länder to arrange a new 
meeting where they have to reconsider their position. 
The last mechanism facilitating coalition-building is the Länderbeobachter in the COREPER 
and Council meetings because this person provides the Länder with up-to-date and ‘unfiltered’ 
information about negotiations at the higher Council levels. The role of this person is quite similar 
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to the representative for the Council working groups: to detect deviations from previously agreed 
positions. However, since the Länderbeobachter intervenes at a rather late point in time, this 
mechanism does not allow anymore substantial changes to be made. 
 
4.2.2 Collecting and exchanging information of the German Länder 
With the exception of profit-oriented companies in EU Education policy, the results demonstrate 
that the policy field itself does not make any difference as regards the exchange of information 
with the respective actor. In other words, regardless of whether the policy proposal stems from 
DG Competition, DG Environment or DG Education and Culture, the German Länder get in touch 
with Commission officials almost equally often.  
As soon as the Länder realize that the Commission is about to work on a draft for a later 
legislative proposal, the regional representation offices make use of their contacts within that 
institution. First of all, they attempt to call a German policy adviser of the responsible Directorate-
General who works in the corresponding Directorate or even in the corresponding unit. Although 
everyone in the German representations speaks English, the preferred contact person should be 
German-speaking because it is much easier to talk about technical details in the native language. 
Since each Land disposes of good contacts this method works quite well in most circumstances. 
However, sometimes the German contact person is not sufficiently involved in the concerned 
subject so that (s)he provides the representation office with the appropriate contact details. 
Second, each Land tries to increase its chances of getting its interests accommodated by inviting 
Commission officials to its office. In this regard, most German representations specifically invite 
the affected actors in their region which means that the audience is almost exclusively German 
(Interview 1). Therefore, the representation office concentrates on finding a Commission official 
who speaks perfect German with the consequence that the speaker is “frequently not the most 
qualified person” (Interview 1) for the concerned topic. The Land, which organizes the event, also 
informs the other Länder as well as the Permanent Representation of Germany about it and all of 
them are free to attend. Since no office is legally obliged to include the national government, this 
working style is already a first indicator that no Land explicitly aims to by-pass the federal 
government right from the beginning. 
Concerning the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, on a first glance it seems 
that, generally, the results show that the German representation offices do not exchange 
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information very often. Such a conclusion, however, would be premature. It is correct that, 
principally, the European Commission is considered more important in this matter than the 
Parliament, but a few civil servants in the representations contact the MEPs particularly frequently 
because they are party members themselves. As a consequence, they do not only get in touch 
with the MEPs from their own region, but they can also fairly easy establish contact to the whole 
European Party which is particularly helpful if the rapporteur belongs to the same party. Yet, it 
should be stated that this is the exception rather than the rule; most representations only contact 
‘their’ MEPs and these Parliamentarians, in turn, attempt to help as much as possible (Interview 
9, Interview 25). As regards the Council, most interviewees stated that, personally, they are not 
engaged with any Council activities. In fact, it was even mentioned that they are forbidden to 
establish contact to the Council working groups or COREPER (Interview 16). This statement, 
however, has to be clarified. Generally, the Länder are allowed to send one representative to 
Council working groups, but this person is not permitted to speak – (s)he may only make notes 
and send them to the Bundesrat. The Bundesrat, in turn, uploads the information on a server 
which is exclusively accessible for all Länder governments and their Brussels representation office 
(Interview 4, 5, 6). The representative has to be an expert for the concerned policy field and (s)he 
is elected by the Bundesrat for a specified period of time (usually 4 years). Since this person does 
not work in the representation office but in a regional or national ministry, it is plausible why the 
figure concerning the exchange of information is low. Moreover, the Länder also have legal access 
to the to all COREPER and Council meetings through their Länderbeobachter. Similar to the Council 
working groups, this person only makes notes and forwards them. Although the representative is 
not permitted to speak or to vote, the Länder do receive the necessary information about the 
concerned subject. As a result, one must not conclude that the German Länder do not have access 
to the Council. 
 Most Länder think that the Committee of the Regions can be a useful additional channel for 
some actors to make regional concerns heard. Several interviewees could remember at least one 
case where the statement of the CoR brought up new evidence which, in turn, was also 
incorporated into the legislative proposal. However, all in all, the CoR’s opinions are considered: 
 not very influential due to their lack of legal power,  
 boring to read because template expressions such as ‘there is still potential for 
improvement’ or ‘it is disappointing that the local and regional authorities had not been 
132 
 
included more comprehensively’ are commonly used so that the final texts look very 
similar, 
 vague since a large amount of actors with a different legal status only produce results that 
reflect the lowest common denominator at best. 
As a consequence, only the larger Länder, which employ enough personnel, use this body for 
influencing the Commission’s proposals from time to time but they are aware of its modest 
impact. 
 It has already briefly described above that the Länder and the federal government precisely 
coordinate their various meetings in- and outside of EU the institutions which is also reflected by 
the high frequency of exchange of information among these actors. The civil servants of the 
regional offices and the Permanent Representation of Germany meet very often at the diverse 
events or contact them via phone in urgent cases. In fact, some of them are even friends and meet 
privately so that they can rely on each other. 
 The amount of information that is exchanged between the Länder themselves is even slightly 
higher compared to the national government. Particularly the smaller Länder, which do not 
employ enough personnel to tap all possible sources of information, consider the exchange of 
information with the other Länder essential. Since each Land has special interests in at least one 
specific area, this kind of cooperation is a very useful form of division of labor. 
 In contrast to the above mentioned actors, the Länder exchange information with legislative 
as well as administrative regions of other EU Member States only occasionally. One might have 
expected that the actual frequency could be higher because such activity would provide a sound 
basis for later coalition-building, which, in turn, could also lead to state by-passing. The 
interviewees provided two reasons that explain this result. First and most importantly, later 
coalition-building with the national government and the inter-state regions is deemed sufficient 
for exerting influence on EU decision-making. Therefore, the lion’s share of resources is spent for 
this kind of action. Second, communicating in English is sometimes burdensome because not 
every employee possesses a high knowledge of that language. As a consequence, the conversation 
does not run smoothly, people have difficulties communicating, and social skills cannot be played 
out so that the conversation is rather exhausting and, ultimately, inefficient (Interview 9). 
However, it should be stressed that this observation only refers to EU lobbying activities and not 
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to other forms of information sharing. Some Länder offices do establish contact and do exchange 
information with some (specific) regions on a regular basis, as for example: 
 Baden-Württemberg: Rhône-Alpes, Lombardy, Catalonia (Four Motors for Europe) 
 North Rhine-Westphalia: Nord-Pas de Calais, Silesia (Triangle of Weimar)  
 Saarland: Lorraine, Luxembourg (Saar-Lor-Lux) 
These and other cooperation agreements demonstrate that legislative and non-legislative regions 
of different EU Member States work together in several areas such as technological innovation, 
culture, or pupil exchange but it should be clear that this is a different form of information sharing 
and cooperation which has nothing to do with EU lobbying. 
 Coming to the last identified group of non-governmental actors – profit-oriented companies, 
non profit-oriented companies, associations and unions – one can state that the German 
representation offices occasionally exchange information with these actors. With the exception 
of EU Education policy, the profit-oriented companies sometimes constitute a valuable source of 
information because they manage to receive the necessary information even faster than the civil 
servants in the representations (Interview 26). Although some German Länder also officially refer 
to their office as a meeting place for business companies, civil servants stress that they do not 
promote particular economic interests but defend the common good of the region as a whole. In 
a similar vein, they regularly meet with NGOs and associations in order to be better aware of the 
social and economic impact of European law but they do not speak on their behalf.  
Figure 9 visualizes the findings above. 
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Figure 9: Exchange of information of the German Länder 
 
Source 13: Interviews conducted in 2014 
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4.2.3 Coalition-building of the German Länder 
Figure 10 illustrates the results as regards the necessity for the German Länder for EU 
Competition, Environment and Education policy. It becomes obvious that the German Länder 
regard a coalition with the national government necessary in most cases for all the three selected 
policy fields. There are a number of reasons for this assessment. First and most importantly, the 
federal government explicitly enjoys a higher legal status vis-à-vis the European Commission than 
the Länder because the German Basic Law explicitly stipulates that “relations with foreign states 
shall be conducted by the Federation” (Art. 31 (1) BL). Therefore, the Permanent Representation 
of Germany is the only official organization that represents the interests of Germany. The Länder 
offices, in contrast, are only allowed to unofficially represent the interests of their territory. 
Although the Commission’s civil servants regularly meet with Länder officials, they strictly comply 
with the legal basis which means that they do not strike deals with them (Interview 1, 2, 3). 
Generally, this code of practice impacts on all policy fields.  
 
Figure 10: Necessity of coalition-building for the German Länder 
 
Source 14: Interviews conducted in 2014 
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In EU Competition policy, the Länder do not have any competences at all whereas the European 
Union, in contrast, possesses the exclusive political competences so that the Commission is able 
to adopt legislation even without a formal legal procedure (see above). In such a case, it appears 
to be very difficult for any lobby organizations to obtain information prior to the date the 
Commission officially publishes its first ideas. Practitioners speculate that this is probably due to 
the fact that the Commission is a very powerful actor in this policy field which is legally not 
dependent upon the Council and the Parliament for adoption (Interview 22, Interview 26). To give 
a concrete example, when the Commission aimed to revise its aviation aid guidelines and 
launched a public consultation in 2005, the Länder were not able to receive precise information 
behind the scenes. Although DG Competition especially sought information from public 
authorities such as Member States, regions, cities and so forth, regional governments could not 
intervene at a later point in time. The Member States’ government, however, had been constantly 
included so that this actor represented the best and, in fact, only possibility to promote regional 
interests at the European level. Relying on the federal government in this matter was rather 
uncontroversial as these revisions affected all Länder so that, consequently, both parties fought 
for the same thing. 
Concerning EU Environment policy, the legal situation for the Länder is not so much different 
than in EU Competition policy. Although they possess some political competences in that area, 
the German Basic Law does not offer them the possibility to represent the Member State in the 
Council. Therefore, the Länder always attempt to build a coalition with the national government 
in the first place. In most cases, this works very well but if not, they made the experience that it is 
very difficult to work without the Federation let alone to work against it (Interview 19, 23). In the 
former case, the regional government has to invest much time and energy for something whose 
outcome is not predictable; in the latter case, the political costs could be high because the federal 
government might not assist the ‘troublemaker’ the next time it needs its support. Therefore, 
even large regions rarely challenge the national government. In 2013, for example, two large 
German regions were in favor of the European Commission’s proposal of reducing CO2-certificates 
(“backloading”) within the framework of the European Trade System. The basic aim was to raise 
the price for CO2-emissions so that firms would be encouraged to invest in low-carbon innovations. 
The FDP-led Federal Ministry of Economy, however, was against this proposal so that the 
Federation rejected to support North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden-Württemberg at the European 
level. Initially, both regions unsuccessfully attempted to proceed on their own, but as soon as the 
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conservative-liberal coalition had been replaced by a great coalition in October 2013, both regions 
could count on the Federal government’s support and things started to work out. 
Another example which illustrates the importance of the national government’s support is 
the directive “On the restriction of the use of certain hazardous substances in electrical and 
electronic equipment” (European Commission 2011e). The Länder were not satisfied with the 
Commission’s proposal because some details would have had far reaching consequences for the 
photovoltaic industry. Therefore, the Länder attempted to convince the European Commission 
and presented all kinds of data, material and studies – but without success: the Commission clung 
to its draft. As a consequence, the Länder informed the federal government and the German MEPs 
about the possible environmental and economic repercussions and both actors assured their 
support. Finally, the German government found allies in the Council and German MEPs could 
easily convince other MEPs so that the controversial technical details were changed (Interview 
33).  
In EU Education policy, the Länder enjoy exclusive competences in some areas and the Basic 
Law grants the right to represent the Federation in the Council of Ministers. In other words, the 
legal and constitutional situation favors the regional level which raises the question of why the 
regions still consider a coalition with the federal government necessary in most cases. One could 
assume that the Länder may simply refer to the ‘Law on cooperation between the federal 
government and the Länder in matters concerning the European Union’ which provides them a 
mandate for conducting negotiations at the European level. In reality, however, the Federation 
usually stresses that the focus of the Commission’s proposal (“Schwerpunkt”) is not on education 
policy but on something else. It is not uncommon that the Federation interprets legislative 
proposals differently so that both parties struggle about the real focus of the concerned piece of 
legislation. In case the Federation does not back down, the Länder only dispose of two formal 
resolution mechanisms. First, the issue has to be discussed on the next Conference of Ministers 
on European Affairs which, however, would take too long and as long as the Ministers of Education 
have not formally agreed on a common position, the Länder are played off against each other by 
the Federation. A second possibility constitutes a legal action before the Federal Constitutional 
Court but this step would be very extreme and not helpful at all. As a result, practitioners state 
that the German federal system includes too many formal provisions for the Länder to remain 
flexible so that they face enormous obstacles to defend their interests in EU Education policy 
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(Interview 8). This means that if the Federation determines to represent the Länder’ interest at 
the EU, they have little room of maneuver to fight the national government.   
Another reason why the Länder do not or perhaps even cannot by-pass the federal 
government in this policy field is because the Irish Council Presidency in 2013 has established a 
new format which is called the “Inner-circle”. Instead of 56 or more, only 28 representatives meet 
in this Council so that the communication and coordination process is facilitated. Almost all 
participants of the previous Education Council51 meetings have welcomed this new format – with 
the exception of the German Länder. The federal government usually prevents the Länder from 
representing Germany with the consequence that they have lost some of their earlier power. In 
order to make their voice heard, the Länder identify those topics that are of major importance for 
them and try to convince the federal government from their point of view. Besides, the Ministers 
of Education from the other Member States prefer to directly speak with the German Federal 
Minister for Education instead of the Länder representative (Interview 8, 9, 11). For these reasons, 
“the Permanent Representation of Germany is our contact partner number one at the European 
level” (Interview 8). 
In the eyes of many German Länder representatives, the European Commission usually 
attempts to revise the national education system of the Member States by its own initiatives 
without specifically involving sub-national authorities, and therefore, the German Länder find 
themselves in a “defense attitude“ (Interview 31). To provide a concrete example, the 
Communication ”Opening up Education: Innovative teaching and learning for all through new 
Technologies and Open Educational Resources” (European Commission 2013d) was supposed to 
pave innovative ways of learning by using new technologies but the Länder considered that 
initiative problematic in several ways because ‘open educational resources’ (OER) meant, in fact, 
that educational materials would be freely available for all those wishing to use them. In Germany, 
however, there are publishing companies which compete for the publication of school books so 
that OER would undermine this market. Besides, in comparison to other Member States, the 
procedure for creating a school book is very complex and includes many different actors: teachers, 
parents and pupils work together and decide about the book’s content and structure. Afterwards, 
the Ministry of Education of the Land reviews it and checks whether the content matches the 
predetermined educational objectives. Only if that is the case, the book will be put on an official 
                                                          
51 The Council’s full name is Education, Youth, Culture and Sports Council 
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book-list so that it can be used for teaching. Other Member States, that supported the 
Commission’s initiative, usually have a different system in which the corresponding Ministry either 
writes school books on its own or allows organizations to determine the content and write it 
(Interview 31). 
What these examples in the different policy fields have shown is that the Länder do consider 
the national government the most influential actor who is most likely to change the Commission’s 
mind. In fact, even officials from the largest Länder state that “we pay attention not to by-pass 
the federal government” (Interview 23). Admittedly, it should be mentioned that this assessment 
is not only attributed to the legal and constitutional situation of the EU and the Member State, 
though. Another crucial aspect is that the Commission as well as the Member States act in a 
‘European spirit’ which means that nobody ignores the concerns of the other one and that all 
actors try to reach a compromise (Interview 4). This spirit provides another incentive to cooperate 
with the national government because the representatives in the Council rarely make use of the 
qualified majority voting but attempt to reach a compromise by consensus. 
 Coalition-building with the other Länder is also considered necessary in most cases because 
“the individual opinion of one region is not relevant for the Commission” (Interview 21). To put it 
differently, each Land is aware that its chances are much higher to make its voice heard if it has 
allies on its side. Although the importance of individual interest representation in Brussels through 
personal contacts is regularly emphasized, most interviewees believe that this activity can only be 
seen as a supplementary way of defending regional interests. In other words, the majority of civil 
servants in the representations think that the national arena is still the most important place for 
getting their interests accommodated. In this regard, coalition-building with inner-state regions is 
particularly useful to make the federal government listen to the concerns of a regional 
government, because, it is the corresponding federal minister who eventually gets in touch with 
the EU Commissioner. 
The necessity of coalition-building with other actors for influencing EU decision-making is not 
very high. To be more concrete, a coalition with legislative as well as administrative regions in 
other EU Member States is sometimes difficult to forge due to language barriers. Concerning 
profit-oriented companies, the Länder do not want to create the impression that they pursue 
particular economic interests. In this regard, they believe that the Commission sees them in a 
different light because they represent a democratically elected government which is responsible 
for the common good. Although a coalition with NGOs or associations is not regarded as 
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disreputable, the regional representations do not believe that it would improve the chances of 
defending their interests. 
 
Figure 11: Frequency of coalition-building of the German Länder 
 
Source 15: Interviews conducted in 2014 
 
The results concerning the frequency of coalition-building do not deviate very much from the 
findings in the previous section which means that a regional government is also capable of building 
a coalition with the preferred actor if it is deemed necessary (see Figure 11). The interviews have 
revealed that the Länder especially forge a coalition with the national government and inner-state 
regions. As it has been outlined above, these two coalitions are highly necessary because on the 
one hand the national government is regarded as the most influential actor and on the other hand 
coalition-building with their regional counterparts is mandatory to put the federal government 
under pressure. This observation applies particularly to EU Competition and Environmental policy. 
In EU Education policy, we see that a clear majority prefers a coalition with their Länder colleagues 
which is, however, not very surprising because this policy area belongs to their exclusive 
competences. In case they receive the mandate to represent Germany at the EU level, close 
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Federation will speak on their behalf in the Council of Ministers, it is crucial that they have agreed 
on a common position in the first place. 
Bearing in mind that the Länder regard a coalition with the other potential actors necessary 
in just a few cases, it is plausible that they only forge a coalition occasionally. It is still interesting 
to note that the Länder do not differentiate between legislative and non-legislative regions. One 
could have expected that the frequency of coalition-building with Spanish, Italian, Austrian or 
Belgian regions would be higher compared to administrative regions such as French or Polish ones 
because the former have the authority to make own decision in certain policy fields. In this regard, 
the interviewees highlighted that this assumption is only correct for those activities which are not 
related to legislative lobbying such as inter-regional cooperation in cultural or economic matters. 
If, for example, a new cooperation agreement for pupil exchange is planned in order to overcome 
prejudices, it is much easier to come to a decision with legislative regions. 
Concerning the last three depicted actors, employer associations or labor unions are taken 
as coalition-partners more often than profit-oriented companies or NGOs but compared to the 
national government or inner-state regions, the frequency is relatively low. Irrespective of the 
actual type of actor, the representations explicitly stress that they do not represent the interests 
of one individual actor only. To be more precise, if a profit-oriented company informs the region’s 
Brussels office about potential negative consequences of a legislative proposal, the civil servants 
check whether other industries and sectors are also affected. For example, when the European 
Commission circulated its proposal for a “Directive on the restriction of the use of certain 
hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment” (European Commission 2008a), the 
Länder representations were consulted by a major solar company which convincingly argued that 
such a law would have tremendous negative effects for the whole (German) solar market. After 
double-checking the assumptions of the company, the Länder picked up its arguments and 
attempted to bring about the necessary changes through direct (Commission) and indirect 
(Council and European Parliament) intervention (Interview 33). 
Finally, the interviewees were also asked to provide a ranking for the various coalition-
partners for each policy field (see Figure 12). The results show that the national government and 
the inner-state regions are considered most important for each policy field. To be more specific, 
the national government is ranked #1 in EU Competition and Environmental policies and #2 in EU 
Education policies as the most important coalition-partner; consequently, only in EU Education 
policy the inner-state regions are considered more important than the national government. For 
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the three selected policy fields, associations, unions and legislative regions are ranked #3 and #4, 
but these and the remaining rankings are, in fact, not deemed important because the majority of 
interviewees stressed that they concentrate on working with the federal government and the 
other Länder most of the time. As a consequence, the gap or the relevance between rank #3 and 
#7 is not very high in practice. 
 
Figure 12: Ranking of coalition-partners of the German Länder 
 
Source 16: own graph 
 
This section has provided evidence that the national government is seen as the most important 
and influential actor for the German Länder to defend their interests at the European level. Even 
in the case of EU Education policy, an area in which they enjoy exclusive political competences, 
they cannot ignore the concerns of the federal government because if the latter is determined to 
oppose the Länder’ claim to send a regional representative to the Council meetings, the Länder 
do not have much of a choice but to adhere to the national line. Although in the past coalition-
building was not always possible due to party-political disagreements, generally, the cooperation 
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between the Länder and the Federation works very smoothly (Interview 4, Interview 24). For that 
reason, several civil servants in the representations do not mind that they have to work through 
national government; in the end the overall objective is to get their regional interests 
accommodated.  
Besides, when they were asked about whether regions need to be more included in the EU 
decision-making process, the vast majority believed that their region already possesses sufficient 
possibilities to make their voice heard – either directly through the Committee of the Regions or 
indirectly through unofficial meetings with Commission officials, the Bundesrat and the national 
government. To be more specific, almost all of them rejected a further institutional inclusion 
because it would render the decision-making processes even more complicated. From their own 
experience in EU Education they know that reaching a compromise in the Council with ‘only’ 27 
other Member States is already a very difficult undertaking. Therefore, another institution with 
legal powers that is composed of legislative regions solely would not help at all to make the EU 
somehow more democratic; quite the contrary, the interviewees expected that the EU would be 
incapable of making decisions so that the output legitimacy would suffer tremendously. Instead, 
they stressed that an earlier inclusion by the European Commission would be desirable so that 
they obtain key information much faster. 
 
4.2.4 Lobbying procedures of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and mechanisms 
facilitating coalition-building   
Intervening at the earliest stage possible is crucial for Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales for 
getting their interests accommodated in the EU decision-making process. Although this 
assessment is commonly accepted, the lobbying activities usually take place after the Commission 
has published its annual Work Program. To put it differently, lobbying starts as soon as the 
Commission aims to become active in an area and gathers information on a specific topic for 
changing an outdated law or introducing something new. The reasons for the UK regions not 
attempting to mark their political footprint on the Commission’s very first document is because 
the number of employees is, in comparison with other legislative regions, not very high. Whereas 
the composition of Scotland’s EU office with twelve persons is quite good, Northern Ireland and 
Wales only employ eight and six people, respectively. For that reason, their scarce human 
resources need to be employed for crucial and controversial issues that directly impact on the 
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regional economy. The annual Work Program, however, is not legally binding and only addresses 
possible future issues which even might not be put on the agenda at all. As a consequence, the 
three regions do not try to lobby the European Commission at this early stage. Yet, this is not to 
say that they consider it unimportant but that they cannot channel their energy on this matter. 
Instead, their home base establishes close contacts to the responsible persons in Whitehall where 
Scottish, Northern Irish and Welsh interests are articulated. The UK Government, in turn, is 
supposed to pick up these regional concerns and include them into the overall UK position. This 
way, the concerns and priorities of the three legislative regions are taken care of and the UK is 
capable of speaking with one voice. 
For managing the huge amount of information that is regularly produced at European level, 
Scotland’s, Northern Ireland’s and Wales’s Brussels offices need to bundle their energies and 
concentrate on those topics that are of high importance for their regional government. After the 
European Commission has published its annual Work Program in autumn for the following year, 
their regional government sets up a priority list which pinpoints all those subjects. In this regard, 
fisheries and renewable energies are particularly important for Scotland whereas agriculture and 
rural development are crucial topics for Northern Ireland and Wales. In addition to this priority 
list, the regional governments are already in close contact with the UK Government at this early 
stage in order to know the latter’s point of view. This is done at national as well as European level. 
In Whitehall the regions’ representatives meet with their UK counterparts and in Brussels the 
regions’ team meets with the UK Permanent Representation to the EU. Consequently, mutual 
coordination takes place at both levels right from the beginning. 
As it has been worked out above, the UK legislative regions cannot refer to solid 
constitutional mechanisms which means that they have to rely on informal mechanisms to a large 
extent. One exception is the Joint Ministerial Committee (Europe) which was created by the 
Memorandum of Understanding with the objective to provide a coordination and negotiation 
platform on EU policy issues. In fact, this instrument constitutes the only formal resolution 
mechanism in case of serious disputes and although it is a purely consultative body, the 
interviewees have confirmed that it had been very useful in the past. Their regional ministers have 
the opportunity, four times a year, to officially to speak with the UK Government about crucial 
and critical topics and from their point of view, and the UK Government does really attempt to 
include their position as much as possible. As one official put it: “In most circumstances, the UK 
Government takes our requests seriously and sometimes it does not. But I assume that regions in 
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other EU Member States face similar problems. All in all, however, we can be pretty satisfied with 
the UK Government because, legally, we do not have other options” (Interview 29). In this regard, 
it should be made clear that the JMC (E) always meets before European Council meetings which 
means that this body predominately deals with very important topics such as the EU sovereign 
debt crisis, the Ukraine/Russia conflict, the Multiannual Financial Framework and so forth. In 
other words, day-to-day politics is usually not the primarily concern of such meetings. Therefore, 
all interviewees emphasized that, in case there is disagreement about a Commission’s proposal, 
they would not wait until the JMC (E) meets for two reasons. First, it simply meets too rarely which 
implicates a loss of time, and second, the respective topic might by deemed to be unimportant 
for the UK as a whole. For these reasons, getting in touch unofficially with the UK 
department/minister/official responsible is the better choice. 
In addition to the JMC (E), there is also another formal procedure which allows the UK 
legislative regions to inform the UK government about their priorities. To be more precise, the UK 
government is supposed to contact all other devolved departments twice a year so that, in theory, 
the UK government cooperates quite intensively with the devolved administrations. In practice, 
however, this mechanism does not work very well. The main problem is the limited number of 
employees both at home and in Brussels so that it is difficult to identify all relevant issues. This 
aspect becomes particularly evident if one bears in mind that most German Länder employ more 
than 12 civil servants and some more than 25. Internally, some UK regions even have an annual 
report on their activities and a work program on the following year, but because of the lack of 
people the regional government publishes it quite late. The bottom line is that the three devolved 
regions could cooperate with the national government even more if they had more human 
resources. 
 In fact, there are no further relevant formal mechanisms at the UK legislative regions’ 
disposal which explains why they predominately work informally with the national government. 
What might look like a disadvantage in comparison to other regions which can count on a diversity 
of formal resolution mechanisms, is in fact a pragmatic way of working with each other for the UK 
regions. Instead of losing time, they pick up the telephone and try to solve the issue instantly. 
Some interviewees even questioned whether more formal mechanisms would be beneficial at all 
because they might jeopardize the hitherto routine of informal cooperation (Interview 28, 
Interview 29). This assessment perhaps sounds a bit awkward to some but one should not forget 
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that, in contrast to large states such as Germany, Austria or Spain, the UK only consists of three 
legislative regions so that informal procedures are relatively easy to maintain.  
 Besides, the interviews have revealed that no official in the UK regional representation offices 
grasps interest representation as a zero-sum game vis-à-vis the UK government which means that 
they do not think in terms of ‘winning’ or ‘losing’ for a couple of reasons. The first one is that, 
usually, EU legislation does not affect one region only but impacts on various regions within the 
same Member State at the same time. As a consequence, what is disadvantageous for Wales 
might also turn out to be an issue for some English regions so that the UK government has an 
incentive to include all affected parties in the internal decision-making process. In this regard, civil 
servants stress that the more UK actors are involved, the more sources at the European level can 
be tapped. Not only regions but also business companies, banks, employers’ associations and so 
forth maintain close ties with the Commission so that they could constitute an additional source 
of information.  
Second, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland do not stick to the illusion that their opinion is 
more important than the UK one; quite the contrary, they draw a very realistic picture of their 
situation: “Although we would like to see that our regional concerns are always taken into account 
by the UK Government and the European Union, we have to be realistic. We do not represent the 
whole UK but only a couple of millions of people. So, from a democratic perspective, we have to 
accept that sometimes things don’t always work out the way we want them to” (Interview 28). 
This is not to say that UK regions neglect to be involved more in EU decision-making processes if 
there were additional opportunities. However, they acknowledge that EU policy-making is already 
extremely complex and complicated so that by increasing the number of actors, it would be even 
more difficult. 
Third, as already pointed out above, the devolved administrations have the feeling that, on 
balance, the UK government does not ignore their concerns. This impression is also confirmed by 
Jim Gallagher, the former Director General for Devolution in the UK Cabinet Office, who reports 
that intergovernmental processes do work in urgent European matters (Gallagher 2012: 210). 
However, this is not supposed to mean that cooperation between the regional and national 
government is always free of tension. As shown elsewhere, one could enumerate some examples 
that reveal conflicts (Göhmann 2010): 
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 Michael Aron, the former EU Director and Head of Scottish Government EU, leaked a 
confidential government report which assessed the relationship between Scottish and the UK 
government in EU matters. In this report he has explicitly illustrated that the UK Government 
had been reluctant to consider many of the Scottish Executive’s opinions particularly if they 
addressed solely a Scottish problem. Additionally, it is noted that the UK Government did not 
always involve Scotland in EU policy processes early enough. On top of that, the Aron report 
highlights not only that Whitehall tended to forget about consulting the Scottish Executive, 
but also that from time to time Whitehall departments deliberately excluded the Executive 
from policy formulation. Although there are several positive reports of relations mentioned, 
the Aron paper sheds light on the fact that mostly Whitehall interacted with the Executive in 
the same way it did with any other stakeholder rather than acknowledging it as a Government 
body answerable to its own Parliament (Aron 2006). 
 Additionally, there had been a quarrel in June 2007 over a ‘memorandum of understanding’ 
with Libya, because the UK Government has not consulted the Scottish Government about 
this. This was controversial because it would have allowed Abdelbaset Al-Meghrari, a Libyan 
prisoner convicted in a Scottish court of the 1989 Lockerbie bombing, to serve his sentence at 
home. 
 Moreover, there was the obstruction by the Scottish government of the building of new 
nuclear power stations in Scotland or there had been arguments about gun control powers 
between Scotland and the UK. 
 
These and other examples demonstrate that regional and national politicians do have to settle 
controversial situations behind the scenes from time to time. Particularly since the Scottish 
National Party came to power in 2007, many observers predicted a deterioration or even a break 
in the relations between Edinburgh and Whitehall, but all in all, academics have evaluated the 
relationship as ‘uncontroversial’ (Cairney 2010: 1), ‘cooperative’ (Swenden and McEwen 2008: 12) 
and ‘trouble-free’ (Bolleyer et al. 2010: 14). 
 A forth reason why no civil servant in the representation office of Scotland, Northern Ireland 
and Wales considers interest representation as a zero-sum game is because the UK government 
itself does not see it this way either. Quite the contrary, the interviewees stressed that the 
national government would unnecessarily get itself into trouble if it ignored their concerns. In this 
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regard, one should not forget that EU legislation has to be implemented throughout the UK and 
in case implementation is delayed or even fails, the Member State as a whole will be called into 
account. Bearing in mind that a violation of European law is always costly and shameful, Member 
States usually try to avoid such a situation. Besides, it is not unreasonable to expect that 
regionalist and nationalist parties would gain further public support if people get the impression 
that the UK government constantly ‘forgets’ or ignores to involve them. Since neither the UK 
Labour Party nor the UK Conservatives are keen to indirectly support these regional parties, it is 
in their own best interest to include them as far as possible.  
 
4.2.5 Collecting and exchanging information of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
Despite the different economic focus, all three regions state that the European Commission is by 
far the most important source of information (see Figure 13). When the Commission plans to 
gather information for a legislative proposal, the civil servants in the regional representation 
offices get in touch with the appropriate desk officer in the Commission. In most cases, they 
contact the responsible person via phone and sometimes also by email. Establishing the right 
contact is not very difficult for English native speakers because the language barrier is usually not 
a problem. Besides, the staff of the regional representation offices frequently attend Commission 
invitations where they can speak with important officials or private actors face-to-face. Another 
advantage of the regional teams is that they employ people of different age which makes it easier 
to meet up with officials from the Commission and other EU institutions after work. Interviews 
have revealed that during the policy formulation process, the regional offices primarily attempt 
to get in touch with respective desk officer who does the “donkey work” (Interview 27). (S)he is 
the most important person at this stage because this person writes the first draft of what will 
become the legislative proposal. Depending on the specific circumstance, the aim is to include or 
exclude certain terms or objectives: “If you are successful at this early stage, half of the job is 
already done. If not, you will have a hard time to bring about substantial changes” (Interview 27). 
In case the regional offices were not successful in getting their interests accommodated in the 
policy formulation process, they set up meetings between high-ranking Commission officials 
(Directors, Directors General or even Commissioners) and their regional ministers. Yet, it has to 
be highlighted that these meetings are not supposed to thwart the general UK standing; the 
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UKREP only allows these bi-lateral meetings if the respective regional government complies with 
the previous agreed position. 
 
Figure 13: Exchange of information of UK regions 
 
Source 17: Interviews conducted in 2014 
 
In a similar vein, the three selected UK regions have a particularly frequent exchange of 
information with the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. In contrast to the 
Commission, the main difference is that developing and cultivating the communication with the 
respective contact persons is much easier. The working relationship with MEPs from Scotland, 
Northern Ireland and Wales is very dense and friendly. The reason for this is probably due to the 
fact that all three regions are traditionally governed by center-left parties. These MEPs, in turn, 
establish contacts to other MEPs and explore ways and means for finding additional allies. Bearing 
in mind that the German representation offices only exchange information with the Council of 
Ministers occasionally or even rarely, it is interesting to note that this channel is of high 
importance for the legislative regions of the UK. First of all, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales 
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are not prohibited to establish contacts to the Council working groups or to COREPER. In fact, as 
it has been already mentioned above, these regions already coordinate their work with the UK 
government from the very beginning. During all the various EU decision-making phases, the 
cooperation and coordination between these actors is constantly managed by UKREP. All 
interviewees confirmed that the working relationship is marked by pragmatism and trust. As long 
as a regional government does not cross the agreed line, the UK Government is willing to share 
all relevant information with them. Moreover, if it is deemed appropriate a regional minister is 
allowed to participate in Council Minister meetings. In fisheries policy, for example, the Scottish 
Minister sits frequently at the table with his/her UK counterpart and, sometimes, (s)he even 
represents the UK as a whole. Or, for example, in education policy the Welsh Minister regularly 
takes part in these meetings as well. 
The Committee of the Regions constitutes an actor with which the UK legislative regions only 
exchange information occasionally at best. The overall reason for this is its inability to force the 
Council or the Parliament to take its views into consideration. The supposed inefficiency of this 
body, which is usually brought up by academics due to its heterogeneous composition, is not a 
considerable issue for Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales. In fact, the interviewees stressed 
that the actual power of the CoR depends to a large extent on the responsible rapporteur who 
drafts the opinion; some past rapporteurs had been very enthusiastic, committed, and precise on 
the details so that the final report contained very useful information for the Commission, the 
Council and the European Parliament. Besides, the three devolved regions primarily use the CoR 
for obtaining an overview about the standing of other participants and for establishing contacts 
to high-ranking EU officials. In other words, the CoR provides an additional channel for Scotland, 
Northern Ireland, and Wales in some circumstances for receiving further information and creating 
networks. 
 It has already been mentioned above that the three regions coordinate their actions very 
closely with the UK Government so that it is not surprising that the exchange of information 
among each other and with the UK Government is of paramount importance. Irrespective of the 
stage of policy-making, they meet weekly in the building of the UK Permanent Representation in 
order to discuss the latest incidents and future events. In case something new has come up, the 
participants exchange their viewpoints so that this meeting provides an ideal information 
platform for all parties. The specific standing and the actual content as regards the topic in 
question, however, are not specified in these meetings but at home. Edinburgh, Belfast and Cardiff 
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work out the details on their own and communicate them to their representatives in London 
where the overall coordination between the devolved administrations and the UK government 
takes place. The concrete mechanisms that lead to the coalition with the central government will 
be scrutinized further below; at this point, it is sufficient to say that Whitehall constitutes the 
central place where UK regions make the final decisions about their later lobbying activities. 
 In contrast to the previous actors, the exchange of information with other legislative and 
non-legislative regions is rare. Theoretically, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales are not only 
allowed to conduct direct communication with regions but also to cooperate with them in policy 
fields of their concern, but in practice, they make very little use of it. All interviewees stated that 
they do not specifically establish contacts with other regions. One reason for this is that their team 
is comparatively small so that they do not have the necessary capacity to carry out that kind of 
work. If they want to obtain an overview whether they are isolated in their standing or whether 
there are potential allies, they get in touch with their members of the Committee of the Regions. 
Generally, they do see the added-value of inter-regional coalitions but the principle problem is 
that they need to adhere to the UK line. Other legislative regions are aware of that fact and are 
discouraged to coordinate and cooperate with the UK regions at the European level because this 
process is too burdensome and takes too much effort. 
As regards the last group of non-governmental actors – profit-oriented companies, nonprofit-
oriented companies, associations and unions – all three selected regions state that exchanging 
information happens on an occasional and sometimes even on a particularly frequent basis. 
Depending on the number of members of those organizations and on their regional importance, 
telephone conversations, bilateral meetings and invitations to podium discussions constitute 
regular instruments for obtaining valuable information. The interviewees stressed that since the 
Commission is very receptive to objective arguments, including first-hand expertise of affected 
stakeholders to the regional position opens the door for discussions. To put it differently, using 
information from stakeholders is not considered to be harmful but increases the possibility of 
making the regional voice heard. 
 
4.2.6 Coalition-building of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
The results depicted in Figure 14 clearly demonstrate that the three legislative regions consider a 
coalition with the national government necessary in almost all cases. There are two reasons for 
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this evaluation. The first and most important one is that, officially, the European Commission only 
negotiates with the Member State’s national government. Moreover, the UK government not only 
represents the Member State but the corresponding UK Minister also votes in the Council of 
Ministers. In similar vein, the devolved administrations do not have the possibility to speak up in 
Council meetings if the UK government is opposed to it. Second, the UK government possesses an 
informational advantage vis-à-vis the three legislative regions because it enjoys better access to 
the EU institutions. In comparison to the UK regional representation offices, the UK Permanent 
Representation employs far more people and since they represent the UK as a whole, EU officials 
are more inclined to meet and speak with them officially as well as unofficially. 
 
Figure 14: Necessity of coalition-building for UK regions 
 
Source 18: Interviews conducted in 2014 
 
This assessment, however, does not signify that the national government is always included in 
case a UK legislative region becomes active at the European level. On occasions, the 
representation office asks its government to independently engage with the European 
Commission. The objective is not only to explain the region’s views on a proposal but also to 
explain domestic legislative initiatives. For example, a health ministry of a UK legislative region 
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planned to introduce a tax on alcohol because too many people drink alcohol too often. The 
ministry referred to various studies that indicated that people drink less if alcohol is more 
expensive. The European Commission, in turn, said that this would not be in accordance with EU 
law for competitive reasons. Therefore, the regional government had to explain to the 
Commission its position. Consequently, representation offices do not only look at what the 
Commission is doing but they also contact the relevant people for pursuing domestic regional 
policies. In a nutshell, UK legislative regions do act autonomously in some cases; especially if they 
need to illuminate domestic legal initiatives.  
As regards the necessity of coalition-building with inner-state regions, the interviewees 
highlighted that “if Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales work together, it is very difficult for 
London to ignore us” (Interview 28) which means that coordination and cooperation among these 
actors should not be underestimated. Yet, a common problem is that their interests diverge very 
often due to legal, political, economic and cultural differences: legally, devolution has granted 
different competences to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland; politically, the regions’ electoral 
system differs which results in different party political constellations; economically, the three 
regions have a different focus; culturally, one region is religiously divided (Northern Ireland) 
whereas one other even strives for independence (Scotland). For these reasons, a coalition with 
the other two regions does not occur in many circumstances. 
The other potential actors, however, are not considered very important for defending 
regional interests. Only in a very few cases, a coalition with legislative as well as non-legislative 
regions in other EU Member States, profit- and non-profit oriented companies, associations and 
unions is deemed necessary. 
When the interviewees were asked about the frequency of coalition-building with the UK 
government, all of them responded that this occurs on a particularly frequent basis (see Figure 
15). Although it is deemed necessary from time to time to contact to European Commission 
individually, they stressed that their lobbying activities do not thwart the previously agreed UK 
position. If they really did something like that, they might face serious problems in the future 
because Whitehall could decide to exclude them from EU negotiations. Legally, Scotland, 
Northern Ireland and Wales have agreed to work together with the UK Government and if they 
breached any of the terms and conditions of the agreement, then UK Government would probably 
decline to adhere to this agreement either.  
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Figure 15: Frequency of coalition-building of UK regions 
 
Source 19: Interviews conducted in 2014 
 
Although the regions are aware of the necessity to coordinate and cooperate with the inner-state 
regional counterparts, in reality a coalition is not very common for the above stated reasons. On 
top of that, German civil servants reported that since the Scottish National Party have entered 
government, it appears that Scotland is not even interested in maintaining good work 
relationships with them as in the past. Instead of working with other regions, Scottish officials 
would follow a policy that rathr includes other nations (Göhmann 2010: 39). It does not appear 
unlikely that such a policy also affects the relationship with Northern Ireland and Wales.  
Bearing in mind the previous results about the necessity of coalition-building, it does not 
come as a surprise that the UK legislative regions do not forge coalitions with the other examined 
actors more often. In most circumstances, these actors establish contact to the offices and not 
vice versa. Since the vast majority of these contacts stem from the respective home regions, 
Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales build a coalition if the respective organization is able to 
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contribute expertise to position of the regional government or if it is capable of exerting strong 
political pressure. 
The results concerning the necessity and frequency of coalition-building already indicate that 
it appears very unlikely that UK regions are willing or even capable of by-passing their central 
government and the results depicted in Figure 16 points into the same direction in this matter. 
When the interviewees were asked to rank the potential coalition-partners, all civil servants stated 
that the UK Government is by far the most important actor. Although inner-state regions are 
ranked second, the interviewees explicitly stressed that there exists a huge gap between the 
relevance of the national government and inner-state regions. In fact, the interviewees had 
problems to rank the remaining actors because, in reality, they are rather unimportant as regards 
legislative lobbying. However, they stressed that other regions or unions are not irrelevant per se; 
if the question was about funds acquisition, the exchange of best practices or cooperation in 
cultural matters, the answers would have been completely different. 
To sum it up, the results show that the UK legislative regions do not indicate that the UK 
Government is by-passed at all. 
Figure 16: Ranking of coalition-partners of UK regions 
 
Source 20: own graph 
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4.2.7 ‘With or without or against you…?’ Reflections on the by-passing 
phenomenon52 
In the second half of the 1990s, Multi-level governance proponents had argued that regions could 
“potentially mobilise Commission support against their own national government” (Ansell et al. 
1997: 350; emphasis added) and one decade later, scholars still concluded that “[R]egions thus 
have the opportunity to become relevant players in the Brussels policy-game even against the 
wishes of their sometimes inextensible gate-keeping central governments” (Tatham 2008: 511; 
emphasis added).  
The above described results have shown that the national government in Germany and the 
UK is considered the most important and influential actor for defending regional interests. As a 
consequence, no regional government attempts to work without this actor in the first place so 
that there is no proof of regular state by-passing in EU Competition, EU Environment or EU 
Education policy. Yet, this does not mean that the national government is not by-passed at all. 
Whereas the UK interviewees emphasized that they do not by-pass the UK government, a number 
of German civil servants in the representations have stressed that if the federal government does 
not or cannot represent their interests at the European level, they may decide to act 
autonomously, as the following examples demonstrate: 
 International agreements: When the negotiations about the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the European Commission and the United States 
focused on the audiovisual sector, a medium-sized Land requested that the promotion for 
children’s films should not be restricted or even forbidden. Initially, these films were not 
considered worth protecting but the Land and regions from other EU Member States met 
unofficially with Commission officials. Together they could convincingly argue that their 
request is based on European norms and values so that the Commission picked up the regions’ 
claim (Interview 26).   
 New guidelines for Trans-European Networks (TEN) 53 : when the European Commission 
revised its guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network 
(European Commission 2013a), it contacted the federal government in 2011 and 2012 and 
asked for input. The objective was to identify new infrastructure projects that better connect 
                                                          
52 I have paraphrased Michael Tatham’s article (2010) “’With or without you’? Revisiting territorial state-
bypassing in EU interest representation” 
53 TENs are infrastructure networks in transport, energy, and telecommunication 
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the regions and Member States. Yet, the Länder had not been involved in the decision-making 
process by the federal government. Then, the Länder built a coalition in the Bundesrat and 
made a common decision which depicted additional corridors that would have been worth 
supporting. Nevertheless, this decision was ignored by the Federation once again because the 
European Commission only guarantees partial financing. In other words, the federal 
government would have had to cover the remaining costs. In the end, the Länder established 
direct contact with the European Commission and convinced it to integrate the requested 
corridors (Interview 34). 
 State aid: if the European Commission has been informed that an organization receives state-
aid by a Land and the Commission finds that this subsidy violates EU competition rules, it 
establishes contact with the corresponding authority. Yet, in this case it must act through the 
Federal Ministry of Economy in the first place which then forwards it to the concerned Land 
government. Afterwards, the federal government sometimes does not insist to be included in 
this process any further, so that the Land can solve the issue directly with the Commission. In 
practice, the Land conducts so-called “non-conversations” with the Commission – 
conversations which officially have never happened. This procedure has two advantages: first, 
the Federation has less work and second the whole process is accelerated (Interview 34).  
 The revision of the Tobacco Products Directive (European Commission 2014d): initially, the 
European Commission attempted to ban menthol in cigarettes which would have prohibited 
Bavarian Snuff. The Bavarian government fought for an exemption from this ban because 
most German snuff clubs are situated in Bavaria which means that its regional economy would 
have been particularly affected. Since this case was of no major concern to the other regional 
governments or the national government, Bavaria acted on its own. It established contact 
with high ranking EU officials and fortunately the former Bavarian Minister President Edmund 
Stoiber, who directed the EU’s High Level Group for Reducing Bureaucracy at that time, 
supported the Bavarian government and unofficially met the former EU Commissioner for 
Health, John Dalli. Ultimately, the directive reflected Bavarian interests and snuff tobacco was 
exempted from the ban. 
 
What these examples show is that, sometimes, regional governments do by-pass their national 
government. This, however, depends very much on the content and is decided on a case by case 
basis. More importantly, although they may have worked without the national government in 
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some circumstances, they have almost never worked against it. More than 30 interviews could 
only reveal one case (‘New guidelines for Trans-European Networks’) in which regional 
governments have actually done that. Therefore, it seems fair to conclude that the assumptions 
or expectations voiced by some MLG proponents are not reflected by reality. In fact, it appears 
that the national government is still seen as a gate-keeper by most regional governments – at 
least in the three selected policy fields. Otherwise, it would be hard to explain why almost all of 
them assess the national government as the most influential actor and try to build a coalition with 
it. 
 Finally, it should be highlighted once again that neither the national government in Germany 
or the UK excludes the regional level on a large scale. Although the conducted interviews have 
revealed a few cases in which the national government purposefully excluded its regions, one 
cannot argue that the regional level is suppressed by the national one. The civil servants in the 
German and UK representations made clear that in most cases, the working relationship runs 
smoothly and that they have the impression that their concerns are not ignored. In fact, the vast 
majority was even against a stronger institutional inclusion of regions in the EU decision-making 
process because it would render policy-making more complicated. In this regard, the idea of 
including regional authorities in the EU machinery to reduce the democratic deficit of the EU 
(‘remoteness to EU citizens’) has to be rejected.  
 
4.2.8 Concluding thoughts on successful lobbying 
The challenges of explaining why one organization was capable of successfully lobbying a 
European actor whereas another was not are well known. There are at least three structural issues 
in this regard: “the existence of different channels of influence, the occurrence of counteractive 
lobbying and that fact that influence can be wielded at different stages of the policy process” (Dür 
2008a: 561). Bearing in mind the targeted lobby organizations of this research project (legislative 
regions), one could also add a further problem. It does not seem very unlikely that legislative 
regions had been successful to promote their interests only because of the support of other strong 
actors such as the federal government. Hence, one could not attribute the desired outcome to 
the lobbying efforts of the legislative regions solely – perhaps they would not have achieved their 
goal at all without their strong ally.  
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 So what theory is able to explain successful lobbying best? This project has applied 
assumptions from rational choice theory which focus on utility maximization by weighing 
opportunities and constraints. Although the interviews conducted have not proven this approach 
wrong, several civil servants have stressed that the personality of an actor seems to be a crucial 
aspect as the following examples demonstrate: 
 The responsible minister’s attitude: the degree of involvement in EU decision-making of each 
Land depends very much on this factor. Some ministers are simply not interested in European 
affairs so that neither the Land’s capital nor its representation office in Brussels take proactive 
steps with the consequence that the Land’s possibility to shape the Commission’s legislative 
proposal to its favor is rather low. If, however, the responsible minister emphasizes that the 
concerned topic is of particular importance and insists on being informed thoroughly, the 
representation office has far more leeway and, if necessary, employees of other policy areas 
assist the respective policy adviser (Interview 14). 
 The socialization and qualities of the civil servants in the representation office: the willingness 
and ability to forge coalitions with actors depends considerably on whether the responsible 
civil servant has enjoyed an international or national education. Someone who has already 
been taught to think internationally is more willing to contact and forge coalitions with 
organizations or actors that are place outside of the Member State. Additionally, an 
international education makes it more likely that the corresponding person knows foreign 
languages which facilitates coalition-building. On top of that, being fluent in French, for 
example, opens doors to EU institutions so that the civil servant has better access to 
information at an early stage (Interview 9). 
 The assertiveness of the leading civil servant in the capital: a leading civil servant with a strong, 
self-confident character who also knows when (s)he can cross the line is likely to achieve more 
than someone who always complies with the rules. This means that the corresponding person 
must be able to assess the situation correctly, be open to suggestions, and most importantly, 
(s)he has to be able to withstand pressure. Bearing in mind that many politicians are usually 
not experts in their policy field, they have to trust their administrative personnel but if the 
responsible person is indecisive and leaves the decision-making to others, valuable time is lost 
(Interview 34). 
These examples show that the personality of an actor is a very important aspect which does have 
an influence on the region’s lobbying activities. In other words, these assessments suggest that 
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future research about successful lobbying of legislative regions may also adopt an approach which 
especially focuses on the individuals in a regional government. Although the legal and 
constitutional situation of the EU and the Member State constitute the key variable to understand 
the lobbying strategy of legislative regions in Germany and the UK, the interviewees stressed that 
the behavior of civil servants and politicians also contribute greatly to the success of lobbying.  
Finally, it is interesting to note that a couple of civil servants expressed their discomfort about 
the whole lobbying debate. Every time the EU identifies an issue, the media and politicians would 
adopt a very national perspective and only ask ‘what’s in for us?’. Instead of illuminating the whole 
complexity of an undertaking and assessing it from a European point of view, most of these actors 
would primarily focus on the negative national aspects. The last quote of this study perfectly 
summarizes this perception. 
 
“For me personally, there are two different understandings of successful lobbying. The first 
one which, unfortunately, is the prevalent type, is that Brussels initiates a piece of legislation 
and regions attempt to get their interests accommodated. If, ultimately, the final wording 
reflects the region’s interests, you have done a good job and you have been successful. The 
second type, which in my eyes would be more beneficial for everyone, is that the popular 
dualism EU/Land does not exist. We all live in the same house. The EU is the roof, the 
Federation the 2nd floor, the Länder the 1st floor and the municipalities the basement. If the 
basement is on fire or the roof is leaky, the intermediate floors will be affected sooner or 
later as well. Therefore, we must stop looking at each floor separately. Neither the 
municipalities, nor the Länder, nor the Federation, nor the EU is aware of the correct way to 
solve an issue right from the beginning. The correct procedure can only be found by 
exchanging information and cooperation. Successful lobbying should be understood in this 
way. We should only refer to success in this context if the common good is better off in the 
end. Individual interests – be it regional or private ones – should not outbalance common 
interests” (Interview 14). 
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5 Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
This study has attempted to systematically analyze the preferred lobbying strategy of German and 
UK legislative to get their interests accommodated at the European level. Bearing in mind the 
theoretical dispute between liberal intergovernmentalists and Multi-level governance proponents 
about the functioning of the European Union and the ability of subnational actors to defend their 
interests autonomously, the principle aim is to generate evidence whether legislative regions 
work with or without (=by-passing) their national government. In this regard, scholarship had 
already worked out a number of factors that affect a region’s capability to influence EU policy-
making to its favor. Yet, experts disagree about the most important variable that affects regions’ 
EU lobbying activities in general and that favors regions to work without its national government 
in particular. As a consequence, research went down different paths without providing irrefutable 
results that could have convinced liberal intergovernmentalist theorists. For example, some 
authors focused exclusively on the region’s size (Nielsen and Salk 1998), whereas others 
concentrated on the region’s financial situation (Bouwen 2002: 10) or its cultural distinctiveness 
(Hepburn 2010). 
For identifying the key factor which makes state by-passing most likely, I have applied the 
situational approach which belongs to organizational sociology, a sub-discipline of sociology. The 
reason for doing this was twofold. First, this approach offers a clear analytical structure which 
helps to elaborate on the relationship between the various identified factors in the academic 
literature. In sociological terms, it illuminates the interdependence between the organization’s 
environment on the one hand and the organization’s goals on the other and stress that the former 
exerts a strong impact on the latter. Second, tackling this field of study from a different discipline 
adds a new theoretical perspective to the subnational mobilization literature which might provide 
fresh impetus. 
The analysis has shown that the legal and constitutional situation of the EU and the Member 
State constitutes the crucial factor that affects regions’ EU lobbying activities. Since the situational 
approach does not predict actors’ behavior I combined it with rational choice theory and assumed 
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that regional governments are rational actors who employ scare resources as effectively as 
possible. Following from this assumption they do not forge coalitions with all possible actors but 
seek the most influential coalition-partner (veto-player) in order to convince EU key decision-
makers about their preferences or concerns. Due to the fact the legal and constitutional situations 
differs from Member State to Member State and policy field to policy field, this project 
investigated the lobbying activities of the German Länder on the one side and Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland on the other in EU Competition, EU Environment as well as EU Education 
policy. Concerning the constitutional situation in the Member States, Germany and the UK 
represent an interesting comparison because the German Länder possess very strong 
participation and information rights in EU politics whereas the UK legislative regions cannot count 
on these rights. As regards the legal situation of the EU, the three selected policy fields cover all 
possible legal manifestations at the European level. 
The overall aim has been to scrutinize if state by-passing can be observed regularly in areas 
other than EU Structural and Cohesion policy because the majority of previous studies have 
explicitly focused on the latter. By-passing was defined as defending regional interests without 
working with the national government and it has been argued that doing this regularly means that 
more than 50% of the population would have to respond in the designed questionnaire that ‘in 
no cases’ or ‘in a few cases’ coalition-building with the national government is necessary. To put 
it differently, if the majority of regions forge coalitions with actors other than the national 
government because the latter actor is not considered necessary for achieving a desired outcome, 
we have evidence that state by-passing is the rule rather than the exception. In order to answer 
this question, I have conducted semi-structured expert interviews with policy advisers, heads and 
deputy heads of office of the regions’ representations in Brussels about (a) collecting and 
exchanging information with other organizations, (b) the procedures of lobbying and the 
mechanisms facilitating coalition-building as well as (c) the necessity, frequency and relevance of 
coalition-building. On top of that, one director of the Committee of the Regions, four policy 
advisers of the European Commission, three MEPs and three advisers of the Permanent 
Representation of Germany were interviewed in order to cross-check the final results. 
 As regard the first mentioned interview question – collecting and exchanging information 
with other organizations – the interviewees were asked to indicate with which actors they 
exchange important information in order to get your interests represented in the EU decision-
making process. This question provides a first impression of whether regions already work with 
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their national government right from the beginning. The results presented above reveal only 
minor differences between the German Länder on the one side and Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland on the other. The only difference worth mentioning is that the German Länder exchange 
information more frequently with legislative and non-legislative regions in other EU Member 
States than the three selected UK regions. The main reason for this is that the team of the UK 
representation offices is comparatively small so that they do not have the necessary capacity to 
carry out that kind of work. Apart from that, the European Commission, the European Parliament, 
the Council of Ministers, the national government and inner-state regions constitute an extremely 
valuable source of information for both the German Länder and the UK legislative regions. 
 Concerning the second stated interview question – the procedures of lobbying and the 
mechanisms facilitating coalition-building – the civil servants were asked to describe how they 
proceed when the European Commission plans to initiate a legislative proposal, how they respond 
to unforeseen events and which mechanisms or methods help to facilitate coalition-building. The 
interviewees have brought up some differences between the selected legislative regions. 
Whereas the German Länder even approach the European Commission when it elaborates on its 
annual Work Program, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland do not intervene at that early stage 
because this paper is not legally binding and therefore, they prefer to use their scare human 
resources for other projects. A further notable difference constitutes the regions’ lobbying activity 
at the national and European level: whereas the German Länder coordinate and perform their 
action predominately at the European level, the UK regions must concentrate their energy on both 
the national and European level. The reason for this is the constitutional situation of Germany and 
the UK: due to their constitutionally granted political competences, the German Länder dispose 
of several formal resolution mechanisms at the European level such as the Länder representative 
for the Council working groups, Draht-Berichte or the Länderbeobachter. Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, in contrast, cannot count on such mechanisms so that they have to maintain 
close contact with Whitehall. At that stage, these findings could be regarded as an indicator that 
German regions might by-pass their national government because they possess a variety of legal 
options to upload their interests at the European level autonomously. 
The third and last main interview question focused on the necessity, frequency and the 
relevance of coalition-building. In this regard, the interviews have shown that the German Länder 
build a coalition with the national government in most cases for all the three selected policy fields 
because of the legal and constitutional situation of the EU and the Member State. To be more 
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specific, due to the German Basis Law the federal government explicitly enjoys a higher legal 
status vis-à-vis the European Commission and because of the EU Treaties the Commission’s civil 
servants are not allowed to strike deals with regional representatives. The policy proposals of DG 
Competition and DG Environment presented in chapter 4 have shown that the national 
government Member State is constantly being informed by the European Commission about the 
latest changes of policy proposals. Due to these legal features and the fact that the national 
government possesses the formal voting power in the Council, the vast majority of interviewees 
have concluded that this actor represents the best and, sometimes, only possibility to promote 
regional interests at the European level. Although the Länder possess the exclusive legal political 
competences in education policy, they find it necessary to build a coalition with the federal 
government in most cases for a variety of reasons. First, the national government may claim that 
the focus (‘Schwerpunkt’) of the policy is not on education but on something else. Second, a new 
format (‘Inner-Circle’) has been established in the Education Council by the Heads of State or 
Government which makes interest representation more difficult for the Länder. Third, national 
education ministers of other EU Member States prefer to talk to the German Federal Minister for 
Education so that reaching compromises in the Council is rather difficult. To put it differently, 
because the constitutional situation in Germany may be interpreted differently, the legal situation 
of the EU favors the national government and preference of national ministers to negotiate with 
their national counterparts cause the German Länder to build a coalition with the federal 
government. 
The results for the UK legislative regions are very similar; Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland build a coalition with the national government in almost all cases. There are two reasons 
for this evaluation. The first and most important one is that, officially, the European Commission 
only negotiates with the Member State’s national government. Moreover, the UK government 
not only represents the Member State but the corresponding UK Minister also votes in the Council 
of Ministers. In similar vein, the devolved administrations do not have the possibility to speak up 
in Council meetings if the UK government is opposed to it. As a consequence, the legal and 
constitutional situation of the EU and the Member State is the primary reason for not by-passing 
the UK Government. Second, the UK Government possesses an informational advantage vis-à-vis 
the three legislative regions because it enjoys better access to the EU institutions. In comparison 
to the UK regional representation offices, the UK Permanent Representation employs far more 
people and since they represent the UK as a whole, EU officials are more inclined to meet and 
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speak with them officially as well as unofficially. If Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland decides to 
become active at the European level without including the national government, the interviewees 
stressed that their lobbying activities do not thwart the previously agreed UK position. 
To sum up, although the procedures of lobbying and the mechanisms facilitating coalition-
building appear to favor state by-passing in the case of the German Länder, the reality proves this 
assumption wrong. The preferred lobbying strategy for defending regional interests of German 
and UK legislative regions constitutes working with the national government.  
 
5.1.1 Reviewing the hypotheses 
In this section I am going to compare my hypotheses formulated in chapter 3 with the results of 
the conducted interviews. The hypotheses have been derived from the different specifications of 
the independent variable as depicted in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Constellation of legal political competences and expected strategy 
Region 
EU 
Exclusive legal political 
competences 
Shared legal political 
competences 
No legal political 
competences 
 
Exclusive legal political 
competences 
 
Impossible Impossible  
By-passing 
(coalition with outer-
state regions and non-
governmental actors) 
 
Shared legal political 
competences 
 
 
Impossible 
 
Working with the 
national government 
Working with the 
national government 
 
Supporting legal 
political competences 
 
By-passing 
(coalition with inner-
state regions) 
Working with the 
national government 
Working with the 
national government 
Source 21: own table 
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Hypothesis 1: If the region possesses shared or no political competences in the concerned 
policy at the national level and the Member State government constitutes a potential veto-
player through the Council at the European level, the national government represents the 
most important coalition-partner for a regional government to defend its interests. As a 
consequence, the majority of regions are going to work with the national government so 
that state by-passing will not occur. 
 
In this research project, this hypothesis refers to EU Environment policy. The interviews have 
shown that the German Länder as well as Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland consider coalition-
building with their national government necessary in most cases. Moreover, the results provide 
evidence that the frequency of coalition building with this actor is high for the German regions 
and even very high for the three UK regions. In a nutshell, the hypothesis cannot be rejected 
because the majority of selected regions do forge a coalition with the national government 
because it is regarded as the most important coalition-partner and, therefore, they do not by-pass 
it on a regular basis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: If the EU possesses exclusive competences in the concerned policy and the 
Member State government is not involved in the decision-making process through the 
Council, regions from other EU Member States and non-governmental actors such as 
business companies, NGOs or employer associations represent the most important coalition-
partners for a regional government to convince the European Commission from its 
viewpoint. As a consequence, the majority of regions are going to work without the national 
government so that state by-passing will occur. 
 
This hypothesis relates to EU Competition policy. Contrary to the assumption, the results 
demonstrate that for German and UK regions, a coalition with the national government is 
necessary in most cases. In addition to that, the frequency of coalition building with that actor is 
high for the German Länder and once again very high for the selected UK regions. In fact, for both 
the Länder as well as Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland the necessity of coalition-building with 
those actors stated in the hypothesis is rather low (‘in a few cases’) and the figures as regards the 
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frequency of coalition building are also relatively low (between ‘rare’ and ‘occasional’). In other 
words, this hypothesis has to be rejected because neither regions from other EU Member States 
nor non-governmental actors such as business companies, NGOs and employer associations 
constitute the most important coalition-partners. The national government is deemed most 
influential and, therefore, it is not regularly by-passed in EU Competition policy.  
   
Hypothesis 3: If the regional level possesses exclusive competences in the concerned policy 
and if it enjoys the legal right to represent the Member State government in the Council, 
regions from the same Member State represent the most important coalition-partners for a 
regional government to defend its regional interests. As a consequence, the majority of 
regions are going to work without the national government so that state by-passing will 
occur. 
As explained in chapter 1, this hypothesis can only be tested for the German Länder in EU 
Education policy. Although a coalition with the national government is necessary in most cases, 
the Länder build a coalition with their regional counterparts (close to ‘particularly frequent’) more 
often than with the federal government (‘occasional’). Consequently, German regions assess the 
other inner-state regions as more important than the national government for defending their 
interests at the European level. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, it has been shown, however, that 
this assessment does not lead to state by-passing for a variety of reasons (the “real” focus of the 
respective policy gives room for interpretation; the ‘Inner-Circle’ format; the preference of 
national education ministers from other EU Member States). As a result, state by-passing does 
not occur regularly so that the hypothesis has to be rejected.  
 
5.1.2 Final remarks 
This final sub-chapter will pinpoint the methodological strengths and weaknesses of this study. 
Clearly, the main weakness is the limited number of cases: it has focused on legislative regions of 
two Member States only. As a consequence, one should be careful to make any generalizations. 
In fact, the constitutional situation of legislative regions differs from Member State to Member 
States so that other regions might have different opportunities to defend their interests at the 
European level. On the other hand and particularly because of the limited number of cases, this 
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study has not worked with samples but it has included the total population54, and therefore, the 
results provide a very accurate picture of the lobbying activities of German and UK legislative 
regions. Moreover, before conducting the interviews, I had ensured to maintain the anonymity of 
my interview partners so that they could speak freely. As a result, I received many valuable 
information which I would have not got otherwise. On top of that, one director of the Committee 
of the Regions, four policy advisers of the European Commission, three MEPs and three advisers 
of the Permanent Representation of Germany were interviewed in order to cross-check the final 
results. With that in mind, it is hard to deny that the final results represent a precise answer of 
whether legislative regions in Germany and the UK work with or without their national 
government for getting their interests accommodated at the European level.  
                                                          
54 Apart from Saxony and Mecklenburg-West Pomerania which refused to take part in this study. 
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7 Appendix A – Questionnaire (German version) 
 
Universität zu Köln 
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät 
Jean Monnet Lehrstuhl – Prof. Dr. W. Wessels 
 
Verantwortlich für diese Untersuchung: 
Dominik Göhmann 
 
Interessensvertretung deutscher und britischer Regionen im EU-
Gesetzgebungsprozess: Bündnisse als entscheidender Faktor? 
 
Dieses Forschungsprojekt thematisiert die Rolle gesetzgebender Regionen im EU-
Gesetzgebungsprozess in drei unterschiedlichen Politikfeldern und versucht 
herauszufinden, ob und wie diese Akteure EU-Politik mitgestalten können. Das Ziel ist 
es, die Bedeutung von temporären Bündnissen in den Bereichen Wettbewerbs-, 
Bildungs- und Umweltpolitik auf unterschiedliche Interaktionsmuster hin zu 
untersuchen. Aus Kapazitätsgründen beschränkt sich diese Studie auf deutsche und 
britische Regionen. 
Wir wären Ihnen sehr verbunden, wenn Sie sich an dem Forschungsprojekt beteiligen 
und den beigelegten Fragebogen ausfüllen würden. Sämtliche Daten werden 
selbstverständlich vertraulich behandelt und anonymisiert. In der späteren Analyse 
werden keine individuellen, sondern aggregierte Ergebnisse präsentiert, so dass die 
Angaben aus diesem Fragebogen einzelnen Regionen nicht zuzuordnen sind. 
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A. Allgemeine Angaben  
 
1. Wie lautet die offizielle Bezeichnung Ihres Vertretungsbüros? 
 
 
2. Für welche(s) Politikfeld(er) sind Sie zuständig? 
 
 
B. Interaktionen in EU-Gesetzgebungsprozessen 
 
1. Informationsaustausch 
Bitte geben Sie in der unten aufgeführten Tabelle an, mit welchen Akteuren in Ihrem 
Aufgabenbereich Sie wichtige Informationen austauschen, um die Interessen Ihrer 
Landesvertretung im EU-Gesetzgebungsprozess besser einbringen zu können. Darunter 
fällt offizielle als auch inoffizielle Kommunikation. Bitte unterscheiden Sie dazu 
zwischen seltenen (1), gelegentlichen (2) und besonders häufigen 
Informationsaustausch (3). 
 
2. Bündnishäufigkeit 
Bitte geben Sie in der unten aufgeführten Tabelle an, mit welchen Akteuren Sie sich in 
Ihrem Aufgabenbereich unter normalen Umständen gegenseitig abstimmen und 
zusammenarbeiten, um die Interessen Ihrer Landesvertretung im EU-
Gesetzgebungsprozess besser einbringen zu können. Bitte unterscheiden Sie dazu 
zwischen seltenen (1), gelegentlichen (2) und besonders häufigen Bündnissen (3). 
 
3. Relevanz 
Bitte beurteilen Sie in der unten aufgeführten Tabelle die Relevanz der potentiellen 
Bündnispartner für Ihren Aufgabenbereich, um die Interessen Ihrer Landesvertretung 
im EU-Gesetzgebungsprozess besser einbringen zu können. Vergeben Sie dafür bitte 
eine Rangfolge, bei der Sie mit 1 den relevantesten und mit 7 den irrelevantesten 
Akteur benennen. 
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Akteursbezeichnung Informations- 
austausch 
Bündnis- 
häufigkeit 
Bündnis- 
relevanz 
Europäische Kommission   
Europäisches Parlament  
Ministerrat  
Ausschuss der Regionen  
Nationale Regierung     
Innermitgliedsstaatliche Regionen    
Regionen mit gesetzgebenden Kompetenzen 
anderer EU-Mitgliedsstaaten 
   
Regionen ohne gesetzgebenden Kompetenzen 
anderer EU-Mitgliedsstaaten 
   
Gewinnorientierte Unternehmen    
Nicht-gewinnorientierte Unternehmen (NGOs…)    
Verbände, Gewerkschaften    
 
4. Bündnisvoraussetzung 
Welcher Voraussetzungen bedarf es, damit Sie mit den oben angegebenen Akteuren 
Bündnisse eingehen? 
 
 
5. Bündnisnotwendigkeit 
Bitte beurteilen Sie die Notwendigkeit der gegenseitigen Abstimmung und 
Zusammenarbeit in Ihrem Aufgabenbereich mit den in der Tabelle aufgeführten 
Akteuren, um die Interessen Ihrer Landesregierung auf europäischer Ebene zu 
vertreten. Bitte kreuzen Sie an. 
Notwendigkeit  
 
Akteur 
Ja, in allen 
Fällen. 
Ja, in vielen 
Fällen. 
Ja, in 
wenigen 
Fällen. 
Nein, in 
keinem 
Fall. 
Nationale Regierung     
Innermitgliedsstaatliche Regionen     
Regionen mit gesetzgebenden 
Kompetenzen anderer EU-Mitgliedsstaaten 
    
Regionen ohne gesetzgebenden 
Kompetenzen anderer EU-Mitgliedsstaaten 
    
Gewinnorientierte Unternehmen     
Nicht-gewinnorientierte Unternehmen 
(NGOs…) 
    
Verbände, Gewerkschaften     
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C. Vorgehensweise bei Interessensvertretung 
 
1. Wie ist in Ihrem Aufgabenbereich die übliche Vorgehensweise, wenn die Europäische 
Kommission plant, einen Gesetzesvorschlag zu unterbreiten? 
 
2. Wie reagieren Sie auf unvorhergesehene Ereignisse in Ihrem Aufgabenbereich?  
Beispielsweise wird plötzlich eine bedeutende Position aus dem ursprünglichen 
Gesetzesvorschlag modifiziert, so dass daraus für Ihre Landesregierung Nachteile 
entstünden.  
 
3. Erachten Sie es für Ihren Aufgabenbereich als zwingend notwendig, zusätzlich zu den 
Bündnissen Ihre Interessen auch eigenständig den EU-Institutionen vorzutragen? Bitte 
begründen Sie Ihre Antwort! 
 
4. Was unterscheidet Sie von Lobbyorganisationen aus der Wirtschaft? Haben Sie 
gegenüber diesen Akteuren eher Vor- oder Nachteile vor den Entscheidungsträgern der 
EU-Institutionen?  
 
5. Welche Persone(n) innerhalb der folgenden Institutionen binden Sie speziell in Ihr 
Vorhaben mit ein? 
i. Kommission: 
ii. Rat: 
iii. Europäisches Parlament: 
 
6. Wie versuchen Sie Ihre Kontaktperson(en) von Ihrem Standpunkt zu überzeugen? Wie 
treten Sie mit ihnen in Kontakt?  
i. Kommission: 
ii. Rat: 
iii. Europäisches Parlament: 
 
 
D. Inklusion regionaler Bedürfnisse 
 
1. Berücksichtigen die Gesetzesvorschlägen der Europäischen Kommission in Ihrem 
Aufgabenfeld regionale Bedürfnisse genügend? 
i. Ja, in allen Fällen. 
ii. Ja, in vielen Fällen. 
iii. Ja, aber nur in wenigen Fällen. 
iv. Nein, in keinem Fall. 
 
2. Müssen Regionen in Ihrem Aufgabenfeld noch stärker in die EU-Gesetzgebungsprozesse 
mit einbezogen werden? Bitte begründen Sie Ihre Antwort! 
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3. Ist der Ausschuss der Regionen für die Inklusion regionaler Bedürfnisse von Nutzen? 
 
4. Gibt es noch andere Ausschüsse bzw. Gremien, die für die Interessenvertretung Ihrer 
Region in Ihrem Aufgabenfeld regelmäßig von Bedeutung sind?   
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Appendix B – Questionnaire (English version) 
 
 
University of Cologne 
Faculty of Economics and Social Science 
Jean Monnet Chair – Prof. Dr. W. Wessels 
 
Responsible for this research project: 
Dominik Göhmann 
 
Interest representation of German and British Regions in EU decision-
making: coalitions as crucial factor? 
 
This research project deals with the role of legislative regions in EU decision-making policy in 
three different policy areas and attempts to find out, if and how these actors shape EU politics. 
The aim is to uncover the importance of temporary coalitions in competition, education and 
environment. Due to capacity reasons, this research is limited to German and British regions.  
 
We would be very grateful if you are willing to participate in this project and answer the stated 
questions below. All data will be treated confidentially and are made anonymous. The final 
analysis will not contain individual but aggregated results so that one cannot connect the 
individual responses to the respective representation offices.   
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E. General information 
 
1. What is the official name of your office? 
 
 
2. For which policy fields are your responsible? 
 
 
F. Interactions in EU policy-processes 
 
1. Exchange of information 
Please indicate in the table below with which actors in your policy field you exchange 
important information in order to get your interests represented in the EU decision-
making process. This includes official and unofficial communication. Please differentiate 
between rare exchange of information (1), occasional exchange of information (2) and 
particularly frequent exchange of information (3).   
 
2. Frequency of coalition-building 
Please indicate in the table below with which actors in your policy field you cooperate 
and coordinate your actions in order to get your interests represented in the EU 
decision-making process. Please differentiate between rare exchange of information 
(1), occasional exchange of information (2) and particularly frequent exchange of 
information (3). 
 
3. Relevance 
Please indicate in the table below the relevance of potential coalition partners in your 
policy field in order to get your interests represented in the EU decision-making 
process. Please use a ranking: 1 stands for the most relevant and 7 for the most 
irrelevant actor. 
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Actor... 
Exchange of 
information  
Frequency of 
coalition- 
building 
Relevance of 
coalition 
partners 
European Commission   
European Parliament  
Council of Ministers  
Committee of the Regions  
National government     
Inner-state regions    
Regions with legislative competences in other EU 
Member States   
   
Regions without legislative competences in other 
EU Member States   
   
Profit-oriented companies    
Non-profit oriented organisations (NGOs…)    
Associations, unions    
 
4. Conditions for coalition-building  
What are the conditions for building a coalition with one of the above stated actors? 
 
 
5. Necessity of coalition-building 
Please indicate the necessity of cooperating and coordinating your actions with the 
stated actors in the table below in order to get your interests represented in the EU 
decision-making process. Please tick the respective cell.  
 
Necessity 
 
Actor... 
Yes, in all 
cases. 
Yes, in 
most cases. 
Yes, in a 
few 
cases. 
No, in no 
cases. 
National government     
Inner-state regions     
Regions with legislative competences in 
other EU Member States 
    
Regions without legislative competences in 
other EU Member States 
    
Profit-oriented companies     
Non-profit oriented organisations (NGOs…)     
Associations, unions     
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G. Procedures concerning interest representation 
 
1. What is the usual procedure in your policy field if the European Commission plans to 
initiate a legislative proposal? 
 
2. How do you respond to unforeseeable events in your policy field? For example, the 
Commission suddenly changes an important detail in the proposal which causes 
negative effects for your region.   
 
3. Do you think that in addition to coalition-building it is mandatory to present your 
interests individually to the EU institutions? Please provide reasons for your response! 
 
4. Where is the difference between you and economic lobby organisations? Compared to 
those actors, do you face advantages or disadvantages before the decision-makers in 
the EU institutions?   
 
5. With which officials do you establish contact in the following institutions?  
i. European Commission: 
ii. Council of Ministers: 
iii. European Parliament: 
 
6. How do you attempt to convince your contact persons from your point of view? How 
do you approach them?  
i. European Commission: 
ii. Council of Ministers: 
iii. European Parliament: 
 
H. Inclusion of regional concerns 
 
1. Does the European Commission include regional concerns in its legislative proposals in 
your policy field sufficiently? Please tick the respective line. 
i. Yes, in all cases. 
ii. Yes, in most cases. 
iii. Yes, but only in a few cases. 
iv. No, in no cases. 
 
2. Do you think that in your policy field regions need to be more included in the EU 
decision-making process? Please provide reasons for your response!  
 
3. Is the Committee of the Regions useful for including regional demands?  
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4. Are there any other committees that help you to get your interests accommodated on a 
regular basis?    
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Appendix C: Article 72, 73, 74 German Basic Law 
 
Article 72 
[Concurrent legislative powers] 
(1) On matters within the concurrent legislative power, the Länder shall have power to legislate 
so long as and to the extent that the Federation has not exercised its legislative power by 
enacting a law. 
(2) The Federation shall have the right to legislate on matters falling within clauses 4, 7, 11, 13, 
15, 19a, 20, 22, 25 and 26 of paragraph (1) of Article 74, if and to the extent that the 
establishment of equivalent living conditions throughout the federal territory or the 
maintenance of legal or economic unity renders federal regulation necessary in the national 
interest. 
(3) If the Federation has made use of its power to legislate, the Länder may enact laws at 
variance with this legislation with respect to: 
1.  hunting (except for the law on hunting licenses); 
2.  protection of nature and landscape management (except for the general principles 
governing the protection of nature, the law on protection of plant and animal species or the law 
on protection of marine life); 
3.  land distribution; 
4.  regional planning; 
5.  management of water resources (except for regulations related to materials or facilities); 
6.  admission to institutions of higher education and requirements for graduation in such 
institutions. 
Federal laws on these matters shall enter into force no earlier than six months following their 
promulgation unless otherwise provided with the consent of the Bundesrat. As for the 
relationship between federal law and law of the Länder, the latest law enacted shall take 
precedence with respect to matters within the scope of the first sentence. 
(4) A federal law may provide that federal legislation that is no longer necessary within the 
meaning of paragraph (2) of this Article may be superseded by Land law. 
 
Article 73 
[Matters under exclusive legislative power of the Federation] 
(1) The Federation shall have exclusive legislative power with respect to: 
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1.  foreign affairs and defence, including protection of the civilian population; 
2.  citizenship in the Federation; 
3.  freedom of movement, passports, residency registration and identity cards, immigration, emigration 
and extradition; 
4.  currency, money and coinage, weights and measures, and the determination of standards of time; 
5.  the unity of the customs and trading area, treaties regarding commerce and navigation, the free 
movement of goods, and the exchange of goods and payments with foreign countries, including customs 
and border protection; 
5a.  safeguarding German cultural assets against removal from the country; 
6.  air transport; 
6a.  the operation of railways wholly or predominantly owned by the Federation (federal railways), the 
construction, maintenance and operation of railroad lines belonging to federal railways, and the levying of 
charges for the use of these lines; 
7.  postal and telecommunications services; 
8.  the legal relations of persons employed by the Federation and by federal corporations under public 
law; 
9.  industrial property rights, copyrights and publishing; 
9a.  protection by the Federal Criminal Police Office against the dangers of international terrorism when 
a threat transcends the boundary of one Land, when the jurisdiction of a Land’s police authorities cannot 
be perceived, or when the highest authority of an individual Land requests the assumption of federal 
responsibility; 
10.  cooperation between the Federation and the Länder concerning 
a)  criminal police work, 
b)  protection of the free democratic basic order, existence and security of the Federation or of a Land 
(protection of the constitution), and 
c)  protection against activities within the federal territory which, by the use of force or preparations for 
the use of force, endanger the external interests of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
as well as the establishment of a Federal Criminal Police Office and international action to combat crime; 
11.  statistics for federal purposes; 
12.  the law on weapons and explosives; 
13.  benefits for persons disabled by war and for dependents of deceased war victims as well as 
assistance to former prisoners of war; 
14.  the production and utilisation of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the construction and 
operation of facilities serving such purposes, protection against hazards arising from the release of nuclear 
energy or from ionising radiation, and the disposal of radioactive substances. 
(2) Laws enacted pursuant to clause 9a of paragraph (1) require the consent of the Bundesrat. 
 
Article 74 
[Matters under concurrent legislative powers] 
(1) Concurrent legislative power shall extend to the following matters: 
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1.  civil law, criminal law, court organisation and procedure (except for the correctional law of 
pretrial detention), the legal profession, notaries, and the provision of legal advice; 
2.  registration of births, deaths and marriages; 
3.  the law of association; 
4.  the law relating to residence and establishment of foreign nationals; 
4a.  [repealed] 
5.  [repealed] 
6.  matters concerning refugees and expellees; 
7.  public welfare (except for the law on social care homes); 
8.  [repealed] 
9.  war damage and reparations; 
10.  war graves and graves of other victims of war or despotism; 
11.    the law relating to economic matters (mining, industry, energy, crafts, trades, 
commerce, banking, stock exchanges and private insurance), except for the law on shop closing 
hours, restaurants, game halls, display of individual persons, trade fairs, exhibitions and 
markets; 
11a.  [repealed] 
12.  labour law, including the organisation of enterprises, occupational health and safety, and 
employment agencies, as well as social security, including unemployment insurance; 
13.  the regulation of educational and training grants and the promotion of research; 
14.  the law regarding expropriation, to the extent relevant to matters enumerated in Articles 
73 and 74; 
15.  the transfer of land, natural resources, and means of production to public ownership or 
other forms of public enterprise; 
16.  prevention of the abuse of economic power; 
17.  the promotion of agricultural production and forestry (except for the law on land 
consolidation), ensuring the adequacy of food supply, the importation and exportation of 
agricultural and forestry products, deep-sea and coastal fishing, and preservation of the coasts; 
18.  urban real estate transactions, land law (except for laws regarding development fees), and 
the law on rental subsidies, subsidies for old debts, home building loan premiums, miners’ 
homebuilding and homesteading; 
19.  measures to combat human and animal diseases which pose a danger to the public or are 
communicable, admission to the medical profession and to ancillary professions or occupations, 
as well as the law on pharmacies, medicines, medical products, drugs, narcotics and poisons; 
19a.  the economic viability of hospitals and the regulation of hospital charges; 
20.  the law on food products including animals used in their production, the law on alcohol 
and tobacco, essential commodities and feedstuffs as well as protective measures in connection 
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with the marketing of agricultural and forest seeds and seedlings, the protection of plants 
against diseases and pests, as well as the protection of animals; 
21.  maritime and coastal shipping, as well as navigational aids, inland navigation, 
meteorological services, sea routes, and inland waterways used for general traffic; 
22.  road traffic, motor transport, construction and maintenance of long-distance highways, as 
well as the collection of tolls for the use of public highways by vehicles and the allocation of the 
revenue; 
23.  non-federal railways, except mountain railways; 
24.  waste disposal, air pollution control, and noise abatement (except for the protection from 
noise associated with human activity); 
25.  state liability; 
26.  medically assisted generation of human life, analysis and modification of genetic 
information as well as the regulation of organ, tissue and cell transplantation; 
27.  the statutory rights and duties of civil servants of the Länder, the municipalities and other 
corporations of public law as well as of the judges in the Länder, except for their career 
regulations, remuneration and pensions; 
28.  hunting; 
29.  protection of nature and landscape management; 
30.  land distribution; 
31.  regional planning; 
32.  management of water resources; 
33.  admission to institutions of higher education and requirements for graduation in such 
institutions. 
(2) Laws enacted pursuant to clauses 25 and 27 of paragraph (1) shall require the consent of the 
Bundesrat. 
 
